Margaret Bourke-White was a correspondent and photographer for LIFE magazine during the WW II years. In September 1947, White went to Pakistan. She met Jinnah and wrote about what she found and heard in her book Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949. The following are the excerpts:
Pakistan was one month old. Karachi was its mushrooming capital. On the sandy fringes of the city an enormous tent colony had grown up to house the influx of minor government officials. There was only one major government official, Mahomed Ali Jinnah, and there was no need for Jinnah to take to a tent. The huge marble and sandstone Government House, vacated by British officialdom, was waiting. The Quaid-i-Azam moved in, with his sister, Fatima, as hostess. Mr. Jinnah had put on what his critics called his "triple crown": he had made himself Governor-General; he was retaining the presidency of the Muslim League -- now Pakistan's only political party; and he was president of the country's lawmaking body, the Constituent Assembly.
"We never expected to get it so soon," Miss Fatima said when I called. "We never expected to get it in our lifetimes."
If Fatima's reaction was a glow of family pride, her brother's was a fever of ecstasy. Jinnah's deep-sunk eyes were pinpoints of excitement. His whole manner indicated that an almost overwhelming exaltation was racing through his veins. I had murmured some words of congratulation on his achievement in creating the world's largest Islamic nation.
"Oh, it's not just the largest Islamic nation. Pakistan is the fifth-largest nation in the world!"
The note of personal triumph was so unmistakable that I wondered how much thought he gave to the human cost: more Muslim lives had been sacrificed to create the new Muslim homeland than America, for example, had lost during the entire Second World War I hoped he had a constructive plan for the seventy million citizens of Pakistan. What kind of constitution did he intend to draw up?
"Of course it will be a democratic constitution; Islam is a democratic religion."
I ventured to suggest that the term "democracy" was often loosely used these days. Could he define what he had in mind?
"Democracy is not just a new thing we are learning," said Jinnah. "It is in our blood. We have always had our system of zakat -- our obligation to the poor."
This confusion of democracy with charity troubled me. I begged him to be more specific.
"Our Islamic ideas have been based on democracy and social justice since the thirteenth century."
This mention of the thirteenth century troubled me still more. Pakistan has other relics of the Middle Ages besides "social justice" -- the remnants of a feudal land system, for one. What would the new constitution do about that? "The land belongs to the God," says the Koran. This would need clarification in the constitution. Presumably Jinnah, the lawyer, would be just the person to correlate the "true Islamic principles" one heard so much about in Pakistan with the new nation's laws. But all he would tell me was that the constitution would be democratic because "the soil is perfectly fertile for democracy."
What plans did he have for the industrial development of the country? Did he hope to enlist technical or financial assistance from America?
"America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America," was Jinnah's reply. "Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed" -- he revolved his long forefinger in bony circles -- "the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves." He leaned toward me, dropping his voice to a confidential note. "Russia," confided Mr. Jinnah, "is not so very far away."
This had a familiar ring. In Jinnah's mind this brave new nation had no other claim on American friendship than this - that across a wild tumble of roadless mountain ranges lay the land of the Bolsheviks. I wondered whether the Quaid-i-Azam considered his new state only as an armoured buffer between opposing major powers. He was stressing America's military interest in other parts of the world. "America is now awakened," he said with a satisfied smile. Since the United States was now bolstering up Greece and Turkey, she should be much more interested in pouring money and arms into Pakistan. "If Russia walks in here," he concluded, "the whole world is menaced."
In the weeks to come I was to hear the Quaid-i-Azam's thesis echoed by government officials throughout Pakistan. "Surely America will build up our army," they would say to me. "Surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in." But when I asked whether there were any signs of Russian infiltration, they would reply almost sadly, as though sorry not to be able to make more of the argument. "No, Russia has shown no signs of being interested in Pakistan."
This hope of tapping the U. S. Treasury was voiced so persistently that one wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against Bolshevism or to bolster Pakistan's own uncertain position as a new political entity. Actually, I think, it was more nearly related to the even more significant bankruptcy of ideas in the new Muslim state -- a nation drawing its spurious warmth from the embers of an antique religious fanaticism, fanned into a new blaze.
Jinnah's most frequently used technique in the struggle for his new nation had been the playing of opponent against opponent. Evidently this technique was now to be extended into foreign policy. ....
No one would have been more astonished than Jinnah if he could have foreseen thirty or forty years earlier that anyone would ever speak of him as a "saviour of Islam." In those days any talk of religion brought a cynical smile. He condemned those who talked in terms of religious rivalries, and in the stirring period when the crusade for freedom began sweeping the country he was hailed as "the embodied symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity." The gifted Congresswoman, Mrs. Naidu, one of Jinnah's closest friends, wrote poems extolling his role as the great unifier in the fight for independence. "Perchance it is written in the book of the future," ran one of her tributes, "that he, in some terrible crisis of our national struggle, will pass into immortality" as the hero of "the Indian liberation."
In the "terrible crisis," Mahomed Ali Jinnah was to pass into immortality, not as the ambassador of unity, but as the deliberate apostle of discord. What caused this spectacular renunciation of the concept of a united India, to which he had dedicated the greater part of his life? No one knows exactly. The immediate occasion for the break, in the mid-thirties, was his opposition to Gandhi's civil disobedience program. Nehru says that Jinnah "disliked the crowds of ill-dressed people who filled the Congress" and was not at home with the new spirit rising among the common people under Gandhi's magnetic leadership. Others say it was against his legal conscience to accept Gandhi's program. One thing is certain: the break with Gandhi, Nehru, and the other Congress leaders was not caused by any Hindu-Muslim issue.
In any case, Jinnah revived the moribund Muslim League in 1936 after it had dragged through an anaemic thirty years' existence, and took to the religious soapbox. He began dinning into the ears of millions of Muslims the claim that they were downtrodden solely because of Hindu domination. During the years directly preceding this move on his part, an unprecedented degree of unity had developed between Muslims and Hindus in their struggle for independence from the British Raj. The British feared this unity, and used their divide-and-rule tactics to disrupt it. Certain highly placed Indians also feared unity, dreading a popular movement which would threaten their special position. Then another decisive factor arose. Although Hindus had always been ahead of Muslims in the industrial sphere, the great Muslim feudal landlords now had aspirations toward industry. From these wealthy Muslims, who resented the well-established Hindu competition, Jinnah drew his powerful supporters. One wonders whether Jinnah was fighting to free downtrodden Muslims from domination or merely to gain an earmarked area, free from competition, for this small and wealthy clan.
The trend of events in Pakistan would support the theory that Jinnah carried the banner of the Muslim landed aristocracy, rather than that of the Muslim masses he claimed to champion. There was no hint of personal material gain in this. Jinnah was known to be personally incorruptible, a virtue which gave him a great strength with both poor and rich. The drive for personal wealth played no part in his politics. It was a drive for power. ......
Less than three months after Pakistan became a nation, Jinnah's Olympian assurance had strangely withered. His altered condition was not made public. "The Quaid-i-Azam has a bad cold" was the answer given to inquiries.
Only those closest to him knew that the "cold" was accompanied by paralyzing inability to make even the smallest decisions, by sullen silences striped with outbursts of irritation, by a spiritual numbness concealing something close to panic underneath. I knew it only because I spent most of this trying period at Government House, attempting to take a new portrait of Jinnah for a Life cover.
The Quaid-i-Azam was still revered as a messiah and deliverer by most of his people. But the "Great Leader" himself could not fail to know that all was not well in his new creation, the nation; the nation that his critics referred to as the "House that Jinnah built." The separation from the main body of India had been in many ways an unrealistic one. Pakistan raised 75 per cent of the world's jute supply; the processing mills were all in India. Pakistan raised one third of the cotton of India, but it had only one thirtieth of the cotton mills. Although it produced the bulk of Indian skins and hides, all the leather tanneries were in South India. The new state had no paper mills, few iron foundries. Rail and road facilities, insufficient at best, were still choked with refugees. Pakistan has a superbly fertile soil, and its outstanding advantage is self-sufficiency in food, but this was threatened by the never-ending flood of refugees who continued pouring in long after the peak of the religious wars had passed.
With his burning devotion to his separate Islamic nation, Jinnah had taken all these formidable obstacles in his stride. But the blow that finally broke his spirit struck at the very name of Pakistan. While the literal meaning of the name is "Land of the Pure," the word is a compound of initial letters of the Muslim majority provinces which Jinnah had expected to incorporate: P for the Punjab, A for the Afghans' area on the Northwest Frontier, S for Sind, -tan for Baluchistan. But the K was missing.
Kashmir, India's largest princely state, despite its 77 per cent Muslim population, had not fallen into the arms of Pakistan by the sheer weight of religious majority. Kashmir had acceded to India, and although it was now the scene of an undeclared war between the two nations, the fitting of the K into Pakistan was left in doubt. With the beginning of this torturing anxiety over Kashmir, the Quaid-i-Azam's siege of bad colds began, and then his dismaying withdrawal into himself. ....
Later, reflecting on what I had seen, I decided that this desperation was due to causes far deeper than anxiety over Pakistan's territorial and economic difficulties. I think that the tortured appearance of Mr. Jinnah was an indication that, in these final months of his life, he was adding up his own balance sheet. Analytical, brilliant, and no bigot, he knew what he had done. Like Doctor Faustus, he had made a bargain from which he could never be free. During the heat of the struggle he had been willing to call on all the devilish forces of superstition, and now that his new nation had been achieved the bigots were in the position of authority. The leaders of orthodoxy and a few "old families" had the final word and, to perpetuate their power, were seeing to it that the people were held in the deadening grip of religious superstition.
credit: Margaret Bourke-White & her book Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949
Showing posts with label kashmir. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kashmir. Show all posts
Sunday, 11 October 2009
Sunday, 26 July 2009
Pak war hero honoured at India's recommendation
New Delhi: Pakistan army’s Colonel Karnal Sher Khan, who died during the Kargil war, is remembered with great pride.
The man who fought on Tiger Hill from Pakistan's side was given the Nishan e Haidar, Pakistan’s highest gallantry award on the recommendation of the Indian Army.
Captain K Sher Khan's brother Sikandar Sheikh says, “Allah ka shukar hai ki humara dushman bhi koi busdil dushman nahi hai. Agar log kahen ki India busdil hai to main kahunga nahi kyuki usne aelania keh diya ki karnel sher hero hai (No enemy is a coward. I won’t call India coward because it proclaimed Sher Khan as a hero).”
Captain Khan had led an assault to re-capture Tiger Hill soon after Indian troops had taken it and had lost his life in the process.
Ten years after Kargil, Karnal Sher Khan is a folk hero. His images visible everywhere, his native village has even been renamed after him.
Sikandar Sheikh says, "Ek game hai yeh. circikete ek game hai, Chakka mara..mara. Ye ek game hai. Cup milna hai bahadur ko. Cup Kernel Sher ko mila.aur wo bhi dushman ke kehe par (War’s a cricket game, but the winner has got the cup awarded by the opponent)."
On the other side too, valour was prized but the culture was different.
Instances of the Indian soldiers tortured as prisoners of war (PoW) by the Pakistani army can’t be forgotten easily.
However, captain Khan's family, unaware of the torture of Indian troops at Kargil, agree there must be a code of honour among warriors.
courtesy: defence.pk
The man who fought on Tiger Hill from Pakistan's side was given the Nishan e Haidar, Pakistan’s highest gallantry award on the recommendation of the Indian Army.
Captain K Sher Khan's brother Sikandar Sheikh says, “Allah ka shukar hai ki humara dushman bhi koi busdil dushman nahi hai. Agar log kahen ki India busdil hai to main kahunga nahi kyuki usne aelania keh diya ki karnel sher hero hai (No enemy is a coward. I won’t call India coward because it proclaimed Sher Khan as a hero).”
Captain Khan had led an assault to re-capture Tiger Hill soon after Indian troops had taken it and had lost his life in the process.
Ten years after Kargil, Karnal Sher Khan is a folk hero. His images visible everywhere, his native village has even been renamed after him.
Sikandar Sheikh says, "Ek game hai yeh. circikete ek game hai, Chakka mara..mara. Ye ek game hai. Cup milna hai bahadur ko. Cup Kernel Sher ko mila.aur wo bhi dushman ke kehe par (War’s a cricket game, but the winner has got the cup awarded by the opponent)."
On the other side too, valour was prized but the culture was different.
Instances of the Indian soldiers tortured as prisoners of war (PoW) by the Pakistani army can’t be forgotten easily.
However, captain Khan's family, unaware of the torture of Indian troops at Kargil, agree there must be a code of honour among warriors.
courtesy: defence.pk
Tuesday, 17 March 2009
Kargil War from the Donkeys mouth
KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE
Pakistani writings on Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is PAF airman's perspective, focusing on the IAF's air operations and the PAF's position.
Operational Planning in the PAF
Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF's appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF's hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.
The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF's 'corporate' decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.
The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF's operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.
In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot's career after repatriation and rose to command PAF's premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.
The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders' School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF's Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.
The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.
The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.
There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF's hierarchy was highly qualified and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.
First Rumblings
As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army's Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army's interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.
After hearing Gp Capt Tariq's report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army's ongoing 'review of contingency plans' required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the 'Kashmir Contingency'.
Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the 'latest situation in Kashmir' at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a 'protective manoeuvre', he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. "Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold," he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of 'providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir' was never mentioned.)
When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. "I have Stingers on every peak," he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud's reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link's vulnerability to our offensive elements.
It seemed from the Corps Commander's smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners' minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander's elucidation.
Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, "After this operation, it's going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!" as we walked out of the briefing room.
Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army's planning, though we were given to believe that it was a 'limited tactical action' in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.
IAF – By Fits & Starts
The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as 'Operation Safedsagar', commenced on 15 May with the bulk of operational assets positioned by 18 May. 150 combat aircraft were deployed as follows:
Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)
Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)
Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)
Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)
Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)
One-third of the aircraft were modern, 'high-threat' fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.
Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC. The salient feature of this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders' positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting 'interrogation' session.)
The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud's rant about a 'Stinger on every peak' seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis' glee.
The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded precision. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led it to be even more cautious.
By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 'technical violations' (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.
The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable for Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.
The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.
While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.
PAF in a Bind
From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF's intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.
Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najib Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najib had an excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy's Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with the help of some courageous flying by Army Aviation pilots. With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.
To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.
While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF's minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.
F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be 'rationalised', a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staff's minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.
Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAF's lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.
It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.
In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to 'equal the match'. Might it strike to some that PAF's restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?
Aftermath
It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the Chief of Army Staff (COAS): General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA): Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio's self-serving presentation.
In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly 'capture' territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman's attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.
In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their 'star-spangled' universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the '65 and '71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters ('devil's advocates', if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.
Tailpiece
Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff in 2001, President Musharraf struck at PAF's top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the appointment of service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi's rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior General Musharraf particularly during Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could order around like one of his Corps Commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus'haf was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF's interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that PAF's precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.
Pakistani writings on Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is PAF airman's perspective, focusing on the IAF's air operations and the PAF's position.
Operational Planning in the PAF
Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF's appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF's hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.
The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF's 'corporate' decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.
The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF's operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.
In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot's career after repatriation and rose to command PAF's premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.
The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders' School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF's Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.
The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.
The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.
There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF's hierarchy was highly qualified and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.
First Rumblings
As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army's Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army's interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.
After hearing Gp Capt Tariq's report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army's ongoing 'review of contingency plans' required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the 'Kashmir Contingency'.
Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the 'latest situation in Kashmir' at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a 'protective manoeuvre', he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. "Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold," he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of 'providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir' was never mentioned.)
When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. "I have Stingers on every peak," he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud's reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link's vulnerability to our offensive elements.
It seemed from the Corps Commander's smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners' minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander's elucidation.
Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, "After this operation, it's going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!" as we walked out of the briefing room.
Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army's planning, though we were given to believe that it was a 'limited tactical action' in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.
IAF – By Fits & Starts
The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as 'Operation Safedsagar', commenced on 15 May with the bulk of operational assets positioned by 18 May. 150 combat aircraft were deployed as follows:
Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)
Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)
Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)
Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)
Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)
One-third of the aircraft were modern, 'high-threat' fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.
Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC. The salient feature of this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders' positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting 'interrogation' session.)
The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud's rant about a 'Stinger on every peak' seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis' glee.
The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded precision. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led it to be even more cautious.
By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 'technical violations' (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.
The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable for Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.
The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.
While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.
PAF in a Bind
From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF's intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.
Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najib Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najib had an excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy's Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with the help of some courageous flying by Army Aviation pilots. With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.
To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.
While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF's minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.
F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be 'rationalised', a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staff's minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.
Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAF's lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.
It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.
In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to 'equal the match'. Might it strike to some that PAF's restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?
Aftermath
It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the Chief of Army Staff (COAS): General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA): Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio's self-serving presentation.
In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly 'capture' territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman's attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.
In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their 'star-spangled' universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the '65 and '71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters ('devil's advocates', if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.
Tailpiece
Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff in 2001, President Musharraf struck at PAF's top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the appointment of service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi's rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior General Musharraf particularly during Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could order around like one of his Corps Commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus'haf was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF's interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that PAF's precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.
Wednesday, 17 September 2008
DELHI BOMB BLAST - 13 SEPTEMBER 2008 – COMMENT REPLY
Thanks to my learned friend who has put his comments on my blog about the Delhi Blasts. Let me clarify some things on what I wrote, firstly none of the people whom I criticised is a constitutional authority. P.C Halder and Home Minster form the bureaucracy/executive. Only people in the position like the President of India or the Governor of a State or the Election Commissioner or the Judges of Supreme Courts are constitutional authorities. Even if they were constitutional authorities, why should we not be able to criticise their conduct. Look at what the courts have said about the family of the President, there are cases of first degree murder on the immediate family members of the president and we should allow such people to hide behind the cloak of not criticising any constitutional authority. Look at the cases of the judges of the Ghaziabad courts defrauding the lowest rung employees of their life’s saving (P.F Scam). Our motto should be the one that I have taken from an American Security Organisation - IN GOD WE TRUST, ALL OTHERS WE INTERCEPT. No one is above the law and that too when people’s lives are involved.
Secondly, again I was tagged along with a few million eunuchs who ran away, from where I do not know but if this blog commentator person is referring about the Kashmiri Migrants, well at least I and my community are clearly on one side and not like other Kashmiri’s who are still in the valley and chant Pro India slogans when they come begging for their monthly cash dole and anti India slogans when they reach back in the valley. My close family, friends as also the wider community to which I belong have been working in the government and security forces trying to fight terror not only in the Valley but in other parts of India (and around the world too). Lots of our community boys have laid down their lives fighting terrorist in the valley and more so like I have said before, our community does not need any certificate from anyone for our patriotic feelings; it is the others who need to show where they belong too; India or Jhootistan. Where ever our community has gone it has always raised the bar as far education and other activities is concerned. Look at the valley, even today thousands of kashmiri muslims send their kids outside of the valley so that they get some good education. This was not an inborn phenomenon as the Kashmiri muslims were deprived from good education before the Indian independence. Whatever mass Kashmiri education came in the valley was only after Bakshi’s saw that the biggest reason that the pundits did well for themselves was their strong emphasis on education. Look at the scenario today, the same things the pundits have done to the Jammu region as well. There is a mass education movement on and what is different from the previous times is that the dogra boys and girls are pushing for higher studies and not stopping at graduation. Jammu has witnesses an exceptional boom in their economy after the migration 1989-90 and lots can be attributed to the Pandits. As a community we have always pushing more on education and less on guns. Imagine the situation in valley now and see where Jammu is today, Valleys loss is Jammu’s gain. Pandits are not pickpockets or rapist but educationist and they have shown that in Jammu. I again say look at the valley and look at Jammu.
Thirdly as far as our identity is concerned, well it will be preserved come what may. That is protection that any Indian will get in our country, unfortunately people who have been fed on Jhootistan propaganda know very little of this. I really hope that the government of India freely opens up the muzzafarabad route for both trade and people to people contact so that people on the Valley realise that there the original state subjects of P.O.K have been put in a minority in their own state by the Punjabi’s through the Pakistani army’s ex servicemen rehab scheme. Better still has been done in Northern Areas – Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Shia’s after their rebellion during Zia’s tenure were brutally hacked and driven out of their land. The shia’s have been revolting frequently against this inhuman treatment in more than one way, Zia’s death is also blamed on a Shia airmen who came from the northern areas. In contrast if there is some semblance in P.O.K area (due to its propaganda nature), the northern areas are a black hole. There is no government and the only authority that people know is the Army and the I.S.I. Look in one of my previous blogs and you would see what Baloch’s say about Pakistan and how their leaders are treated by the Pak army and the ISI and we on the other hand pay for the medical treatment of Kashmiri separatist leaders. Helping some in need is the Indian ethos but let it not be known that Kashmiri’s are thankless people. Indian ethos stems from the old proverb that a fruit bearing tree is always bent downwards, so we need to be humble for all the acts that we do but the other side should not see that as our weakness.
Kashmiri people in the valley should see this and realise that what their ancestors did during the 1948 Pakistani - Kabaili raid was because they saw through the designs of Jhootistan. Today 99% of the valley folk would not know that today’s Lal chowk in Srinagar infamous for grenade attacks was actually the place where Pakistani - Kabaili’s who were caught by the JK Militia were publically executed in that square. As I have said before that an entire generation has grown up in the valley without any knowledge of their history and only knowing the Nizam e Mustafa that has been enforced privately since 1989.
p.s – Just got a post asking if I am in the army, Please NO. That was a typo error which I realised after I published it. I am a common Indian citizen who is in a private organisation and that is the reason that I do not write under my name. As for hunting down is concerned, well house to house search is common in all law and order manuals all around the world. In the recent muslim youth riots within Denmark, the police used the same techniques to quell the riots. The 2006 Paris immigrant riots were quelled by the French police only after a house to house raid at the Picasso estate area of Paris. In the 2000 BNP-South Asian riots, the Leeds, Leicester, bradford and other police forces in the U.K used house to house searches and identity parades to fight this menace. What we need to remember that community needs to be involved in such mass exercises and educated on the need for the same.
Also please do not publish hearsay stories about the truckers and this donation. Please all of it is based on hearsay - Half truths and full lies and lots of rumours. Lots of people have called saying that on the 6th October, Geelani is going to declare Independence after the Id namaz and Pakistan, Bangladesh and some other Muslim nations will recognise it. All this has stemmed from just one statement of Zardari at his swearing in press conference that something is going to be done within a month. Lots of our friends who are honest, secular Kashmiri’s (including Minority shia’s) have called our relatives to enquire if such reports were true. Ha Ha Ha.
Please we cannot be bogged down by half truths and full lies and lots of rumours. Please there is so much to do, there are so many people suffering and if we the lucky few who are blessed with good education and support waste our time on 400 acres of Land then there is nothing sadder to say. The faster that issue is over the better it is, we have family ties with so many kashmiri muslims that it is amazing that we have allowed the situation to reach such a turn. The main culprits are the leaders of the valley and then Jammu. Now if there are any bad feelings talk it across and clear it up. We would meet each other again and then as a saying goes – Hate a person but not so much that next time you meet, you would have to lower your eyes in shame.
My strength and that of this nation comes from our democracy. My personal motto IN GOD WE TRUST, ALL OTHERS WE INTERCEPT gives me the freedom to criticise our own bad politicians, our own gods, our holy books which have some negative references and it is because of this freedom I still say that GOD BLESS INDIA. This great country of 5000 years, of a book of knowledge of Rig Veda and it has managed to retain its roots. It is amazing and nothing else. The more I have read about the ethos that defined this nation even in 1947, the more I respect it. The debates in the constituents assembly before the constitution was passed are iconic and should be read by one and all as to why we call this nation as great and why I will stand by each and every letter of the same.
More later.
Secondly, again I was tagged along with a few million eunuchs who ran away, from where I do not know but if this blog commentator person is referring about the Kashmiri Migrants, well at least I and my community are clearly on one side and not like other Kashmiri’s who are still in the valley and chant Pro India slogans when they come begging for their monthly cash dole and anti India slogans when they reach back in the valley. My close family, friends as also the wider community to which I belong have been working in the government and security forces trying to fight terror not only in the Valley but in other parts of India (and around the world too). Lots of our community boys have laid down their lives fighting terrorist in the valley and more so like I have said before, our community does not need any certificate from anyone for our patriotic feelings; it is the others who need to show where they belong too; India or Jhootistan. Where ever our community has gone it has always raised the bar as far education and other activities is concerned. Look at the valley, even today thousands of kashmiri muslims send their kids outside of the valley so that they get some good education. This was not an inborn phenomenon as the Kashmiri muslims were deprived from good education before the Indian independence. Whatever mass Kashmiri education came in the valley was only after Bakshi’s saw that the biggest reason that the pundits did well for themselves was their strong emphasis on education. Look at the scenario today, the same things the pundits have done to the Jammu region as well. There is a mass education movement on and what is different from the previous times is that the dogra boys and girls are pushing for higher studies and not stopping at graduation. Jammu has witnesses an exceptional boom in their economy after the migration 1989-90 and lots can be attributed to the Pandits. As a community we have always pushing more on education and less on guns. Imagine the situation in valley now and see where Jammu is today, Valleys loss is Jammu’s gain. Pandits are not pickpockets or rapist but educationist and they have shown that in Jammu. I again say look at the valley and look at Jammu.
Thirdly as far as our identity is concerned, well it will be preserved come what may. That is protection that any Indian will get in our country, unfortunately people who have been fed on Jhootistan propaganda know very little of this. I really hope that the government of India freely opens up the muzzafarabad route for both trade and people to people contact so that people on the Valley realise that there the original state subjects of P.O.K have been put in a minority in their own state by the Punjabi’s through the Pakistani army’s ex servicemen rehab scheme. Better still has been done in Northern Areas – Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Shia’s after their rebellion during Zia’s tenure were brutally hacked and driven out of their land. The shia’s have been revolting frequently against this inhuman treatment in more than one way, Zia’s death is also blamed on a Shia airmen who came from the northern areas. In contrast if there is some semblance in P.O.K area (due to its propaganda nature), the northern areas are a black hole. There is no government and the only authority that people know is the Army and the I.S.I. Look in one of my previous blogs and you would see what Baloch’s say about Pakistan and how their leaders are treated by the Pak army and the ISI and we on the other hand pay for the medical treatment of Kashmiri separatist leaders. Helping some in need is the Indian ethos but let it not be known that Kashmiri’s are thankless people. Indian ethos stems from the old proverb that a fruit bearing tree is always bent downwards, so we need to be humble for all the acts that we do but the other side should not see that as our weakness.
Kashmiri people in the valley should see this and realise that what their ancestors did during the 1948 Pakistani - Kabaili raid was because they saw through the designs of Jhootistan. Today 99% of the valley folk would not know that today’s Lal chowk in Srinagar infamous for grenade attacks was actually the place where Pakistani - Kabaili’s who were caught by the JK Militia were publically executed in that square. As I have said before that an entire generation has grown up in the valley without any knowledge of their history and only knowing the Nizam e Mustafa that has been enforced privately since 1989.
p.s – Just got a post asking if I am in the army, Please NO. That was a typo error which I realised after I published it. I am a common Indian citizen who is in a private organisation and that is the reason that I do not write under my name. As for hunting down is concerned, well house to house search is common in all law and order manuals all around the world. In the recent muslim youth riots within Denmark, the police used the same techniques to quell the riots. The 2006 Paris immigrant riots were quelled by the French police only after a house to house raid at the Picasso estate area of Paris. In the 2000 BNP-South Asian riots, the Leeds, Leicester, bradford and other police forces in the U.K used house to house searches and identity parades to fight this menace. What we need to remember that community needs to be involved in such mass exercises and educated on the need for the same.
Also please do not publish hearsay stories about the truckers and this donation. Please all of it is based on hearsay - Half truths and full lies and lots of rumours. Lots of people have called saying that on the 6th October, Geelani is going to declare Independence after the Id namaz and Pakistan, Bangladesh and some other Muslim nations will recognise it. All this has stemmed from just one statement of Zardari at his swearing in press conference that something is going to be done within a month. Lots of our friends who are honest, secular Kashmiri’s (including Minority shia’s) have called our relatives to enquire if such reports were true. Ha Ha Ha.
Please we cannot be bogged down by half truths and full lies and lots of rumours. Please there is so much to do, there are so many people suffering and if we the lucky few who are blessed with good education and support waste our time on 400 acres of Land then there is nothing sadder to say. The faster that issue is over the better it is, we have family ties with so many kashmiri muslims that it is amazing that we have allowed the situation to reach such a turn. The main culprits are the leaders of the valley and then Jammu. Now if there are any bad feelings talk it across and clear it up. We would meet each other again and then as a saying goes – Hate a person but not so much that next time you meet, you would have to lower your eyes in shame.
My strength and that of this nation comes from our democracy. My personal motto IN GOD WE TRUST, ALL OTHERS WE INTERCEPT gives me the freedom to criticise our own bad politicians, our own gods, our holy books which have some negative references and it is because of this freedom I still say that GOD BLESS INDIA. This great country of 5000 years, of a book of knowledge of Rig Veda and it has managed to retain its roots. It is amazing and nothing else. The more I have read about the ethos that defined this nation even in 1947, the more I respect it. The debates in the constituents assembly before the constitution was passed are iconic and should be read by one and all as to why we call this nation as great and why I will stand by each and every letter of the same.
More later.
Tuesday, 9 September 2008
KASHMIR - J.K POLICE and CRPF Actions
Last month a strange thing happened, as i was all geared up to write a blog on the C.R.P.F’s handling of the current turmoil in the valley, i found that there were 5 comments by an unidentified blogger commenting on the same topic. In the last few days I have been troubled by the pathetic handling of the situation by 3 different parties, the central government, the governor and the CRPF. Today I would like to keep my focus on C.R.P.F’s handling of the valley situation and leave the other 2 characters for a later date.
Firstly, I would like the readers to go through my previous blog on police reforms and see this as a continuation of the same. Firstly it is my firm belief that the Local Police and the CRPF is the worst that the Indian state has to offer to the citizens. What creates my view is seeing their conduct from both historical and contemporary perspective in the valley as in the rest of India. This time my views are also supported by the fact that people on both sides of the Pir Panjal are unhappy with the handling of the situation by both the Local Police and the CRPF.
First let us the talk of the Police actions in Jammu, when Kuldeep Kumar Dogra died due to the intake of a poisonous substance at a rally in Jammu, the police in connivance with the hospital staff managed to smuggle out his body from the morgue and were trying to cremate it by putting it on fire using discarded car and truck tyres. They would have succeeded in the same had it not been for a passing sadhu who raised an alarm and alerted the local population of that area. This desecration of the mortal remains of a person killed during the agitation was the second big booster to the ongoing agitation; the first being Omar Abdullah’s parliament speech. Maybe the police as also Omar might have thought that the act would pass off as a regular police action or for Omar a freedom of speech. What both forgot is the fact that most of the Indians generally will forgive millions of acts that are perceived as not correct but something’s are generally non negotiable. These two were part of that which is termed as non negotiable especially when the scenario is as tense as it is now. We should not ignore the basic premise that people anywhere in India have a right to demonstrate. Why the extra judicial killing or the rallies there after Kashmir do not shake the national conscious is due to the fact that such rallies turn into a Pro Pakistani Pro Azaadi rallies. What amazes people in other parts of India is the condition that Pakistan is itself in. The kind of extra judicial killings that are being committed by each and every concerned (or unconcerned) party including government, ISI, Pakistan Army, US Army, CIA and many more is simply ignored. This added to the fact that Pakistani generals take money from CIA after each “terrorist” captured or killed or even after each “Predator” strike. This is quietly ignored by the people lecturing the common people in the Valley. Just because Justice Ifthkar Chaudhury the CJ of Pakistan Supreme Court wanted some sort of accountability from the government on these killing that emergency was imposed in Pakistan. This is the level to which our Jhootistan neighbour can go to hide their extra judicial killing machinery. So the less the valley and in particular Geelani talk about their undying love for the land of the pure the better it would be.
Now let us look at the CRPF, well this force is probably the most untrained, unmotivated, ill equipped and over utilised forces that the union of India has. There is no system of governance or leadership that exists in that force. The officers that command the frontline soldiers are mainly from the ranks whose training and leadership skills are suspect and the only reason of their promotion from the ranks is the length of service and their Annual Confidential Report. This is absurd as the basic criteria for a leader of soldiers is to have leadership qualities either in born in him or been trained to have them. This ACR driven promotion business works well in bureaucracy but not in forces either military or Para military. The best part is that hardly anyone understands the basic problems of the force and the main thrust for any so called correction in the force usually ends up creating more posts for I.P.S officers at the CRPF Hqrs in Delhi.
Looking specifically at the valley and the CRPF reaction, well the same things happened when B.S.F took charge of the valley. They used all kinds of trials and error methods to strengthen their grip in the valley. They had very few positives in their method of operations and even those were lacked by the CRPF. The biggest problem comes from the fact that Para military units do not have a fully vetted counter insurgency manual. This coupled with the unfamiliarity of working in new operational setup like CI Grid or using collateral Damage Avoidance procedures and Lack of adequate weaponry or training has created the situation which will take its toll not only on the people of the valley but also on the CRPF men and women who work there. Today the BSF may laugh and say that they had told the home ministry that CRPF is not equipped to handle the CI grid in the valley as the premier force along with the JK police but the fact of the matter is that BSF had itself been a totally disjointed and ill equipped force when it landed in the valley. They picked up after a long and painful period in which they used draconian methods like their PAPA ONE interrogation centre, capture, death and the brutal skinning of some BSF men in the villages of Kashmir, number of terrorist attacks at key installations in spite of having their own intelligence wing – the G branch cannot be forgotten. Also R.A.F was created out of the CRPF to handle such situations and again it has not been used in the valley. This act is unpardonable as it makes the Home Ministry suspect in the eyes of all the people who know the effectiveness of the R.A.F. I guess you cannot expect much from this home minister who is in a way there because MADAM likes meo cats and not roaring tigers in the Home Ministry. I guess as any other law abiding citizen of the country it is a matter of shame that we have to use illogical force on people who have a right to demonstrate. I might have a difference in opinion from the people who demonstrate but it cannot take away their rights. All peaceful agitations must and need to be promoted in all over India, however when they threaten life and limb – please use all modern methods minus firing to stop them. Crowd control is something that a lot of research is going on in Europe and lessons can be learnt from them. Use of dye coloured water, video recording of the event, issuance of criminal record on the person and the threat of dismissal from service can be used as more humane and civilised ways to control a crowd. The faster we move from the British methods of General Dyer, the better it will be for our nation.
Being a devil’s advocate, firstly it is not easy being CRPF trooper in India and more so currently in the Valley. They have no system of training either on induction or during their tenure. Their units are moved not as battalions but as companies. This goes against the basic tenets of any general duty force which 90% of the CRPF belongs to. Although comparisons are tough but a general duty force on a CI grid like the Indian Army infantry units on the other hand move only in battalion strength, making it easier to manage command and logistical issues. This added to the fact that army can use its own engineering or supply regiments to arrange for accommodation or other logistical matters which the CRPF lacks. Most of the times the CRPF moves to their designated location even before the CPWD which is tasked to help them in issues of accommodation start putting out tender notices. CPWD’s speed even at the best of the times is to wake up only after a couple of weeks of deployment have passed. The only Army units that work on company strength are specialised units like Engineers, medics, Bomb disposal and dog squads and those too within their command. In the CRPF it can happen that the commanding officer is in Kashmir and his 2 companies would have been airlifted for a deployment in Kerala. This deployment of the 2 companies of the CRPF is for infinite time leaving a complete sense of disarray in the battalion. The state government which request for these men and women do not want to relieve these units leaving even further disarray as far as the operational, leave and training requirements of that particular battalion are concerned. The charter of these men and women is just not defined making them tools in the hands of state governments. Then same company or even the battalion could be one day used for polling booths, next day for anti electricity theft operations, next day land clearing operations, next day for rally, then next day for VIP bandobast, the next day in anti naxal operations and finally to flush out heavily armed terrorist from some house in the valley. Please have a look at the quality of food of the CRPF men and women, their tents, their weapons, their duty hours, their nature of duties, their motivations and one will can easily understand why this force is totally out of the sync with the methods to be adopted in the valley. Which force can do all that? Is it humanly possible to do all this and then remain sane and think logically? How many of the CRPF DG’s have worked at the level of SP and below for more than 10 years in the force? Please read my previous blog on police reforms to understand the crux of this problem and maybe it’s possible solutions.
I have myself seen one of their ROP (road opening party) methods in Jammu division and all myself and a friend of mine (whose is in the army) could do is to hold our heads in disgust. The entire CRPF company had no arrangement for transportation or accommodation of the men and each of their boys were carrying their own gun, holdall, bucket, sticks and trunks. All this was on a road that was a very strategic road which terrorist were using as their main crossing point between P.O.K and Doda (for their onward movement to the valley from south Kashmir). This lacklustre approach was when there was a specific threat that the terrorist were thinking of ambushing forces on that road and Army (which was earlier doing the ROP) was relieved to make way for some clearing operations in the higher reaches of those hills to thwart such an attack. The next day Army had to spare some of its men to augment the CRPF ROP as the brigadier of that sector had no trust on the ROP abilities of the CRPF (as the road was also used by Army conveys). This example is only to illustrate the frustration of all the concerned parties in such a scenario.
There is no short cut to arranging leadership of troops. It is a very painful process that even the Indian Army is discovering given the drop in quality of people applying for the officer’s rank. I do not say the Indian Army is perfect and all other forces are fools but the fact of the matter is that the Army is able to adapt faster to such changes. The army is backed by schools for its troops like CI ops schools, High altitude schools, etc which the other forces do not have. They can rotate their troops from peace to active duty which CRPF cannot do; they have a system of no carry forward leave (all troops under the home ministry have that) which enables them to retain a minimum level of force for deployment. Small measures like splitting the very generalised of this force can help create a better CRPF.
All this is no sympathy for the near and dear ones of people who suffer due to such an action. This debate to re invent the CRPF and also the Indian police forces must be pushed to its logical end otherwise if today it is Kashmir, tomorrow it can be any other Indian City.
Firstly, I would like the readers to go through my previous blog on police reforms and see this as a continuation of the same. Firstly it is my firm belief that the Local Police and the CRPF is the worst that the Indian state has to offer to the citizens. What creates my view is seeing their conduct from both historical and contemporary perspective in the valley as in the rest of India. This time my views are also supported by the fact that people on both sides of the Pir Panjal are unhappy with the handling of the situation by both the Local Police and the CRPF.
First let us the talk of the Police actions in Jammu, when Kuldeep Kumar Dogra died due to the intake of a poisonous substance at a rally in Jammu, the police in connivance with the hospital staff managed to smuggle out his body from the morgue and were trying to cremate it by putting it on fire using discarded car and truck tyres. They would have succeeded in the same had it not been for a passing sadhu who raised an alarm and alerted the local population of that area. This desecration of the mortal remains of a person killed during the agitation was the second big booster to the ongoing agitation; the first being Omar Abdullah’s parliament speech. Maybe the police as also Omar might have thought that the act would pass off as a regular police action or for Omar a freedom of speech. What both forgot is the fact that most of the Indians generally will forgive millions of acts that are perceived as not correct but something’s are generally non negotiable. These two were part of that which is termed as non negotiable especially when the scenario is as tense as it is now. We should not ignore the basic premise that people anywhere in India have a right to demonstrate. Why the extra judicial killing or the rallies there after Kashmir do not shake the national conscious is due to the fact that such rallies turn into a Pro Pakistani Pro Azaadi rallies. What amazes people in other parts of India is the condition that Pakistan is itself in. The kind of extra judicial killings that are being committed by each and every concerned (or unconcerned) party including government, ISI, Pakistan Army, US Army, CIA and many more is simply ignored. This added to the fact that Pakistani generals take money from CIA after each “terrorist” captured or killed or even after each “Predator” strike. This is quietly ignored by the people lecturing the common people in the Valley. Just because Justice Ifthkar Chaudhury the CJ of Pakistan Supreme Court wanted some sort of accountability from the government on these killing that emergency was imposed in Pakistan. This is the level to which our Jhootistan neighbour can go to hide their extra judicial killing machinery. So the less the valley and in particular Geelani talk about their undying love for the land of the pure the better it would be.
Now let us look at the CRPF, well this force is probably the most untrained, unmotivated, ill equipped and over utilised forces that the union of India has. There is no system of governance or leadership that exists in that force. The officers that command the frontline soldiers are mainly from the ranks whose training and leadership skills are suspect and the only reason of their promotion from the ranks is the length of service and their Annual Confidential Report. This is absurd as the basic criteria for a leader of soldiers is to have leadership qualities either in born in him or been trained to have them. This ACR driven promotion business works well in bureaucracy but not in forces either military or Para military. The best part is that hardly anyone understands the basic problems of the force and the main thrust for any so called correction in the force usually ends up creating more posts for I.P.S officers at the CRPF Hqrs in Delhi.
Looking specifically at the valley and the CRPF reaction, well the same things happened when B.S.F took charge of the valley. They used all kinds of trials and error methods to strengthen their grip in the valley. They had very few positives in their method of operations and even those were lacked by the CRPF. The biggest problem comes from the fact that Para military units do not have a fully vetted counter insurgency manual. This coupled with the unfamiliarity of working in new operational setup like CI Grid or using collateral Damage Avoidance procedures and Lack of adequate weaponry or training has created the situation which will take its toll not only on the people of the valley but also on the CRPF men and women who work there. Today the BSF may laugh and say that they had told the home ministry that CRPF is not equipped to handle the CI grid in the valley as the premier force along with the JK police but the fact of the matter is that BSF had itself been a totally disjointed and ill equipped force when it landed in the valley. They picked up after a long and painful period in which they used draconian methods like their PAPA ONE interrogation centre, capture, death and the brutal skinning of some BSF men in the villages of Kashmir, number of terrorist attacks at key installations in spite of having their own intelligence wing – the G branch cannot be forgotten. Also R.A.F was created out of the CRPF to handle such situations and again it has not been used in the valley. This act is unpardonable as it makes the Home Ministry suspect in the eyes of all the people who know the effectiveness of the R.A.F. I guess you cannot expect much from this home minister who is in a way there because MADAM likes meo cats and not roaring tigers in the Home Ministry. I guess as any other law abiding citizen of the country it is a matter of shame that we have to use illogical force on people who have a right to demonstrate. I might have a difference in opinion from the people who demonstrate but it cannot take away their rights. All peaceful agitations must and need to be promoted in all over India, however when they threaten life and limb – please use all modern methods minus firing to stop them. Crowd control is something that a lot of research is going on in Europe and lessons can be learnt from them. Use of dye coloured water, video recording of the event, issuance of criminal record on the person and the threat of dismissal from service can be used as more humane and civilised ways to control a crowd. The faster we move from the British methods of General Dyer, the better it will be for our nation.
Being a devil’s advocate, firstly it is not easy being CRPF trooper in India and more so currently in the Valley. They have no system of training either on induction or during their tenure. Their units are moved not as battalions but as companies. This goes against the basic tenets of any general duty force which 90% of the CRPF belongs to. Although comparisons are tough but a general duty force on a CI grid like the Indian Army infantry units on the other hand move only in battalion strength, making it easier to manage command and logistical issues. This added to the fact that army can use its own engineering or supply regiments to arrange for accommodation or other logistical matters which the CRPF lacks. Most of the times the CRPF moves to their designated location even before the CPWD which is tasked to help them in issues of accommodation start putting out tender notices. CPWD’s speed even at the best of the times is to wake up only after a couple of weeks of deployment have passed. The only Army units that work on company strength are specialised units like Engineers, medics, Bomb disposal and dog squads and those too within their command. In the CRPF it can happen that the commanding officer is in Kashmir and his 2 companies would have been airlifted for a deployment in Kerala. This deployment of the 2 companies of the CRPF is for infinite time leaving a complete sense of disarray in the battalion. The state government which request for these men and women do not want to relieve these units leaving even further disarray as far as the operational, leave and training requirements of that particular battalion are concerned. The charter of these men and women is just not defined making them tools in the hands of state governments. Then same company or even the battalion could be one day used for polling booths, next day for anti electricity theft operations, next day land clearing operations, next day for rally, then next day for VIP bandobast, the next day in anti naxal operations and finally to flush out heavily armed terrorist from some house in the valley. Please have a look at the quality of food of the CRPF men and women, their tents, their weapons, their duty hours, their nature of duties, their motivations and one will can easily understand why this force is totally out of the sync with the methods to be adopted in the valley. Which force can do all that? Is it humanly possible to do all this and then remain sane and think logically? How many of the CRPF DG’s have worked at the level of SP and below for more than 10 years in the force? Please read my previous blog on police reforms to understand the crux of this problem and maybe it’s possible solutions.
I have myself seen one of their ROP (road opening party) methods in Jammu division and all myself and a friend of mine (whose is in the army) could do is to hold our heads in disgust. The entire CRPF company had no arrangement for transportation or accommodation of the men and each of their boys were carrying their own gun, holdall, bucket, sticks and trunks. All this was on a road that was a very strategic road which terrorist were using as their main crossing point between P.O.K and Doda (for their onward movement to the valley from south Kashmir). This lacklustre approach was when there was a specific threat that the terrorist were thinking of ambushing forces on that road and Army (which was earlier doing the ROP) was relieved to make way for some clearing operations in the higher reaches of those hills to thwart such an attack. The next day Army had to spare some of its men to augment the CRPF ROP as the brigadier of that sector had no trust on the ROP abilities of the CRPF (as the road was also used by Army conveys). This example is only to illustrate the frustration of all the concerned parties in such a scenario.
There is no short cut to arranging leadership of troops. It is a very painful process that even the Indian Army is discovering given the drop in quality of people applying for the officer’s rank. I do not say the Indian Army is perfect and all other forces are fools but the fact of the matter is that the Army is able to adapt faster to such changes. The army is backed by schools for its troops like CI ops schools, High altitude schools, etc which the other forces do not have. They can rotate their troops from peace to active duty which CRPF cannot do; they have a system of no carry forward leave (all troops under the home ministry have that) which enables them to retain a minimum level of force for deployment. Small measures like splitting the very generalised of this force can help create a better CRPF.
All this is no sympathy for the near and dear ones of people who suffer due to such an action. This debate to re invent the CRPF and also the Indian police forces must be pushed to its logical end otherwise if today it is Kashmir, tomorrow it can be any other Indian City.
Tuesday, 2 September 2008
Hurrah - State of Pakistani Minorities
I dedicate this article to Mr. S.A Geelani and his band of terrorists in Kashmir
A Pakistani Sikh, who graduated from the Punjab University this year, has become the first from his community to receive a bachelor's degree from the prestigious institution since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.
Juswinder Singh, who passed his Bachelors in Arts (Honours) programme, now plans to do his Masters in Business Administration in finance from the same university.
Singh said he was proud of being the first Pakistani Sikh in the country's history to get a four-year degree from the Punjab University and demanded that seats be reserved for in the institution for religious minorities.
Bilateral relations between India and Pakistan should be strengthened as this would give an opportunity to Pakistani Sikhs to pursue education in India, Singh told the Daily Times newspaper.
Singh, who hails from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas was admitted to the University in 2004 on a seat reserved for students from the tribal belt.
He demanded that the government frame a policy on admitting minorities seeking admission to the university.
The Punjab University has reserved seats for children of army personnel, teachers and varsity employees and those who excel in sports and debate.
"They have also reserved seats for students coming from ATA, Waziristan and Balochistan, but no seat has been reserved for minorities," he said.
Singh said he enjoyed his time at the Punjab University and faced no discrimination throughout his stay.
"No one discriminated against me because of my religion and appearance during my four years at the university," he said.
credit: NDTV
p.s: Sorry for being so cynical about our neighbour Jhootistan
A Pakistani Sikh, who graduated from the Punjab University this year, has become the first from his community to receive a bachelor's degree from the prestigious institution since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.
Juswinder Singh, who passed his Bachelors in Arts (Honours) programme, now plans to do his Masters in Business Administration in finance from the same university.
Singh said he was proud of being the first Pakistani Sikh in the country's history to get a four-year degree from the Punjab University and demanded that seats be reserved for in the institution for religious minorities.
Bilateral relations between India and Pakistan should be strengthened as this would give an opportunity to Pakistani Sikhs to pursue education in India, Singh told the Daily Times newspaper.
Singh, who hails from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas was admitted to the University in 2004 on a seat reserved for students from the tribal belt.
He demanded that the government frame a policy on admitting minorities seeking admission to the university.
The Punjab University has reserved seats for children of army personnel, teachers and varsity employees and those who excel in sports and debate.
"They have also reserved seats for students coming from ATA, Waziristan and Balochistan, but no seat has been reserved for minorities," he said.
Singh said he enjoyed his time at the Punjab University and faced no discrimination throughout his stay.
"No one discriminated against me because of my religion and appearance during my four years at the university," he said.
credit: NDTV
p.s: Sorry for being so cynical about our neighbour Jhootistan
Sunday, 24 August 2008
Thursday, 14 August 2008
Amarnath Yatra Struggle - Reply
Hi Bloggers,
This is my repsonse to comments that i got from someone calling himself Indian Muslim. As you would see from his comments, his understanding of India and his ethos is very low. Please decide yourself.
This is my repsonse to comments that i got from someone calling himself Indian Muslim. As you would see from his comments, his understanding of India and his ethos is very low. Please decide yourself.
- Definition of Legend Oxford Concise English Dictionary: A traditional story popularly regarded as historical but which is not authenticated; Oxford Pocket English Dictionary: A traditional story from the past which may or may not be true
Definition of Puranas : eighteen ancient books consisting of legends and mythological narrations dealing with creation, recreation and the genealogies of sages and rulers
Definition of Mythology (Oxford Pocket English Dictionary): Set of widely held but exaggerated or false stories or beliefs.
Reply: Thanks for telling me the oxford pocket dictionary meaning of English words. I definitely need it given that I am on a temporary assignment in London.
Look my friend, matter of faith is never solved by oxford dictionary meanings.
Faith is something that you and I cannot comprehend. How can you define the fact when people travel to places like Kumb Mela or Perform Hajj and think that their soul will get cleansed by doing so? When holy books say that God create the world with Adam and Eve and Noah had an Arc through which he saved the world. You and I can discuss scientifically all this and maybe able reject these theories but for most it is a matter of faith and I as an Indian and that too a proud one – am committed to make sure that people are allowed to maintain that faith until it doesn’t harm my Nation. I am committed to the fact that our holy constitution has framed a system for all to practise the same and not to ridicule Holy Books like Veda’s or Puran’s or Quran or Bible. Can you scientifically prove anything written in these books? So it is your limited knowledge about other people and their religion and maybe including your own which prompts you to tell me the Oxford dictionary meaning of faith and mythology.
Faith is said to move mountains and that is all I can say.
2. Supported by Malik Family agreed. But who are the pony owners? Who give shelter to Yatris during storms? Who carry the old on their backs? For your information, they are all Muslims since you seem to have seen Kashmir only through the internet and through “mythological” stories.
Reply: Well I really did not know that 300,000 people stay with Pony wallah’s at their homes during storms. I do not think that in the snow storm on the yatra route in 1996, the 250 people who died were the ones who were left out of the pony owner houses. Please let us stop to dramatise the situation. Religions and people co exist and for multiple reasons, maybe trade and commerce, maybe faith. Leave it to them to run their lives like it is and create situations to smoothen the yatra. Take a look at what Jagmohan did for Vashino Devi Yatra and see how the vested interests tried to do what they are doing in the valley for the Amarnath yatra. Read his book “My Frozen Turbulence” and you get a better idea in your closed mindset.
3. Total No. of Kashmiri Muslims Killed (as per Govt. of India Statistics) since 1988 – 31,000
Total Number of Kashmiri Pandits Killed (as per your own blog): 361
It is grossly incorrect to term Kashmiri Muslims as terrorists. The statement “All terrorists are Kashmiri Muslims” can to an extent be a valid statement. But when you take the converse statement it is an utter violation of logical reasoning. The total Terrorist population by exaggerated estimates would be no more than 1% of the entire population.
Hence if you say Yatris were killed by Kashmiri Muslims, I suggest you go back to school and take a class in reasoning.
By the way, terrorists have no religion and have been misusing religion/race/creed since time immemorial across the world.
Reply: Deaths in a conflict zone are inevitable and as there are no Pandits left, it is the Muslims who would be on the death list. If there are 200,000 official guns of the security forces in the valley and 3500 terrorists, you can well imagine that killings would happen. Guns do not shoot out roses but deadly bullets. As far as who kills these people, well I cannot say Robots or Birds or Hunguls; it must be humans and if there are mostly one community there, it is some disgruntled elements from the same doing it on provocation of our friendly Jhootistan neighbour. Once peace returns in the valley and one day it will, the people in valley will understand that the cost they paid for all this violence was far greater than what they were promised by our friendly Jhootistan neighbour.
Also thanks for the school suggestion, will look into it.
4. SASB had only 8 Hindu members - Justice (Retd) G D Sharma, Prof Vishnu Murti Shastri, Sunil Sachdeva, Manoj Gaur, Dr Vimla Dhar, Professor Neerja Mattoo, Raghu Modi and Dr Arun Kumar. The people who did the actual work on field were all Kashmiri Muslims. Thus, to say that just 8 people managed a gathering of 300,000 people is absolutely ridiculous.
Reply: Does your oxford dictionary tell you about the word Governance or Leadership? There are only 40 Lt Generals in the Indian Army of 1 Million Men and Women. Does this that they do all the fighting or they are just to lead men without discriminating on any basis? I really do not believe in this hindu members in hindu shrines or muslim in muslim shrines. My simple yardstick is that if any Indian can lead an army battalion without any discrimination, why shrine boards can’t be run like same. We are not asking them to pray but to behave like a professional and work in his or her area of professional expertise to enhance the spiritual quest of the followers.
5. I absolutely agree with your statement. The primary aim of Pakistan is to destroy any and every system in India. They had been trying to disconnect the Valley from the rest of India for the past 20 years. When they didn’t succeed people in Jammu came to their aid. For God’s sake stop communalizing the whole issue.
Reply: How is it not communalised? Look the problem if it has to be tackled needs to be sorted head on. First accept that there is an insurgency and that too Muslim insurgency in India’s only Muslim majority state. Just by saying so does not make the personal communal. It is like older people in India never say the person has cancer but they always say that he has a bad illness – running away from the reality. There are number of questions that need to be asked: Why is the insurgency there? How has the Indian state treated Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh? How are the people doing vis a vis other parts of India and also P.O.K? How has the Indian Army ever operated in a counter insurgency operations in the valley before 1988? What was the crime rate in J&K before 1988 and what is it now? Why cannot the people in valley have this fascination for Jhootistan? As you have no idea of the valley; Pakistan Independence Day was celebrated and Indian Independence Day always had a strike call? Why Pakistani team victory was celebrated and not the Indian teams? As you have no idea of Kashmir, probably not coming from there, you are mostly like the Barkha Dutts of Indian Media, who are out of sync with the genesis of the problem. The minute Jammu came out for something it was turned communal and for 20 years valley people have driven out all minorities the situation was secular.
6. As in point No 4
7. I’m sorry but I’ll again say that Jagmohan was responsible for the unfortunate uprooting of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley. He planned to “cleanse” the Kasmiri separatists in an indiscriminate planned attack. He along with his agencies spread terror amongst the KPs and they used to send Military Trucks to aid the migration. Even today, 1100 KP families still live in the valley. Why did anyone not touch them?
Point 1: Well this is something that if you have not been there you are unable to comprehend. I cannot say much but just to tell you what land means to people in India is that 80% of cases in our courts pertain to Land & Housing. Why such a big number; the reason is that people are unwilling to part with their land or houses even when they are paid hefty amounts. You all would have seen scenes at narmada, nandigram and singur and that is a reflection on what happens if you taken someone out from your land even after paying them money. So pandits were fools to leave their homeland for living in tents because one gentleman had so much power to do that. Maybe we use Mr. Jagmohan for all such places like singur and nandigram.
Point 2. Even today, 1100 KP families still live in the valley. Why did anyone not touch them?
Wandhama massacre refers to the murder of Kashmiri Hindus in the town of Wandhama on January 1998.It was one of the worst incidences of violence against Kashmiri Pandits being carried out by terrorists in Kashmir. It was an illustration of the Kashmiri terrorist's policy of ethnic cleansing .The victims, all of them Hindus, included four children, nine women and 10 men.
Point 3. Military Trucks
Personal Story II: Well I would not like to go far but start with my own family. Our family resided at Karan Nagar locality in Sringar. On 20th of January when Farooq Abdullah had resigned and Mr. Jagmohan had not taken charge (when was no real government in place), the whole valley was shouting slogans like kashmiri pandits leave the valley but keep your women behind for us (translated), what will rule here – nizam e Mustafa, what to worship here holy quran and only quran…..what we need azaadi……there are some more but I really do not want to remember that period. All the newspapers were filled up of notices for KP and other secular people along with their pictures giving notices to them either embrace the movement or suffer death. Leave the valley or suffer death. Who was the person doing all that; people like bitta karate, Yasin malik and their likes. Slowly they started killing key KP people and that too at different localities across the city and the valley to create a feeling that terror had reached the doorsteps of the pandits. Then on the 21st Jan 90, all the mosques in the valley started making theses slogans from their loudspeakers and that went on till at least 2 more days. Similar slogans and that too simultaneously from all over the city. The Doordarshan was totally taken over by terrorist and was broadcasting their news (this was before the entire programming was transferred to Delhi-you might not know and neither it might have been in your oxford dictionary).
So the situation was really terrible and on 24th January, just 2 days before the Republic day; one of my cousins who had grown a beard, went to the batmaloo bus stand to look for a K.M.D (Kashmir Motor Drivers Association) bus to take us to Jammu. No one agreed as they need buses for the mass rally on the 26th where they were told to bring 10 Million people in total to enforce the blockade/strike on the 26th January 1990. Finally one driver agreed (charging 4 times the money) so the family started at 3.30 am in the morning loading 4 suit cases. It was all we took from a 4 storied house having 20 rooms. That was the last time we would see the house. All of the journey will banihal was undertaken sitting on the floor of the very cold bus between the seats. The driver was stopped at 1 or 2 places (even at 3.30 AM) but he told that his “duty” was to collect the people for the rally from banihal. Only once we crossed the tunnel did we get a chance to sit on our seats; 12 people in a bus for 65 people.
Personal Story II: Another cousin of mine (55 year old husband and wife) had come to Delhi in November 1989 during the winter break to meet their son. Learning that the situation was fast deteriorating in the valley for KP’s, my uncle decided that he needs to go back to collect some more clothes and some other valuables from his house. 2 days before he was to leave, our cousins in Jammu (who had moved out of the valley some days earlier) sent a copy of a newspaper having his picture with a warning for him to leave the Valley for good. That was the last he would ever think of visiting his house (nearly 200 year old house for nearly 4 generations – all left because of Mr. Jagmohan).
Anyhow, as half of my family and friends work in the Army/ Defence Forces, after 3 years of migration (in 1993) we could manage to arrange 1 small 407 truck (on a personal basis) with 2 escort trucks of CRPF men (as army cannot be used for all these jobs –so much for the military trucks of Mr. Jagmohan). My uncle’s was given exactly 25 minutes by the Asst Commandant of the CRPF to take his belongings from a house where his family had stayed for nearly 200 years. As my uncle stayed near Habba Kadal – and very near to a major terrorist leaders house (he now has turned hurriyat politician, the commandant did not want to anyone to know that we were vacating the house; so all lights were cut and my uncle and aunt was both given a burkah to wear and take away their 200 years old belongings in 25 minutes. As they went in their house of 200 years without electricity, they realised that it had already been used as a militant store house previously. The temple etc had been desecrated and so had some rooms. Anyways within 25 minutes (like a reality game show) they could gather 3 suitcases and that was the last they saw of their 4 generational home (Thanks to Mr. Jagmohan). Just for your information this uncle of mine is one of the top kashmiri writers whose Books and plays have something like a cult status in the valley for all Hindus and Muslims- who had nothing to do with either Jagmohan or Politics.
Sorry but I have yet to thank Mr. Jagmohan for helping us and also other KP’s with all this including military trucks.
Mr. Indian Muslim – please keep you logic with you. I and also any another KP does not need either your certificate in secularism or oxford dictionary meaning for any word.
Coming to issues at Jammu, we have heard all voices coming from Jammu and from Kashmir. The voices and actions from Jammu are categorically against Muslims to the extent that even houses of Gujjars are being destroyed and supplies to the valley have been stopped.
On the contrary, Kashmiris made all attempts to make the Yatra successful by all means. Who is communal?
Reply: Given last time. Please tell me what Jammu or even Doda (Hindus and Muslims) have got in the last 60 years from Kashmiri politicians.
8. Excuse me; the land belongs to the people of Jammu as well, unless they choose not to associate themselves with the state. They have an equal right being state subjects. I agree that Kashmiri Pandits are also inhabitants of the land and Omar never disputed that in his speech. However, many of the Pandits chose to leave their homeland. I have read the other story about your childhood on your blog. But tell me how were Muslims different from Pandits. More Muslims who went against the terrorists were killed than Pandits. I will again reiterate that Jagmohan was responsible for the migration. Why did Sikhs and Christians never leave? Even after Chhati Singhpora incident? As I have already stated more than 31,000 Kashmiri Muslims have died due to Militancy, and the number excludes the number of Kashmiri Terrorists.
Reply: There are 30 Christians in the Valley and that too mostly running some churchs and schools. Even in the Zionist state of Israel, there are more Muslims (not counting west bank and gaza). The target was to remove the KP as they had a larger share of Central Government Jobs in the valley (the state government jobs were slowly out of the reach for the younger generation). Once that was achieved, no one had any problems for them to visit the valley like a tourist. The fight was to move them out of the valley; as long as they came as tourist, there were always wazawans ready. As for the Sikhs; in 1990 the slogan was “Muslim sikh bhai bhai, yeh Hindu kom kahan se aayee” and there were lots more but unprintable. The fight was to remove Hindus and keep the Sikhs; 2 reasons – 1. the kashmiri terrorist were getting a lot of help from Khalastani terrorists 2. the Sikhs were located in pockets mainly into commerce and agriculture and not in government jobs.
9. It is not about demographics. It is about pollution and contamination of ecology. The SASB started a helicopter service to add to the pollution. They were constructing permanent structures thereby destructing ecology. For evidence you may check their site at http://www.shriamarnathjishrine.com/amarnath-shrine-board.html
Moreover, if the Yatra is going on smoothly, isn’t it immaterial whether the land is transferred or not?
Reply: Ok, that is a new thing. Railways have denuded couple of Lakh trees, the Big Baglihar Dam has done the same, so has been the condition of the city forest that Jagmohan created at casmishai next to the governor’s house for creating a golf course, the big timber mafia at dacigam, nearly 10,000 trees on the Uri Poonch Road, the trees for creating the campus of Baba Ghulam Shah university at Poonch/Rajouri, etc. The structures were temporary as they were the same DRDO made stuff that helped Kashmiri earthquake victims in their time of crisis some years back.
The problem with Omar was his speech was highly charged and when politicians like him with whom people associate themselves overcoming their own religious or regional lines, such politicians need to make speeches in a different tenor. His speech like I said was the final straw in the camels back and now this whole issue has become a matter of prestige.
10. Same a/a
11. Pakistan & ISI are benefiting from the protests and from the economic blockade. Wake up!
Reply: There is no blockade and there was only disruptions. Pleae avoid going by Jhootistan news.
12. Our soldiers died to keep the link open but our fellow citizens- brothers and citizens succeeded!
Yes, everything was well till Jammuites called a strike. The strike called by secular Yasin Malik, Sajjad Lone, Syed Ali Shah Geelani (who unashamedly took 70 lakhs of Indian Tax payers money for his health bills), etc are not economic blockades for people of Kargil, Dras or Leh.
13. By blocking the road they are supporting the plans of secessionists
Yes, the same way as today sitram yechury of CPM has said in his article in the Hindustan Times , that we should not vote for BJP or any other party that we like - as the Militants say that they too like that party. There can be nothing more ridiculous than this. This is what creates communal politics in the long run. Also today Mr. Geelani has blamed the entire problems of J&K on the communal parties of Jammu. Look who is talking.
14. We want a unified state under India. Recent developments in Jammu aim at further dividing the state.
Yes when Jammu does anything it is dividing and when valley does the same it is all secular. When salman rushdie says something to the prophet Mohd. 5000 miles away the valley will burn, when danes publish highly objectionable cartoons – the valley will burn, when taslima nasreen writes something wrong in Bangladesh the valley must burn – but when jammu protest for 400 acres of land for temporary structures it is all communal and aimed at dividing the state. Please stop saying such unrelevant and unreasonable things. It only strikes fire.
15. I’m sorry but Sikhs and Christians still continue to live in harmony with us. They, like us, never bowed down to terrorism. We have some of the leading schools run by Christian missionaries. Churches, Gurudwaras and temples and mosques continue with their religious proceedings.
If you now say that temples were destroyed, I would like you to find out how many mosques and shrines were destroyed by terrorists? Remember the destruction of one of the holiest shrines at Chraresharief? I again reiterate, terrorists don’t have any religion.
Reply: Thanks but really when you write Christians in the valley, I cannot help laughing at your poor knowledge of the valley or its demographic composition. The terrorist burnt a dargah and that is something that they consider as un Islamic in the deoband-wahibi school of Islamic thought. As the terrorists who did that were non kashmiri, they felt is easy to burn down something that they did not believe in. It also signalled the end of the great sufi tradition of Kashmir. Not a single person on the street rose to condemn that (very similar to what happened during the KP exit from the valley) – no mass hysteria like the land transfer agitation. Even that is the one and only discretion that the terrorist did to a mosque.
It is very unfortunate that sometimes ill informed individuals start to "blog" half-truths encouraging communalism. In the world today when everyone is striving towards peace, please use your efforts to contribute for a better tomorrow. Dont sow seeds of violence and hatered!
Yes, thank you Mr. Oxford Dictionary informed person. For someone to comment on the other judgement is very easy. It is sad that people like you who have no relevance or have not even been there talk about the valley as if it is their play ground. I term it as the Barkha Dutt syndrome – you unfortunately have it and I really cannot help. I do not need your secular tag and you can keep that with yourself, writing irrelevant responses to blog’s without understanding what people construe as a simple thing as religion. For you the purans as well as other holy books of muslims, Sikhs, Christians, jews and others are a source of mythology which in turn is all falsehood, then I can not discuss this issue any further. I might be personally an atheist but I have no right to question the beliefs of millions of muslims, hindus or other religious people of India. This is how this great nation of Bharat has run for 5000 years and this is how it will run for 50000000000 + years. This is why our nation is named Bharat and I might not agree with everything of King Bharata but on his name is our great country named.
I guess like millions of other Indian who do not know this story or of why our country was named Bharata, please read this and realise the importance of mythology in the life of all Indian Hindus, muslims , Sikhs and each and every one who calls himself an Indian citizen. Maybe it will help make you a better Indian and also a better Muslim.
Monday, 11 August 2008
Truth about Holy Amarnath Cave and the Yatra
Hi Bloggers,
I got these comments from one of the bloggers and my response is given below.
Some points for thought!
1. The shrine was discovered by a Kashmiri Muslim.
Reply: According to legend, when Kashyap Reshi drained the Kashmir valley of water (it was believed to have been a vast lake), the cave and the lingam were discovered by Bregish Reshi who was travelling the Himalayas. When people heard of the lingam, Amarnath for them became Shiva's abode and a centre of pilgrimage.
Then it was rediscovered by a Muslim shepherd named Buta Malik who was given a sack of coal by a sadhu. Upon reaching home he discovered that the sack, in fact, contained gold. Overjoyed and overcome, Buta Malik rushed back to look for the sadhu and thank him, but on the spot of their meeting discovered a cave, and eventually this became a place of pilgrimage for all believers. To date, a percentage of the donations made by pilgrims are given to the descendants of Malik and the remaining to the trust which manages the shrine.
As the history of Kashmir goes back to the days to Sharda Peeth, Kalhan’s Raj Tarangni and the fact that Kashmir was a major centre of learning for the Shivite School of thought, the probability of the cave being discovered earlier also remain. It however should not be an issue to score brownie points but to understand that the history of Kashmir is ancient and way beyond what is being taught to the kids in the valley.
There is ample and conclusive historical evidence, on the other hand, to prove that the holy cave and the ice lingam were known to the people since very ancient times and have been continuously and regularly visited by pilgrims not only from Kashmir but also from different parts of India.
“While the earliest reference to Amarnath can be seen in the Nilamata Purana (v.1324), a 6th century Sanskrit text which depicts the religious and cultural life of early Kashmiris and gives Kashmir’s own creation myth, the pilgrimage to the holy cave has been described with full topographical details in the Bhringish Samhita and the Amarnatha Mahatmya, both ancient texts said to have been composed even earlier.”
References to Amarnath, known have also been made in historical chronicles like the Rajatarangini and its sequels and several Western travellers’ accounts also leaving no doubt about the fact that the holy cave has been known to people for centuries. The original name of the tirtha, as given in the ancient texts, is of course Amareshwara, Amarnath being a name given later to it.
Giving the legend of the Naga Sushruvas, who in his fury burnt to ashes the kingdom of King Nara when he tried to abduct his daughter already married to a Brahmin youth, and after the carnage took his abode in the lake now known as Sheshnag (Kashmiri Sushramnag), Kalahana writes:
“The lake of dazzling whiteness [resembling] a sea of milk (Sheshnag), which he created [for himself as residence] on a far off mountain, is to the present day seen by the people on the pilgrimage to Amareshwara.”(Rajatarangini, Book I v. 267.Translation: M. A. Stein).
This makes it very clear that pilgrims continued to visit the holy Amarnath cave in the 12th century, for Kalhana wrote his chronicle in the years1148-49.
At another place in the Rajatarangini (Book II v. 138), Kalhana says that King Samdhimat Aryaraja (34 BCE-17CE) used to spend “the most delightful Kashmir summer” in worshiping a linga formed of snow “in the regions above the forests”. This too appears to be a reference to the ice linga at Amarnath. There is yet another reference to Amareshwara or Amarnath in the Rajatarangini (Book VII v.183). According to Kalhana, Queen Suryamati, the wife of King Ananta (1028-1063), “granted under her husband’s name agraharas at Amareshwara, and arranged for the consecration of trishulas, banalingas and other [sacred emblems]“.
In his Chronicle of Kashmir, a sequel to Kalhana’s Rajatarangini, Jonaraja relates that that Sultan Zainu’l-abidin (1420-1470) paid a visit to the sacred tirtha of Amarnath while constructing a canal on the left bank of the river Lidder (vv.1232-1234). The canal is now known as Shah Kol.
In the Fourth Chronicle named Rajavalipataka, which was begun by Prjayabhatta and completed by Shuka, there is a clear and detailed reference to the pilgrimage to the sacred site (v.841,vv. 847-849). According to it, in a reply to Akbar’s query about Kashmir Yusuf Khan, the Mughal governor of Kashmir at that time, described among other things the Amarnath Yatra in full detail. His description shows that the not only was the pilgrimage in vogue in Akbar’s time - Akbar annexed Kashmir in 1586 - but the phenomenon of waxing and waning of the ice linga was also well known.
Amareshwar (Amarnath) was a famous pilgrimage place in the time of the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan also. In his eulogy of Shah Jahan’s father-in-law Asif Khan, titled “Asaf Vilas”, the famous Sanskrit scholar and aesthete Panditraj Jagannath makes clear mention of Amareshwara (Amarnath) while describing the Mughal garden Nishat laid out by Asif Khan. The King of gods Indra himself, he says, comes here to pay obeisance to Lord Shiva”.
As we well know Francois Bernier, a French physician accompanied Emperor Aurangzeb during his visit to Kashmir in 1663. In his book “Travels in Mughal Empire” he writes while giving an account the places he visited in Kashmir that he was “pursuing journey to a grotto full of wonderful congelations, two days journey from Sangsafed” when he “received intelligence that my Nawab felt very impatient and uneasy on account of my long absence”. The “grotto” he refers to is obviously the Amarnath cave as the editor of the second edition of the English translation of the book, Vincient A. Smith makes clear in his introduction. He writes: “The grotto full of wonderful congelations is the Amarnath cave, where blocks of ice, stalagmites formed by dripping water from the roof are worshipped by many Hindus who resort here as images of Shiva…..”
Another traveler, Vigne, in his book “Travels in Kashmir, Ladakh and Iskardu” writes about the pilgrimage to the sacred spot in detail, clearly mentioning that “the ceremony at the cave of Amarnath takes place on the 15th of the Hindoo month of Sawan” and that “not only Hindoos of every rank and caste can be seen collecting together and traveling up the valley of Liddar towards the celebrated cave……” Vigne visited Kashmir after his return from Ladakh in 1840-41 and published his book in 1842. His book makes it very clear that the Amarnath Yatra drew pilgrims from the whole of India in his time and was undertaken with great enthusiasm.
Again, the great Sikh Guru Arjan Dev is said to have granted land in Amritsar for the ceremonial departure of Chari, the holy mace of Lord Shiva which marks the beginning of the Yatra to the Holy Cave. In 1819, the year in which the Afghan rule came to an end in Kashmir, Pandit Hardas Tiku “founded the Chhawni Anmarnath at Ram Bagh in Srinagar where the Sadhus from the plains assembled and where he gave them free rations for the journey, both ways from his own private resources”, as the noted Kashmiri naturalist Pandit Samsar Chand Kaul has pointed out in his booklet titled “The Mysterious cave of Amarnath”.
2. The Yatra has always been conducted by Kashmiri Muslims.
Reply: Yes the yatra has been supported by the Malik family descendents but not conducted by them.
3. No Yatri was ever harmed by a Kashmiri Muslim.
Reply: Yes, numerous. Even this year some were killed at Bus Stand (5), grenade attack at Gulmarg, etc. Here are only some of them from previous years, it is a long list but i have taken only 3 years;
2000: At least 25 persons, including 16 Amarnath pilgrims were killed and 60 others were injured in an attack by militants at Pahalgam base camp.
2001: Twelve persons, including three women pilgrims and two police officials, were killed and 15 injured when a militant hurled two grenades at a camp and later fired indiscriminately near the holy cave.
2002: Two pilgrims were killed and two others injured when militants threw a grenade and later opened fire on a group of devotees in Jammu ahead of their trek to Amarnath cave shrine.
Twenty four persons were injured in a powerful grenade attack by suspected militants at a bus station on the route of the Amarnath pilgrimage.
A devotee and a taxi driver were killed and three injured when suspected militants lobbed a grenade in Anantnag along the pilgrim route.
Eight persons were killed and 27 wounded in an attack by militants on a base camp at Nunwan.
4. This year, we had record number of Yatris (more than 300,000) visiting the holy Shrine.
Reply: Yes, that is good but it has nothing to do with the valley as the arrangements are done by the SASB. Generally Yatra’s world over are matter of faith and people endure great hardship to complete them. Kashmir being part of India, 300,000 or 3 million is no big deal.
5. Each and every Yatri had praises for the locals who fed them in spite of scanty supplies due to the economic blockage of the highway.
Reply: Well, that is what was the great sufi kashmiri culture that Paki’s wanted to destroy. This was the culture of Lal Ded and Rishi peer. This was the culture where hindus celebrated the 3 day Herath festival (shivratri) with the next day as Salam for their Muslim neighbours. This was the valley which not only fed but gave alms to one and all inculuding hindu sadhu’s coming or going to the cave.
6. Entire country including the 300,000 Yatris are fully satisfied with the arrangements.
Reply: Well, the arrangements were done by SASB.
7. A handful of communal elements at Jammu have a problem.
Reply: It is not as our P.M say “an issue of modalities”. It is a decision of how people will be treated. 400,000 pandits were forced out of their land, 361 were killed, their temples destroyed and sahbir shah, sajjad lone, yasin mailk and their likes are saying that Jammu has communal elements. Well it is like Pakistan accusing India of supporting Taliban.
8. The local Jammu Dogra has never in history protested like this.
Reply: Well that is the point, their patience has now broken and the last straw in the camels backs was Omar Abdullah’s speech in the parliament. It is he who shouted “it is OUR LAND and we will die but not give it away”. How dare he, Kashmiri Pandits were the original inhabitants of the land and by saying so he has proved that he no sense or understanding of history. Clarifying that he meant all of J&K, well please do not lie now. If state subject was the issue, how come land was transferred to Railways, Airports Authourity, NHPC, HMT, Centaur, etc.
9. Some of the people who migrated from valley more than decade ago see this as an opportunity to take a revenge to rout out Muslims from Jammu
Reply: Well again you are missing the point. Surely 20 years is a long time to take revenge. It is akin to agreeing that temporary structures 13000 feet at Baltal can be used for changing the demographic’s of the valley.
10. The Jammu Dogras have fallen prey to the game plan.
Reply: same as above. Sadly, you are missing the point.
11. Who is benefiting from the protests?
Reply: Sometimes, protests are done without immediate gains. What will be gained is that the fact that Kashmiri’s have got too much without doing anything. How many pay taxes- state or central, pay for their electricity bills, etc. The formula of aid dispersal for rest of India is 75% loan and 25% grant, whereas Kashmir it is 75% grant and 25% loan (even that is not repaid back).
12. Our soldiers have laid down their lives fighting militants to keep the National Highway open for the past 20 years.
Reply: Yes, that is the point. The Highway is a scared piece if land for all and we cannot allow it to be used to pump in secessionist elements. Just for your information, an R.O.P (road opening party) of the army clearing the highway, starts their day at 4AM in the morning and ends it at 12PM midnight. It is too holy for anyone to understand. Hopefully the people would now realise how much it takes to keep the lifeline open. Troops can always be flown in as they have been for such a long time, it is common people who will suffer if disruptions occur.
13. Whose cause are people at Jammu supporting?
Reply: They are fighting for the cause of India and the right of an Indian over secessionists.
14. Kashmiri Leaders want a unified state including Jammu/Kashmir/POK/Ladakh
Reply: Sorry but that is not a consolation. It is and will remain unified as per the 1947 agreed boundaries. It is the writ of the Parliament that the P.O.K been taken back from Pakistan. Please read the pre 1947 history of J&K and the exploits of Maharaja Gulab Singh and how Indian have a claim over the entire state of J&K.
15. Protestors at Jammu want separate Jammu, Separate Kashmir, Separate KP Land, Separate Ladakh and maybe further slices of the flesh of our motherland.
Reply: Haven’t heard that but there will always be multiple view points and that is the corner stone of democracy. People in valley who have been following nizam e Mustafa cannot and will not understand what a pluralistic society is. After all they forced out 400,000 people out of the valley by the fear of gun to enforce their singular point of view. Imagine an entire generation of people growing up in a place where there are no minorities left. Most of the over 20 year olds in the valley have not even seen what Diwali, Herath, Nevreh or any other minority festival is like and that is the root cause of all these problems.
If this was not the case, tell me one conflict where the state has suffered so much in spite of their claim being backed by history that Pandits were the original inhabitants of the valley. The problem is the fact that people in the valley are not used to the other side reacting back and this is what has really puzzled them. It was always this Paki notion of a superior race being fed into the valley people which has now turned back to haunt them.
For 60 years Paki’s have fed into the people of valley a sense of utopia something which can only be compared to the communist. A false sense of bravado and beliefs. If you take a step back and understand that a nation who is number 6 or 7 in the list of failed states has not right to talk to India about running a nation or handling it’s conflicts. What they did to Lal Masjid, their use of gunships and missles against Tribal people, balti’s and balouch is well known. It is a country that sold its people to America for as less as 1000$$ and sent them to guantanamo bay and other American prisons.
Have a look at these 2 links and you would understand what I am trying to say. Have a look at this gentleman Amanullah Khan part I and II who was once the so called great freedom fighter of Kashmiri’s and what he has been reduced to. He is also talking of utopia but look at the fear in his speech when he says something about the Pakistan Army and ISI. He is senile but looking at his position you feel nothing but sad. This is what happens to someone who is backed by Paki’s.
Have a look at all this and then decide for yourself which way to go!
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