New Delhi: Pakistan army’s Colonel Karnal Sher Khan, who died during the Kargil war, is remembered with great pride.
The man who fought on Tiger Hill from Pakistan's side was given the Nishan e Haidar, Pakistan’s highest gallantry award on the recommendation of the Indian Army.
Captain K Sher Khan's brother Sikandar Sheikh says, “Allah ka shukar hai ki humara dushman bhi koi busdil dushman nahi hai. Agar log kahen ki India busdil hai to main kahunga nahi kyuki usne aelania keh diya ki karnel sher hero hai (No enemy is a coward. I won’t call India coward because it proclaimed Sher Khan as a hero).”
Captain Khan had led an assault to re-capture Tiger Hill soon after Indian troops had taken it and had lost his life in the process.
Ten years after Kargil, Karnal Sher Khan is a folk hero. His images visible everywhere, his native village has even been renamed after him.
Sikandar Sheikh says, "Ek game hai yeh. circikete ek game hai, Chakka mara..mara. Ye ek game hai. Cup milna hai bahadur ko. Cup Kernel Sher ko mila.aur wo bhi dushman ke kehe par (War’s a cricket game, but the winner has got the cup awarded by the opponent)."
On the other side too, valour was prized but the culture was different.
Instances of the Indian soldiers tortured as prisoners of war (PoW) by the Pakistani army can’t be forgotten easily.
However, captain Khan's family, unaware of the torture of Indian troops at Kargil, agree there must be a code of honour among warriors.
courtesy: defence.pk
Showing posts with label indian army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label indian army. Show all posts
Sunday, 26 July 2009
Tuesday, 17 March 2009
Kargil War from the Donkeys mouth
KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE
Pakistani writings on Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is PAF airman's perspective, focusing on the IAF's air operations and the PAF's position.
Operational Planning in the PAF
Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF's appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF's hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.
The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF's 'corporate' decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.
The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF's operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.
In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot's career after repatriation and rose to command PAF's premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.
The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders' School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF's Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.
The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.
The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.
There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF's hierarchy was highly qualified and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.
First Rumblings
As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army's Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army's interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.
After hearing Gp Capt Tariq's report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army's ongoing 'review of contingency plans' required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the 'Kashmir Contingency'.
Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the 'latest situation in Kashmir' at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a 'protective manoeuvre', he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. "Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold," he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of 'providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir' was never mentioned.)
When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. "I have Stingers on every peak," he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud's reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link's vulnerability to our offensive elements.
It seemed from the Corps Commander's smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners' minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander's elucidation.
Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, "After this operation, it's going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!" as we walked out of the briefing room.
Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army's planning, though we were given to believe that it was a 'limited tactical action' in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.
IAF – By Fits & Starts
The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as 'Operation Safedsagar', commenced on 15 May with the bulk of operational assets positioned by 18 May. 150 combat aircraft were deployed as follows:
Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)
Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)
Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)
Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)
Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)
One-third of the aircraft were modern, 'high-threat' fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.
Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC. The salient feature of this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders' positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting 'interrogation' session.)
The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud's rant about a 'Stinger on every peak' seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis' glee.
The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded precision. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led it to be even more cautious.
By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 'technical violations' (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.
The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable for Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.
The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.
While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.
PAF in a Bind
From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF's intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.
Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najib Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najib had an excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy's Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with the help of some courageous flying by Army Aviation pilots. With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.
To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.
While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF's minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.
F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be 'rationalised', a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staff's minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.
Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAF's lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.
It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.
In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to 'equal the match'. Might it strike to some that PAF's restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?
Aftermath
It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the Chief of Army Staff (COAS): General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA): Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio's self-serving presentation.
In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly 'capture' territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman's attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.
In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their 'star-spangled' universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the '65 and '71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters ('devil's advocates', if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.
Tailpiece
Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff in 2001, President Musharraf struck at PAF's top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the appointment of service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi's rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior General Musharraf particularly during Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could order around like one of his Corps Commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus'haf was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF's interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that PAF's precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.
Pakistani writings on Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is PAF airman's perspective, focusing on the IAF's air operations and the PAF's position.
Operational Planning in the PAF
Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF's appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF's hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.
The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF's 'corporate' decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.
The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF's operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.
In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot's career after repatriation and rose to command PAF's premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.
The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders' School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF's Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.
The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.
The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.
There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF's hierarchy was highly qualified and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.
First Rumblings
As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army's Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army's interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.
After hearing Gp Capt Tariq's report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army's ongoing 'review of contingency plans' required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the 'Kashmir Contingency'.
Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the 'latest situation in Kashmir' at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a 'protective manoeuvre', he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. "Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold," he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of 'providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir' was never mentioned.)
When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. "I have Stingers on every peak," he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud's reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link's vulnerability to our offensive elements.
It seemed from the Corps Commander's smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners' minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander's elucidation.
Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, "After this operation, it's going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!" as we walked out of the briefing room.
Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army's planning, though we were given to believe that it was a 'limited tactical action' in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.
IAF – By Fits & Starts
The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as 'Operation Safedsagar', commenced on 15 May with the bulk of operational assets positioned by 18 May. 150 combat aircraft were deployed as follows:
Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)
Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)
Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)
Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)
Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)
One-third of the aircraft were modern, 'high-threat' fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.
Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC. The salient feature of this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders' positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting 'interrogation' session.)
The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud's rant about a 'Stinger on every peak' seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis' glee.
The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded precision. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led it to be even more cautious.
By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 'technical violations' (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.
The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable for Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.
The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.
While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.
PAF in a Bind
From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF's intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.
Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najib Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najib had an excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy's Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with the help of some courageous flying by Army Aviation pilots. With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.
To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.
While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF's minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.
F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be 'rationalised', a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staff's minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.
Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAF's lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.
It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.
In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to 'equal the match'. Might it strike to some that PAF's restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?
Aftermath
It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the Chief of Army Staff (COAS): General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA): Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio's self-serving presentation.
In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly 'capture' territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman's attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.
In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their 'star-spangled' universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the '65 and '71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters ('devil's advocates', if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.
Tailpiece
Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff in 2001, President Musharraf struck at PAF's top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the appointment of service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi's rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior General Musharraf particularly during Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could order around like one of his Corps Commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus'haf was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF's interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that PAF's precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.
Monday, 8 December 2008
To Our Dear Prime Minister - From Air Marshal SY Savur (Retd)
Dear Prime Minister,
I admire you hugely for all that you have done for the Indian economy and for many things that you have done for India since becoming the PM. Today, I watch is despair the terrorist attack inspired frenzy of promises and assurances of action. I plead for sanity, clear thought and an action plan that is not only effective but also long-term.
I plead with you; do not be tempted to take knee-jerk, short term decisions without considering their long term implications just because you want to be seen as a man of action. In the nearly 5 years you headed the Govt, you took time to even think that there is need for counter-terror mechanisms, so a few days more will not be of substantial loss unless you have the General Elections 2009 in your sights.
I plead with you not to disperse the Special Action Group (SAG), the counter-terror arm of the NSG to the four metros. Have you heard about the Special Air Service (SAS), counter-terror fighting unit of the UK being dispersed even though it fights all over the world?
If you heed some opinion and disperse the SAG please consider the following: -
Centralised training ensures that standards are the highest and the same for every man in the SAG. Dispersal would mean that training standards and maintenance of equipment would be diluted because different people train differently in different circumstances. And there will be temptation to provide one unit more/better equipment because some one will tell you that the perception of terrorist threat there is more than elsewhere.
If at all you want to place the SAG in a place where it can reach any corner of India then please consider Nagpur. It is equidistant in terms of flying duration from the 4 metros as well as the large cities of Ahmedabad, Bangalore and Hyderabad.
Nagpur’s Sonegaon airport is not the busiest of airports and the IAF base there has an IL-76 squadron which can make available its aircraft. It is better to utilise the large open spaces for setting up a training facility than making an air cargo hub that nobody will use.
While on this topic of aircraft, please ensure that more than six IL-76 are serviceable at any time by providing them the spares that they badly need. You know that one of the reasons that the SAG was delayed was because the IL-76 became unserviceable and the SAG had to be flown in by An-32 (not because the IL-76 is slower than the B-737 or the Airbus). Come to think of it, why wasn’t an Air India Airbus used?
Please make the MoS-cum-National Security Adviser (NSA) just a MoS. Let the MoS handle the political requirements, which Prabhu Chawla said was herding MPs to support the Govt in July 2008.
The NSA should head the National Security Agency (not the National Security Council which is top heavy and hence unable to take quick decisions or react to any crisis). The NSA should be a serving officer selected from amongst the (in alphabetical order so that I don’t step on some corns) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence), Director of the IB and the Secretary, R & AW. The post should be held on a rotational basis for a fixed tenure of 3 years.
Please make the Director IB, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) and Secretary R & AW answerable to the NSA for collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.
Please make every State’s ADGP (Intelligence) responsible to the NSA for ensuring action and feedback on the intelligence inputs supplied to the States.
Please place an embargo on any intelligence or police authority talking to the Press or leaking information when an operation is in progress; better still till prosecution of the apprehended terrorist or completion of investigation in case of deceased terrorists is over. It will help by not providing the terrorist set up or leaders so that the SAG can complete its job.
Please tell the media that by giving breathless descriptions and broadcasting TV pictures they are actually helping the terrorists and their outfits know where the counter-terror SAG persons are and what they are doing. I shudder to think whether the terrorists were watching TV channels (and surfing them too) to know what was going on to help them play “hide and shoot” with the SAG.
The leadership of the LeT, JeM even the ISI must have been glad that, (in alphabetical order), Aaj Tak, CNN-IBN, Headlines Today, NDTV, Times Now et al were giving them a free ringside seat.
Sir, in your extensive travels and study you would have found that the British media showed restraint in broadcasting pictures of the bombing in the Underground, the Police and the Intelligence agencies did not resort to the blame game nor passed the buck. Why does our IB, R &AW always tell us that they told the State Police and the police did nothing? After all the same IB and R &AW is staffed by IPS officers!
Sir, why should the DG NSG have to tell the media what they already know? Have you ever heard of, let alone seen a photo, of the commander of the SAS? Why shouldn’t our SAG/NSG also do their job and disappear? Is it because DG NSG wants exposure so that he is rewarded in the next Republic Day honours list? Even that could be done but quietly.
Sir, I cannot but appreciate your firmness in telling India that you will not cut the price of petrol, diesel etc because the oil companies had suffered losses. How about the same firmness in handling the IB, R &AW etc?
Finally, Sir, the Federal Investigative Agency – laudable but will go the way the CBI unless you give it the autonomy of the Election Commission, Comptroller & Auditor General even the Chief Vigilance Commissioner.
Thank you, Prime Minister for your patience.
Jai Hind
Air Marshal SY Savur (Retd)
I admire you hugely for all that you have done for the Indian economy and for many things that you have done for India since becoming the PM. Today, I watch is despair the terrorist attack inspired frenzy of promises and assurances of action. I plead for sanity, clear thought and an action plan that is not only effective but also long-term.
I plead with you; do not be tempted to take knee-jerk, short term decisions without considering their long term implications just because you want to be seen as a man of action. In the nearly 5 years you headed the Govt, you took time to even think that there is need for counter-terror mechanisms, so a few days more will not be of substantial loss unless you have the General Elections 2009 in your sights.
I plead with you not to disperse the Special Action Group (SAG), the counter-terror arm of the NSG to the four metros. Have you heard about the Special Air Service (SAS), counter-terror fighting unit of the UK being dispersed even though it fights all over the world?
If you heed some opinion and disperse the SAG please consider the following: -
Centralised training ensures that standards are the highest and the same for every man in the SAG. Dispersal would mean that training standards and maintenance of equipment would be diluted because different people train differently in different circumstances. And there will be temptation to provide one unit more/better equipment because some one will tell you that the perception of terrorist threat there is more than elsewhere.
If at all you want to place the SAG in a place where it can reach any corner of India then please consider Nagpur. It is equidistant in terms of flying duration from the 4 metros as well as the large cities of Ahmedabad, Bangalore and Hyderabad.
Nagpur’s Sonegaon airport is not the busiest of airports and the IAF base there has an IL-76 squadron which can make available its aircraft. It is better to utilise the large open spaces for setting up a training facility than making an air cargo hub that nobody will use.
While on this topic of aircraft, please ensure that more than six IL-76 are serviceable at any time by providing them the spares that they badly need. You know that one of the reasons that the SAG was delayed was because the IL-76 became unserviceable and the SAG had to be flown in by An-32 (not because the IL-76 is slower than the B-737 or the Airbus). Come to think of it, why wasn’t an Air India Airbus used?
Please make the MoS-cum-National Security Adviser (NSA) just a MoS. Let the MoS handle the political requirements, which Prabhu Chawla said was herding MPs to support the Govt in July 2008.
The NSA should head the National Security Agency (not the National Security Council which is top heavy and hence unable to take quick decisions or react to any crisis). The NSA should be a serving officer selected from amongst the (in alphabetical order so that I don’t step on some corns) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence), Director of the IB and the Secretary, R & AW. The post should be held on a rotational basis for a fixed tenure of 3 years.
Please make the Director IB, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) and Secretary R & AW answerable to the NSA for collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.
Please make every State’s ADGP (Intelligence) responsible to the NSA for ensuring action and feedback on the intelligence inputs supplied to the States.
Please place an embargo on any intelligence or police authority talking to the Press or leaking information when an operation is in progress; better still till prosecution of the apprehended terrorist or completion of investigation in case of deceased terrorists is over. It will help by not providing the terrorist set up or leaders so that the SAG can complete its job.
Please tell the media that by giving breathless descriptions and broadcasting TV pictures they are actually helping the terrorists and their outfits know where the counter-terror SAG persons are and what they are doing. I shudder to think whether the terrorists were watching TV channels (and surfing them too) to know what was going on to help them play “hide and shoot” with the SAG.
The leadership of the LeT, JeM even the ISI must have been glad that, (in alphabetical order), Aaj Tak, CNN-IBN, Headlines Today, NDTV, Times Now et al were giving them a free ringside seat.
Sir, in your extensive travels and study you would have found that the British media showed restraint in broadcasting pictures of the bombing in the Underground, the Police and the Intelligence agencies did not resort to the blame game nor passed the buck. Why does our IB, R &AW always tell us that they told the State Police and the police did nothing? After all the same IB and R &AW is staffed by IPS officers!
Sir, why should the DG NSG have to tell the media what they already know? Have you ever heard of, let alone seen a photo, of the commander of the SAS? Why shouldn’t our SAG/NSG also do their job and disappear? Is it because DG NSG wants exposure so that he is rewarded in the next Republic Day honours list? Even that could be done but quietly.
Sir, I cannot but appreciate your firmness in telling India that you will not cut the price of petrol, diesel etc because the oil companies had suffered losses. How about the same firmness in handling the IB, R &AW etc?
Finally, Sir, the Federal Investigative Agency – laudable but will go the way the CBI unless you give it the autonomy of the Election Commission, Comptroller & Auditor General even the Chief Vigilance Commissioner.
Thank you, Prime Minister for your patience.
Jai Hind
Air Marshal SY Savur (Retd)
Friday, 5 December 2008
Indian Army: Counter Insurgency Force Motto
"It's God's responsibility to forgive the terrorist organisation, It's our responsibility to arrange the meeting between them and god."
Tuesday, 9 September 2008
KASHMIR - J.K POLICE and CRPF Actions
Last month a strange thing happened, as i was all geared up to write a blog on the C.R.P.F’s handling of the current turmoil in the valley, i found that there were 5 comments by an unidentified blogger commenting on the same topic. In the last few days I have been troubled by the pathetic handling of the situation by 3 different parties, the central government, the governor and the CRPF. Today I would like to keep my focus on C.R.P.F’s handling of the valley situation and leave the other 2 characters for a later date.
Firstly, I would like the readers to go through my previous blog on police reforms and see this as a continuation of the same. Firstly it is my firm belief that the Local Police and the CRPF is the worst that the Indian state has to offer to the citizens. What creates my view is seeing their conduct from both historical and contemporary perspective in the valley as in the rest of India. This time my views are also supported by the fact that people on both sides of the Pir Panjal are unhappy with the handling of the situation by both the Local Police and the CRPF.
First let us the talk of the Police actions in Jammu, when Kuldeep Kumar Dogra died due to the intake of a poisonous substance at a rally in Jammu, the police in connivance with the hospital staff managed to smuggle out his body from the morgue and were trying to cremate it by putting it on fire using discarded car and truck tyres. They would have succeeded in the same had it not been for a passing sadhu who raised an alarm and alerted the local population of that area. This desecration of the mortal remains of a person killed during the agitation was the second big booster to the ongoing agitation; the first being Omar Abdullah’s parliament speech. Maybe the police as also Omar might have thought that the act would pass off as a regular police action or for Omar a freedom of speech. What both forgot is the fact that most of the Indians generally will forgive millions of acts that are perceived as not correct but something’s are generally non negotiable. These two were part of that which is termed as non negotiable especially when the scenario is as tense as it is now. We should not ignore the basic premise that people anywhere in India have a right to demonstrate. Why the extra judicial killing or the rallies there after Kashmir do not shake the national conscious is due to the fact that such rallies turn into a Pro Pakistani Pro Azaadi rallies. What amazes people in other parts of India is the condition that Pakistan is itself in. The kind of extra judicial killings that are being committed by each and every concerned (or unconcerned) party including government, ISI, Pakistan Army, US Army, CIA and many more is simply ignored. This added to the fact that Pakistani generals take money from CIA after each “terrorist” captured or killed or even after each “Predator” strike. This is quietly ignored by the people lecturing the common people in the Valley. Just because Justice Ifthkar Chaudhury the CJ of Pakistan Supreme Court wanted some sort of accountability from the government on these killing that emergency was imposed in Pakistan. This is the level to which our Jhootistan neighbour can go to hide their extra judicial killing machinery. So the less the valley and in particular Geelani talk about their undying love for the land of the pure the better it would be.
Now let us look at the CRPF, well this force is probably the most untrained, unmotivated, ill equipped and over utilised forces that the union of India has. There is no system of governance or leadership that exists in that force. The officers that command the frontline soldiers are mainly from the ranks whose training and leadership skills are suspect and the only reason of their promotion from the ranks is the length of service and their Annual Confidential Report. This is absurd as the basic criteria for a leader of soldiers is to have leadership qualities either in born in him or been trained to have them. This ACR driven promotion business works well in bureaucracy but not in forces either military or Para military. The best part is that hardly anyone understands the basic problems of the force and the main thrust for any so called correction in the force usually ends up creating more posts for I.P.S officers at the CRPF Hqrs in Delhi.
Looking specifically at the valley and the CRPF reaction, well the same things happened when B.S.F took charge of the valley. They used all kinds of trials and error methods to strengthen their grip in the valley. They had very few positives in their method of operations and even those were lacked by the CRPF. The biggest problem comes from the fact that Para military units do not have a fully vetted counter insurgency manual. This coupled with the unfamiliarity of working in new operational setup like CI Grid or using collateral Damage Avoidance procedures and Lack of adequate weaponry or training has created the situation which will take its toll not only on the people of the valley but also on the CRPF men and women who work there. Today the BSF may laugh and say that they had told the home ministry that CRPF is not equipped to handle the CI grid in the valley as the premier force along with the JK police but the fact of the matter is that BSF had itself been a totally disjointed and ill equipped force when it landed in the valley. They picked up after a long and painful period in which they used draconian methods like their PAPA ONE interrogation centre, capture, death and the brutal skinning of some BSF men in the villages of Kashmir, number of terrorist attacks at key installations in spite of having their own intelligence wing – the G branch cannot be forgotten. Also R.A.F was created out of the CRPF to handle such situations and again it has not been used in the valley. This act is unpardonable as it makes the Home Ministry suspect in the eyes of all the people who know the effectiveness of the R.A.F. I guess you cannot expect much from this home minister who is in a way there because MADAM likes meo cats and not roaring tigers in the Home Ministry. I guess as any other law abiding citizen of the country it is a matter of shame that we have to use illogical force on people who have a right to demonstrate. I might have a difference in opinion from the people who demonstrate but it cannot take away their rights. All peaceful agitations must and need to be promoted in all over India, however when they threaten life and limb – please use all modern methods minus firing to stop them. Crowd control is something that a lot of research is going on in Europe and lessons can be learnt from them. Use of dye coloured water, video recording of the event, issuance of criminal record on the person and the threat of dismissal from service can be used as more humane and civilised ways to control a crowd. The faster we move from the British methods of General Dyer, the better it will be for our nation.
Being a devil’s advocate, firstly it is not easy being CRPF trooper in India and more so currently in the Valley. They have no system of training either on induction or during their tenure. Their units are moved not as battalions but as companies. This goes against the basic tenets of any general duty force which 90% of the CRPF belongs to. Although comparisons are tough but a general duty force on a CI grid like the Indian Army infantry units on the other hand move only in battalion strength, making it easier to manage command and logistical issues. This added to the fact that army can use its own engineering or supply regiments to arrange for accommodation or other logistical matters which the CRPF lacks. Most of the times the CRPF moves to their designated location even before the CPWD which is tasked to help them in issues of accommodation start putting out tender notices. CPWD’s speed even at the best of the times is to wake up only after a couple of weeks of deployment have passed. The only Army units that work on company strength are specialised units like Engineers, medics, Bomb disposal and dog squads and those too within their command. In the CRPF it can happen that the commanding officer is in Kashmir and his 2 companies would have been airlifted for a deployment in Kerala. This deployment of the 2 companies of the CRPF is for infinite time leaving a complete sense of disarray in the battalion. The state government which request for these men and women do not want to relieve these units leaving even further disarray as far as the operational, leave and training requirements of that particular battalion are concerned. The charter of these men and women is just not defined making them tools in the hands of state governments. Then same company or even the battalion could be one day used for polling booths, next day for anti electricity theft operations, next day land clearing operations, next day for rally, then next day for VIP bandobast, the next day in anti naxal operations and finally to flush out heavily armed terrorist from some house in the valley. Please have a look at the quality of food of the CRPF men and women, their tents, their weapons, their duty hours, their nature of duties, their motivations and one will can easily understand why this force is totally out of the sync with the methods to be adopted in the valley. Which force can do all that? Is it humanly possible to do all this and then remain sane and think logically? How many of the CRPF DG’s have worked at the level of SP and below for more than 10 years in the force? Please read my previous blog on police reforms to understand the crux of this problem and maybe it’s possible solutions.
I have myself seen one of their ROP (road opening party) methods in Jammu division and all myself and a friend of mine (whose is in the army) could do is to hold our heads in disgust. The entire CRPF company had no arrangement for transportation or accommodation of the men and each of their boys were carrying their own gun, holdall, bucket, sticks and trunks. All this was on a road that was a very strategic road which terrorist were using as their main crossing point between P.O.K and Doda (for their onward movement to the valley from south Kashmir). This lacklustre approach was when there was a specific threat that the terrorist were thinking of ambushing forces on that road and Army (which was earlier doing the ROP) was relieved to make way for some clearing operations in the higher reaches of those hills to thwart such an attack. The next day Army had to spare some of its men to augment the CRPF ROP as the brigadier of that sector had no trust on the ROP abilities of the CRPF (as the road was also used by Army conveys). This example is only to illustrate the frustration of all the concerned parties in such a scenario.
There is no short cut to arranging leadership of troops. It is a very painful process that even the Indian Army is discovering given the drop in quality of people applying for the officer’s rank. I do not say the Indian Army is perfect and all other forces are fools but the fact of the matter is that the Army is able to adapt faster to such changes. The army is backed by schools for its troops like CI ops schools, High altitude schools, etc which the other forces do not have. They can rotate their troops from peace to active duty which CRPF cannot do; they have a system of no carry forward leave (all troops under the home ministry have that) which enables them to retain a minimum level of force for deployment. Small measures like splitting the very generalised of this force can help create a better CRPF.
All this is no sympathy for the near and dear ones of people who suffer due to such an action. This debate to re invent the CRPF and also the Indian police forces must be pushed to its logical end otherwise if today it is Kashmir, tomorrow it can be any other Indian City.
Firstly, I would like the readers to go through my previous blog on police reforms and see this as a continuation of the same. Firstly it is my firm belief that the Local Police and the CRPF is the worst that the Indian state has to offer to the citizens. What creates my view is seeing their conduct from both historical and contemporary perspective in the valley as in the rest of India. This time my views are also supported by the fact that people on both sides of the Pir Panjal are unhappy with the handling of the situation by both the Local Police and the CRPF.
First let us the talk of the Police actions in Jammu, when Kuldeep Kumar Dogra died due to the intake of a poisonous substance at a rally in Jammu, the police in connivance with the hospital staff managed to smuggle out his body from the morgue and were trying to cremate it by putting it on fire using discarded car and truck tyres. They would have succeeded in the same had it not been for a passing sadhu who raised an alarm and alerted the local population of that area. This desecration of the mortal remains of a person killed during the agitation was the second big booster to the ongoing agitation; the first being Omar Abdullah’s parliament speech. Maybe the police as also Omar might have thought that the act would pass off as a regular police action or for Omar a freedom of speech. What both forgot is the fact that most of the Indians generally will forgive millions of acts that are perceived as not correct but something’s are generally non negotiable. These two were part of that which is termed as non negotiable especially when the scenario is as tense as it is now. We should not ignore the basic premise that people anywhere in India have a right to demonstrate. Why the extra judicial killing or the rallies there after Kashmir do not shake the national conscious is due to the fact that such rallies turn into a Pro Pakistani Pro Azaadi rallies. What amazes people in other parts of India is the condition that Pakistan is itself in. The kind of extra judicial killings that are being committed by each and every concerned (or unconcerned) party including government, ISI, Pakistan Army, US Army, CIA and many more is simply ignored. This added to the fact that Pakistani generals take money from CIA after each “terrorist” captured or killed or even after each “Predator” strike. This is quietly ignored by the people lecturing the common people in the Valley. Just because Justice Ifthkar Chaudhury the CJ of Pakistan Supreme Court wanted some sort of accountability from the government on these killing that emergency was imposed in Pakistan. This is the level to which our Jhootistan neighbour can go to hide their extra judicial killing machinery. So the less the valley and in particular Geelani talk about their undying love for the land of the pure the better it would be.
Now let us look at the CRPF, well this force is probably the most untrained, unmotivated, ill equipped and over utilised forces that the union of India has. There is no system of governance or leadership that exists in that force. The officers that command the frontline soldiers are mainly from the ranks whose training and leadership skills are suspect and the only reason of their promotion from the ranks is the length of service and their Annual Confidential Report. This is absurd as the basic criteria for a leader of soldiers is to have leadership qualities either in born in him or been trained to have them. This ACR driven promotion business works well in bureaucracy but not in forces either military or Para military. The best part is that hardly anyone understands the basic problems of the force and the main thrust for any so called correction in the force usually ends up creating more posts for I.P.S officers at the CRPF Hqrs in Delhi.
Looking specifically at the valley and the CRPF reaction, well the same things happened when B.S.F took charge of the valley. They used all kinds of trials and error methods to strengthen their grip in the valley. They had very few positives in their method of operations and even those were lacked by the CRPF. The biggest problem comes from the fact that Para military units do not have a fully vetted counter insurgency manual. This coupled with the unfamiliarity of working in new operational setup like CI Grid or using collateral Damage Avoidance procedures and Lack of adequate weaponry or training has created the situation which will take its toll not only on the people of the valley but also on the CRPF men and women who work there. Today the BSF may laugh and say that they had told the home ministry that CRPF is not equipped to handle the CI grid in the valley as the premier force along with the JK police but the fact of the matter is that BSF had itself been a totally disjointed and ill equipped force when it landed in the valley. They picked up after a long and painful period in which they used draconian methods like their PAPA ONE interrogation centre, capture, death and the brutal skinning of some BSF men in the villages of Kashmir, number of terrorist attacks at key installations in spite of having their own intelligence wing – the G branch cannot be forgotten. Also R.A.F was created out of the CRPF to handle such situations and again it has not been used in the valley. This act is unpardonable as it makes the Home Ministry suspect in the eyes of all the people who know the effectiveness of the R.A.F. I guess you cannot expect much from this home minister who is in a way there because MADAM likes meo cats and not roaring tigers in the Home Ministry. I guess as any other law abiding citizen of the country it is a matter of shame that we have to use illogical force on people who have a right to demonstrate. I might have a difference in opinion from the people who demonstrate but it cannot take away their rights. All peaceful agitations must and need to be promoted in all over India, however when they threaten life and limb – please use all modern methods minus firing to stop them. Crowd control is something that a lot of research is going on in Europe and lessons can be learnt from them. Use of dye coloured water, video recording of the event, issuance of criminal record on the person and the threat of dismissal from service can be used as more humane and civilised ways to control a crowd. The faster we move from the British methods of General Dyer, the better it will be for our nation.
Being a devil’s advocate, firstly it is not easy being CRPF trooper in India and more so currently in the Valley. They have no system of training either on induction or during their tenure. Their units are moved not as battalions but as companies. This goes against the basic tenets of any general duty force which 90% of the CRPF belongs to. Although comparisons are tough but a general duty force on a CI grid like the Indian Army infantry units on the other hand move only in battalion strength, making it easier to manage command and logistical issues. This added to the fact that army can use its own engineering or supply regiments to arrange for accommodation or other logistical matters which the CRPF lacks. Most of the times the CRPF moves to their designated location even before the CPWD which is tasked to help them in issues of accommodation start putting out tender notices. CPWD’s speed even at the best of the times is to wake up only after a couple of weeks of deployment have passed. The only Army units that work on company strength are specialised units like Engineers, medics, Bomb disposal and dog squads and those too within their command. In the CRPF it can happen that the commanding officer is in Kashmir and his 2 companies would have been airlifted for a deployment in Kerala. This deployment of the 2 companies of the CRPF is for infinite time leaving a complete sense of disarray in the battalion. The state government which request for these men and women do not want to relieve these units leaving even further disarray as far as the operational, leave and training requirements of that particular battalion are concerned. The charter of these men and women is just not defined making them tools in the hands of state governments. Then same company or even the battalion could be one day used for polling booths, next day for anti electricity theft operations, next day land clearing operations, next day for rally, then next day for VIP bandobast, the next day in anti naxal operations and finally to flush out heavily armed terrorist from some house in the valley. Please have a look at the quality of food of the CRPF men and women, their tents, their weapons, their duty hours, their nature of duties, their motivations and one will can easily understand why this force is totally out of the sync with the methods to be adopted in the valley. Which force can do all that? Is it humanly possible to do all this and then remain sane and think logically? How many of the CRPF DG’s have worked at the level of SP and below for more than 10 years in the force? Please read my previous blog on police reforms to understand the crux of this problem and maybe it’s possible solutions.
I have myself seen one of their ROP (road opening party) methods in Jammu division and all myself and a friend of mine (whose is in the army) could do is to hold our heads in disgust. The entire CRPF company had no arrangement for transportation or accommodation of the men and each of their boys were carrying their own gun, holdall, bucket, sticks and trunks. All this was on a road that was a very strategic road which terrorist were using as their main crossing point between P.O.K and Doda (for their onward movement to the valley from south Kashmir). This lacklustre approach was when there was a specific threat that the terrorist were thinking of ambushing forces on that road and Army (which was earlier doing the ROP) was relieved to make way for some clearing operations in the higher reaches of those hills to thwart such an attack. The next day Army had to spare some of its men to augment the CRPF ROP as the brigadier of that sector had no trust on the ROP abilities of the CRPF (as the road was also used by Army conveys). This example is only to illustrate the frustration of all the concerned parties in such a scenario.
There is no short cut to arranging leadership of troops. It is a very painful process that even the Indian Army is discovering given the drop in quality of people applying for the officer’s rank. I do not say the Indian Army is perfect and all other forces are fools but the fact of the matter is that the Army is able to adapt faster to such changes. The army is backed by schools for its troops like CI ops schools, High altitude schools, etc which the other forces do not have. They can rotate their troops from peace to active duty which CRPF cannot do; they have a system of no carry forward leave (all troops under the home ministry have that) which enables them to retain a minimum level of force for deployment. Small measures like splitting the very generalised of this force can help create a better CRPF.
All this is no sympathy for the near and dear ones of people who suffer due to such an action. This debate to re invent the CRPF and also the Indian police forces must be pushed to its logical end otherwise if today it is Kashmir, tomorrow it can be any other Indian City.
Sunday, 24 August 2008
Saturday, 23 August 2008
Lest We Forget - Pakistan Army in Bangladesh
One of the very few remaining Horror Videos of the Pakistani Army's action in Bangladesh. I dedicate this one to the Mr. Geelani of Kashmir for his viewing pleasure.
The images in the videos are very disturbing.
The images in the videos are very disturbing.
Thursday, 14 August 2008
Lest We Forget - Kargil War 1999 - Captain Vijayant Thapar , Vrc
Credit: Do not know for sure but definitely Captain Vijayant Thapar, Vrc family.
This is something that i never intended to post (as it is a personal letter) until i got it today in my mail. It takes precedence over some of the replies that i wanted to post on the comments sent to me 2 days back. This blog as mentioned earlier is a tribute to all such martyrs who gave up their lives for our better tomorrow.
Sunday, 10 August 2008
Wednesday, 9 July 2008
SAM "BAHADUR" MANEKSHAW
His famous Quote:
`I wonder whether those of our political masters who have been put in charge of the defence of the country can distinguish a mortar from a motor, a gun from a howitzer, a guerrilla from a gorilla – although a great many of them in the past have resembled the latter’
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