Dear Prime Minister,
I admire you hugely for all that you have done for the Indian economy and for many things that you have done for India since becoming the PM. Today, I watch is despair the terrorist attack inspired frenzy of promises and assurances of action. I plead for sanity, clear thought and an action plan that is not only effective but also long-term.
I plead with you; do not be tempted to take knee-jerk, short term decisions without considering their long term implications just because you want to be seen as a man of action. In the nearly 5 years you headed the Govt, you took time to even think that there is need for counter-terror mechanisms, so a few days more will not be of substantial loss unless you have the General Elections 2009 in your sights.
I plead with you not to disperse the Special Action Group (SAG), the counter-terror arm of the NSG to the four metros. Have you heard about the Special Air Service (SAS), counter-terror fighting unit of the UK being dispersed even though it fights all over the world?
If you heed some opinion and disperse the SAG please consider the following: -
Centralised training ensures that standards are the highest and the same for every man in the SAG. Dispersal would mean that training standards and maintenance of equipment would be diluted because different people train differently in different circumstances. And there will be temptation to provide one unit more/better equipment because some one will tell you that the perception of terrorist threat there is more than elsewhere.
If at all you want to place the SAG in a place where it can reach any corner of India then please consider Nagpur. It is equidistant in terms of flying duration from the 4 metros as well as the large cities of Ahmedabad, Bangalore and Hyderabad.
Nagpur’s Sonegaon airport is not the busiest of airports and the IAF base there has an IL-76 squadron which can make available its aircraft. It is better to utilise the large open spaces for setting up a training facility than making an air cargo hub that nobody will use.
While on this topic of aircraft, please ensure that more than six IL-76 are serviceable at any time by providing them the spares that they badly need. You know that one of the reasons that the SAG was delayed was because the IL-76 became unserviceable and the SAG had to be flown in by An-32 (not because the IL-76 is slower than the B-737 or the Airbus). Come to think of it, why wasn’t an Air India Airbus used?
Please make the MoS-cum-National Security Adviser (NSA) just a MoS. Let the MoS handle the political requirements, which Prabhu Chawla said was herding MPs to support the Govt in July 2008.
The NSA should head the National Security Agency (not the National Security Council which is top heavy and hence unable to take quick decisions or react to any crisis). The NSA should be a serving officer selected from amongst the (in alphabetical order so that I don’t step on some corns) Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence), Director of the IB and the Secretary, R & AW. The post should be held on a rotational basis for a fixed tenure of 3 years.
Please make the Director IB, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) and Secretary R & AW answerable to the NSA for collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.
Please make every State’s ADGP (Intelligence) responsible to the NSA for ensuring action and feedback on the intelligence inputs supplied to the States.
Please place an embargo on any intelligence or police authority talking to the Press or leaking information when an operation is in progress; better still till prosecution of the apprehended terrorist or completion of investigation in case of deceased terrorists is over. It will help by not providing the terrorist set up or leaders so that the SAG can complete its job.
Please tell the media that by giving breathless descriptions and broadcasting TV pictures they are actually helping the terrorists and their outfits know where the counter-terror SAG persons are and what they are doing. I shudder to think whether the terrorists were watching TV channels (and surfing them too) to know what was going on to help them play “hide and shoot” with the SAG.
The leadership of the LeT, JeM even the ISI must have been glad that, (in alphabetical order), Aaj Tak, CNN-IBN, Headlines Today, NDTV, Times Now et al were giving them a free ringside seat.
Sir, in your extensive travels and study you would have found that the British media showed restraint in broadcasting pictures of the bombing in the Underground, the Police and the Intelligence agencies did not resort to the blame game nor passed the buck. Why does our IB, R &AW always tell us that they told the State Police and the police did nothing? After all the same IB and R &AW is staffed by IPS officers!
Sir, why should the DG NSG have to tell the media what they already know? Have you ever heard of, let alone seen a photo, of the commander of the SAS? Why shouldn’t our SAG/NSG also do their job and disappear? Is it because DG NSG wants exposure so that he is rewarded in the next Republic Day honours list? Even that could be done but quietly.
Sir, I cannot but appreciate your firmness in telling India that you will not cut the price of petrol, diesel etc because the oil companies had suffered losses. How about the same firmness in handling the IB, R &AW etc?
Finally, Sir, the Federal Investigative Agency – laudable but will go the way the CBI unless you give it the autonomy of the Election Commission, Comptroller & Auditor General even the Chief Vigilance Commissioner.
Thank you, Prime Minister for your patience.
Jai Hind
Air Marshal SY Savur (Retd)
Showing posts with label 26november2008. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 26november2008. Show all posts
Monday, 8 December 2008
Sunday, 30 November 2008
National Security Guard (NSG)
Terrorism, both national and international raised its head in the West during the seventies. It manifested in many forms including hijacking of aircraft, taking of hostages, assassination of dignitaries and others. The normal law and order machinery and the defence forces of the West were found wanting to deal with this menace. Specially equipped and trained Forces like SAS of UK, DELTA Force of USA and GSG-9 of West Germany were raised abroad.
The need for creating a Special Force for executing surgical operations based on tactical intelligence was felt when Blue Star Operation was carried out by the Army at the Golden Temple, Amritsar in 1984. This operation not only caused extensive damage to the Golden Temple but also occasioned a large number of casualties
and above all the Sikh psyche was badly hurt. NSG was conceptualised and created after studying and analysing Special Forces like SAS in the United Kingdom, GIGN in France, GSG-9 in Germany, Shar-et-matkal in Israel and DELTA in the USA. It
consists of selected and highly motivated personnel from the Army as well as the Para Military Forces. 53% of the personnel are drawn from the Army while the Para Military Forces like BSF, CRPF and ITBP contribute 47%.
Tasks
(a) Neutralisation of specific terrorist threat in any given area, building, vital installations, etc.
(b) Engaging terrorists in a specific situation in order to neutralise them.
(c) Handling hijacks situation-involving piracy in the air and on land.
(d) Rescue of hostages in kidnap situations.
Additional Tasks
(a) Security of high risk VIPs.
(b) Anti sabotage check of venue of visits/public meetings of VVIPs.
(c) Create information Bomb Data Centre.
(d) Training of State Police personnel on anti terrorist, VIP Security, PSO duties, bomb detection and disposal etc.
The Ethos of the force is:—
(a) Elitism.
(b) Pursuit for excellence.
(c) Lead from front.
(d) No runners up.
(e) One for all and all for one.
National Security Guard is a small Specialised Force with each of its component having a specific role. The Central Govt. has in NSG a viable Force to carry out specialised CT Ops like Op Black Thunder I& II and Anti-hijack Ops. It mobilised for Hazratbal Shrine in October 1993 also. The Force is well trained, motivated and highly skilled in their tasks. NSG with its expertise and sophisticated
equipment and weapons can take on counter terrorist tasks which are beyond the capabilities of State Police personnel, Central Police Organisations and at times even the Army.
Operations and Training
National Security Guard has been raised to counter terrorism and counter hijack operations in the country. NSG has 51 SAG trained and equipped to carry out CT Ops, while 52 SAG is trained and equipped for CH Ops.
Presently there are two types of elitist roles which this organisation is performing; Counter Terrorist (CT) and Counter Hijack (CH) operations. In addition to that NSG is also entrusted with close protection and mobile security duties of threatened VIPs of Z + category risk. CT & CH tasks are very specialised and high risk duties and the best of personnel are required for this job. Similarly VIP protection is also highly skilled task. NSG has patterned VIP security tasks on the same lines as the protection of the Prime Minister by special protection group (SPG). Since VIP protection duty personnel remain under constant threat while moving with the
VIPs, they have to be selectively enrolled, well trained and highly motivated. To streamline these duties and integrate the commandos with their tasks, NSG propose to internally divide its force into two parts; one for CH and CT duties and the other for VIP security duties. This step will further add to the elitism of NSG and more
importantly will further refine the training .standards and performance of these personnel. This will provide them with the upgraded skills, techniques and operational competence for foolproof performance of their duty at all times. Due to the risks involved in the above mentioned highly sensitive tasks and to attract high quality manpower for this elite organisation it is essential that Pay & Allowances of the NSG personnel is made the best and at par with SPG if not better than them.
To carry out Counter Terrorists Commando operations, routine operation tactics is not adequate. Commando type operations are special operations and they have to be conceived and conducted as such.
The salient aspects of Commando type operations are:—
(a) Speedy induction from the Administrative Base up to target area, to achieve maximum surprise.
(b) Isolation of the area by Special Ranger Groups (SRGs).
(c) Surgical strikes by Special Action Group (SAG).
(d) SAG is relieved by SRG/State Police.
(e) Rapid denudation of the task force.
To carry out CT Tasks at a very short notice and to ensure the force is operationally ready and fit we have evolved a system whereby one Squadron is readily available for operation and is available at 3 hrs notice. Another Squadron is placed on training while the third Squadron is on leave and other routine duties. Thus at any time 2 Squadron worth of personnel are always available to be launched for any tasks.
The main Commando type operations carried out by NSG are given below:-
(a) OP Black Thunder-I (29 Apr-30 Apr 86). Approx 80 offers, 180 JCOs and 1500 men participated in it. The temple was cleared and handed over to Punjab Police by 0600 hrs on 01 May 1986. 122 terrorists surrendered.
(b) Op Steeple Chase III (5 Sep 87—15 Jan 88). Guarding of a high risk terrorist code 'Jack'.
(c) Op Black Hawk (20 Jan 1988). Heliborne ops in Mand area of Punjab. 2 terrorists killed and one 7.62 SLR recovered.
(d) Op Black Thunder-ll (10 May-20 May 88) Ops in golden Temple in conjunction with Punjab Police. 30 terrorist killed 217 surrendered. 69 weapons of all types recovered. AK-47-22, CPMG-3, Pistol-19, 1500 (all ranks) of the NSG participated in the ops.
(e) Op Cactus (03 Nov-08 Nov 88). 600 Commando (Cdo) Mob for ops in Male, Maldives. Subsequently tasked for rescue mission of Hostages on "MW Progress Light".
(f) Op Mouse Trap (04 Aug 89). Ops in Taran Distt in conjunction with PP and SF. 26 terrorists killed, 17 apprehended, 27 weapons recovered including 13 x AK 47, 2 Gp MG's one RPG.
(g) Op Ani Ban (25-26 Jan 91). CI Tasks at Baroda. Punjab terrorists holed up inside a house in Baroda. 2 terrorists killed and 2 AK 47 recovered.
(h) Op Ghost Buster (01 Jul—20 Sep 91). NSG Commandos deployed with SIT for search and strike missions after the assassination of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.
(j) Op Sudarshan (25 Nov-16 Dec 92). 150 NSG Cdos deployed at Ayodhya during RJB and BM dispute.
(k) Op Winter Storm (27 Oct-18 Nov 93). Ops at Hazratbal Shrine. A TF of 20 Offers, 29 ACs and 176 Cdos was moved on 27 Oct 93 to Srinagar. Ops called off after final preparation had been made.
Op Black Thunder I & II were conducted by the NSG. Op Blue Star conducted by the Army in the Golden Temple in 1984 caused extensive damage to the temple complex as well as hurt the psyche of the Sikhs. Op Blue Star was conducted by the Army in a conventional manner employing max fire power to flush out the terrorist inside the Golden Temple. By excessive use of force, there was not only excessive damage to the temple but the casualties on both sides were heavy. However, the after effects of Op Blue Star is yet to be healed. On the other hand NSG carried out Op Black Thunder I & II of similar magnitude. These ops conducted by well trained, well equipped tips of NSG not only completed the task with élan, but the ops had no ramification thereafter.
Counter Hijack Role
52 SAG is earmarked and trained for CH Tasks. Along with 52 SAG, 52 BD and 52 Dog Units provide the Bomb Disposal and detection cover to this force. 52 SAG is based at Palam. The composite TF for CH Ops based on a Boeing 747 aircraft is
quarantined for 2 months at a time at Palam and placed at 30 minutes notice.
Some of the Hijack situations in which NSG commandos were deployed are:-
(a) Op Dum Dum (10 Nov 90). CH TF mob and move to rescue hostages of Thai airbus by Burmese students at Calcutta.
(b) Op Turning Pt (27 Mar 93). CH TF mobilised and move to Adampur for rescue of hostages of IA fit 436.
(c) Op Ashwamedha (24-25 Apr 93). CH Ops to rescue hostages of IA flt IC-427. Mission successful. Without any casualty. Op Ashwamedha was meticulously planned and conducted with a clock like precision. Once the hijack took place, the CH TF was mob at 1505 hrs and was ready to take off at 1525 hrs. The TF took off in an IL-76 ac at 1718 hrs and landed at Adampur. The TF was taken by 6 x MI-17 and 1 x MI 26 hectors to move to Amritsar. The TF arrived at Amritsar airport at 1925 hrs. Throughout the negotiations, the hijacker did not relent to release even ladies and children and ordered the aircraft to be refuelled and flown to Kabul. On 25 Apr
93 at 0047 hrs, the Crisis Management Group cleared the operation of NSG to go ahead. The aircraft was stormed by the NSG Cdos with its specialised CH eqt and shot the hijacker. The Op lasted barely 15 sec» from the word 'go'. The passengers and the crew thereafter were released without any casualty.
Special Ranger Groups (SRG)
The Special Ranger Groups (SRGs) i.e. 11, 12, & 13 SRGs provided immediate support to the SAGs and undertake all facets of anti terrorist actions. Presently the SRGs' manpower is not available for intimate support to the SAGs in case of a CH/CT scenario in view of VIP security duties.
VIP security duties have been entrusted to the NSG for the 'Z' risk category of VIPs. They include 12 Delhi based VIPs and 6 out station VIPs. The manpower of the SRGs is completely committed on the VIP security duties. This becomes worse during elections due to extensive tour of VIPs requiring prepositioning of escorts.
BD & Dog Units.
The BD and Dog Units are to support the ops of the two SAGs. However, they also handle bomb incidents and bomb threat around Delhi. They carry out Anti Sabotage check (ASC) of Parliament House during parliament sessions, important buildings, vehicles and so for PM, President and visiting Heads of State, the BD and Dog Units
have taken part in all ops conducted by the NSG. They have also been deployed in Delhi for major events like Republic Day parade, Independence Day celebrations etc.
Weapon Equipment in the NSG
Keeping in mind the role and the task of various units of the NSG, the over-riding requirement is to process 'State of the Art' weaponry at all times. During the time of initial raising of the NSG, equipment for only one-third of the force was procured.
In the world of fast changing technology newer and better weapons are developed and are available in the world market in a short span of time. To ensure elite force like the NSG to have superior weapons and have guaranteed success, it is essential that the NSG possesses better weapons & equipment with precision, there is a requirement that the quality of manpower in the NSG be of a high standard.
Quality of Manpower
For the task envisaged for the NSG, it requires highly motivated, dedicated personnel who are physically tough and mentally robust. Since NSG is a zero error and no runners-up force and to accomplish the assigned task with no failure, officers and men are handpicked from CPOs and Army. Some of the notable operations undertaken by the NSG and its achievements have been highlighted. In the absence of adequate incentives, the men and officers from the Army and CPOs are not responding to the desired extent, and as a result there are a large number of vacancies. Besides the quality of men volunteering for deputation to the NSG due to lack of adequate incentives is also being felt by the NSG. This no doubt has a direct impact on their performance when a special task is entrusted to them. Till date they have not been able to fill up a large scale vacancies which are continuing since its very inception mainly due to lack of incentives. The training is very tough and the tasks are sensitive and hazardous. To volunteer to NSG one expects attractive perks to compensate the hard life, risks and nature of duty.
Training
NSG Training Centre is located at Manesar. Initially, only NSG probationers were given training at NSG Training Centre. •Subsequently, it was decided to make use of the spare training capacity of the Training Centre to impart training to the personnel
from CPOs, State Police and Army as well. NSG Training Centre is now conducting three types of courses for the Police personnel viz Police Commandos, Personal Security Officers and Bomb personnel viz Police Commandos, Personal Security Officers and Bomb Disposal courses. As per the then PM's decision the bulk of the
instructional staff is from the Army.
The quality of training in NSG has made a mark in the country and is emerging as a major Counter Terrorist Training outfit for different organisations. The demand is growing much faster than, can be met by NSG. It has been proposed to upgrade the Training Centre to the status of a National Academy of Counter Terrorism. This will necessitate a large well trained staff structure for effective handling as well as other institutional establishment security organisations to continuously scan and update their methods. It will be our endeavour to make the Training Centre a 'Centre for excellence for combating terrorism', once the up gradation is carried out.
Risk: The risk factor to its personnel is self explanatory. When dealing with terrorists having 'State of the Art Weapons and Equipments': and ops in unconventional manner, the risks involved are enormous. Even during training the NSG personnel are subjected to risk of injury and even permanent disablement.
Constant Training: To be able to motivate and instil a sense of confidence to carry out any task with surgical precision the NSG has to be always on training to sharpen their skills. Thus it will be seen that NSG carries out constant training to ensure that
when called to carry out a particular task, it is accomplished with 100% success. In addition, the NSG personnel have to operate with latest State of the Art weapon system and equipment which needs constant training to use them to its best advantage.
Constant Alert: In view of short notice at which tasks may be entrusted to the NSG, the NSG personnel have to be constantly on Alert to be deployed for either CT/CH tasks. It is for this very purpose there is an Alert system whereby one TF is always on Alert status. The remainder too will have to be mobile in case needed at a very short notice. This alertness on the NSG personnel puts additional pressures on him and his family.
Credit: Bureau of Police Research and Development
The need for creating a Special Force for executing surgical operations based on tactical intelligence was felt when Blue Star Operation was carried out by the Army at the Golden Temple, Amritsar in 1984. This operation not only caused extensive damage to the Golden Temple but also occasioned a large number of casualties
and above all the Sikh psyche was badly hurt. NSG was conceptualised and created after studying and analysing Special Forces like SAS in the United Kingdom, GIGN in France, GSG-9 in Germany, Shar-et-matkal in Israel and DELTA in the USA. It
consists of selected and highly motivated personnel from the Army as well as the Para Military Forces. 53% of the personnel are drawn from the Army while the Para Military Forces like BSF, CRPF and ITBP contribute 47%.
Tasks
(a) Neutralisation of specific terrorist threat in any given area, building, vital installations, etc.
(b) Engaging terrorists in a specific situation in order to neutralise them.
(c) Handling hijacks situation-involving piracy in the air and on land.
(d) Rescue of hostages in kidnap situations.
Additional Tasks
(a) Security of high risk VIPs.
(b) Anti sabotage check of venue of visits/public meetings of VVIPs.
(c) Create information Bomb Data Centre.
(d) Training of State Police personnel on anti terrorist, VIP Security, PSO duties, bomb detection and disposal etc.
The Ethos of the force is:—
(a) Elitism.
(b) Pursuit for excellence.
(c) Lead from front.
(d) No runners up.
(e) One for all and all for one.
National Security Guard is a small Specialised Force with each of its component having a specific role. The Central Govt. has in NSG a viable Force to carry out specialised CT Ops like Op Black Thunder I& II and Anti-hijack Ops. It mobilised for Hazratbal Shrine in October 1993 also. The Force is well trained, motivated and highly skilled in their tasks. NSG with its expertise and sophisticated
equipment and weapons can take on counter terrorist tasks which are beyond the capabilities of State Police personnel, Central Police Organisations and at times even the Army.
Operations and Training
National Security Guard has been raised to counter terrorism and counter hijack operations in the country. NSG has 51 SAG trained and equipped to carry out CT Ops, while 52 SAG is trained and equipped for CH Ops.
Presently there are two types of elitist roles which this organisation is performing; Counter Terrorist (CT) and Counter Hijack (CH) operations. In addition to that NSG is also entrusted with close protection and mobile security duties of threatened VIPs of Z + category risk. CT & CH tasks are very specialised and high risk duties and the best of personnel are required for this job. Similarly VIP protection is also highly skilled task. NSG has patterned VIP security tasks on the same lines as the protection of the Prime Minister by special protection group (SPG). Since VIP protection duty personnel remain under constant threat while moving with the
VIPs, they have to be selectively enrolled, well trained and highly motivated. To streamline these duties and integrate the commandos with their tasks, NSG propose to internally divide its force into two parts; one for CH and CT duties and the other for VIP security duties. This step will further add to the elitism of NSG and more
importantly will further refine the training .standards and performance of these personnel. This will provide them with the upgraded skills, techniques and operational competence for foolproof performance of their duty at all times. Due to the risks involved in the above mentioned highly sensitive tasks and to attract high quality manpower for this elite organisation it is essential that Pay & Allowances of the NSG personnel is made the best and at par with SPG if not better than them.
To carry out Counter Terrorists Commando operations, routine operation tactics is not adequate. Commando type operations are special operations and they have to be conceived and conducted as such.
The salient aspects of Commando type operations are:—
(a) Speedy induction from the Administrative Base up to target area, to achieve maximum surprise.
(b) Isolation of the area by Special Ranger Groups (SRGs).
(c) Surgical strikes by Special Action Group (SAG).
(d) SAG is relieved by SRG/State Police.
(e) Rapid denudation of the task force.
To carry out CT Tasks at a very short notice and to ensure the force is operationally ready and fit we have evolved a system whereby one Squadron is readily available for operation and is available at 3 hrs notice. Another Squadron is placed on training while the third Squadron is on leave and other routine duties. Thus at any time 2 Squadron worth of personnel are always available to be launched for any tasks.
The main Commando type operations carried out by NSG are given below:-
(a) OP Black Thunder-I (29 Apr-30 Apr 86). Approx 80 offers, 180 JCOs and 1500 men participated in it. The temple was cleared and handed over to Punjab Police by 0600 hrs on 01 May 1986. 122 terrorists surrendered.
(b) Op Steeple Chase III (5 Sep 87—15 Jan 88). Guarding of a high risk terrorist code 'Jack'.
(c) Op Black Hawk (20 Jan 1988). Heliborne ops in Mand area of Punjab. 2 terrorists killed and one 7.62 SLR recovered.
(d) Op Black Thunder-ll (10 May-20 May 88) Ops in golden Temple in conjunction with Punjab Police. 30 terrorist killed 217 surrendered. 69 weapons of all types recovered. AK-47-22, CPMG-3, Pistol-19, 1500 (all ranks) of the NSG participated in the ops.
(e) Op Cactus (03 Nov-08 Nov 88). 600 Commando (Cdo) Mob for ops in Male, Maldives. Subsequently tasked for rescue mission of Hostages on "MW Progress Light".
(f) Op Mouse Trap (04 Aug 89). Ops in Taran Distt in conjunction with PP and SF. 26 terrorists killed, 17 apprehended, 27 weapons recovered including 13 x AK 47, 2 Gp MG's one RPG.
(g) Op Ani Ban (25-26 Jan 91). CI Tasks at Baroda. Punjab terrorists holed up inside a house in Baroda. 2 terrorists killed and 2 AK 47 recovered.
(h) Op Ghost Buster (01 Jul—20 Sep 91). NSG Commandos deployed with SIT for search and strike missions after the assassination of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.
(j) Op Sudarshan (25 Nov-16 Dec 92). 150 NSG Cdos deployed at Ayodhya during RJB and BM dispute.
(k) Op Winter Storm (27 Oct-18 Nov 93). Ops at Hazratbal Shrine. A TF of 20 Offers, 29 ACs and 176 Cdos was moved on 27 Oct 93 to Srinagar. Ops called off after final preparation had been made.
Op Black Thunder I & II were conducted by the NSG. Op Blue Star conducted by the Army in the Golden Temple in 1984 caused extensive damage to the temple complex as well as hurt the psyche of the Sikhs. Op Blue Star was conducted by the Army in a conventional manner employing max fire power to flush out the terrorist inside the Golden Temple. By excessive use of force, there was not only excessive damage to the temple but the casualties on both sides were heavy. However, the after effects of Op Blue Star is yet to be healed. On the other hand NSG carried out Op Black Thunder I & II of similar magnitude. These ops conducted by well trained, well equipped tips of NSG not only completed the task with élan, but the ops had no ramification thereafter.
Counter Hijack Role
52 SAG is earmarked and trained for CH Tasks. Along with 52 SAG, 52 BD and 52 Dog Units provide the Bomb Disposal and detection cover to this force. 52 SAG is based at Palam. The composite TF for CH Ops based on a Boeing 747 aircraft is
quarantined for 2 months at a time at Palam and placed at 30 minutes notice.
Some of the Hijack situations in which NSG commandos were deployed are:-
(a) Op Dum Dum (10 Nov 90). CH TF mob and move to rescue hostages of Thai airbus by Burmese students at Calcutta.
(b) Op Turning Pt (27 Mar 93). CH TF mobilised and move to Adampur for rescue of hostages of IA fit 436.
(c) Op Ashwamedha (24-25 Apr 93). CH Ops to rescue hostages of IA flt IC-427. Mission successful. Without any casualty. Op Ashwamedha was meticulously planned and conducted with a clock like precision. Once the hijack took place, the CH TF was mob at 1505 hrs and was ready to take off at 1525 hrs. The TF took off in an IL-76 ac at 1718 hrs and landed at Adampur. The TF was taken by 6 x MI-17 and 1 x MI 26 hectors to move to Amritsar. The TF arrived at Amritsar airport at 1925 hrs. Throughout the negotiations, the hijacker did not relent to release even ladies and children and ordered the aircraft to be refuelled and flown to Kabul. On 25 Apr
93 at 0047 hrs, the Crisis Management Group cleared the operation of NSG to go ahead. The aircraft was stormed by the NSG Cdos with its specialised CH eqt and shot the hijacker. The Op lasted barely 15 sec» from the word 'go'. The passengers and the crew thereafter were released without any casualty.
Special Ranger Groups (SRG)
The Special Ranger Groups (SRGs) i.e. 11, 12, & 13 SRGs provided immediate support to the SAGs and undertake all facets of anti terrorist actions. Presently the SRGs' manpower is not available for intimate support to the SAGs in case of a CH/CT scenario in view of VIP security duties.
VIP security duties have been entrusted to the NSG for the 'Z' risk category of VIPs. They include 12 Delhi based VIPs and 6 out station VIPs. The manpower of the SRGs is completely committed on the VIP security duties. This becomes worse during elections due to extensive tour of VIPs requiring prepositioning of escorts.
BD & Dog Units.
The BD and Dog Units are to support the ops of the two SAGs. However, they also handle bomb incidents and bomb threat around Delhi. They carry out Anti Sabotage check (ASC) of Parliament House during parliament sessions, important buildings, vehicles and so for PM, President and visiting Heads of State, the BD and Dog Units
have taken part in all ops conducted by the NSG. They have also been deployed in Delhi for major events like Republic Day parade, Independence Day celebrations etc.
Weapon Equipment in the NSG
Keeping in mind the role and the task of various units of the NSG, the over-riding requirement is to process 'State of the Art' weaponry at all times. During the time of initial raising of the NSG, equipment for only one-third of the force was procured.
In the world of fast changing technology newer and better weapons are developed and are available in the world market in a short span of time. To ensure elite force like the NSG to have superior weapons and have guaranteed success, it is essential that the NSG possesses better weapons & equipment with precision, there is a requirement that the quality of manpower in the NSG be of a high standard.
Quality of Manpower
For the task envisaged for the NSG, it requires highly motivated, dedicated personnel who are physically tough and mentally robust. Since NSG is a zero error and no runners-up force and to accomplish the assigned task with no failure, officers and men are handpicked from CPOs and Army. Some of the notable operations undertaken by the NSG and its achievements have been highlighted. In the absence of adequate incentives, the men and officers from the Army and CPOs are not responding to the desired extent, and as a result there are a large number of vacancies. Besides the quality of men volunteering for deputation to the NSG due to lack of adequate incentives is also being felt by the NSG. This no doubt has a direct impact on their performance when a special task is entrusted to them. Till date they have not been able to fill up a large scale vacancies which are continuing since its very inception mainly due to lack of incentives. The training is very tough and the tasks are sensitive and hazardous. To volunteer to NSG one expects attractive perks to compensate the hard life, risks and nature of duty.
Training
NSG Training Centre is located at Manesar. Initially, only NSG probationers were given training at NSG Training Centre. •Subsequently, it was decided to make use of the spare training capacity of the Training Centre to impart training to the personnel
from CPOs, State Police and Army as well. NSG Training Centre is now conducting three types of courses for the Police personnel viz Police Commandos, Personal Security Officers and Bomb personnel viz Police Commandos, Personal Security Officers and Bomb Disposal courses. As per the then PM's decision the bulk of the
instructional staff is from the Army.
The quality of training in NSG has made a mark in the country and is emerging as a major Counter Terrorist Training outfit for different organisations. The demand is growing much faster than, can be met by NSG. It has been proposed to upgrade the Training Centre to the status of a National Academy of Counter Terrorism. This will necessitate a large well trained staff structure for effective handling as well as other institutional establishment security organisations to continuously scan and update their methods. It will be our endeavour to make the Training Centre a 'Centre for excellence for combating terrorism', once the up gradation is carried out.
Risk: The risk factor to its personnel is self explanatory. When dealing with terrorists having 'State of the Art Weapons and Equipments': and ops in unconventional manner, the risks involved are enormous. Even during training the NSG personnel are subjected to risk of injury and even permanent disablement.
Constant Training: To be able to motivate and instil a sense of confidence to carry out any task with surgical precision the NSG has to be always on training to sharpen their skills. Thus it will be seen that NSG carries out constant training to ensure that
when called to carry out a particular task, it is accomplished with 100% success. In addition, the NSG personnel have to operate with latest State of the Art weapon system and equipment which needs constant training to use them to its best advantage.
Constant Alert: In view of short notice at which tasks may be entrusted to the NSG, the NSG personnel have to be constantly on Alert to be deployed for either CT/CH tasks. It is for this very purpose there is an Alert system whereby one TF is always on Alert status. The remainder too will have to be mobile in case needed at a very short notice. This alertness on the NSG personnel puts additional pressures on him and his family.
Credit: Bureau of Police Research and Development
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