The Messiah and the Promised Land

Margaret Bourke-White was a correspondent and photographer for LIFE magazine during the WW II years. In September 1947, White went to Pakistan. She met Jinnah and wrote about what she found and heard in her book Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949. The following are the excerpts:

Pakistan was one month old. Karachi was its mushrooming capital. On the sandy fringes of the city an enormous tent colony had grown up to house the influx of minor government officials. There was only one major government official, Mahomed Ali Jinnah, and there was no need for Jinnah to take to a tent. The huge marble and sandstone Government House, vacated by British officialdom, was waiting. The Quaid-i-Azam moved in, with his sister, Fatima, as hostess. Mr. Jinnah had put on what his critics called his "triple crown": he had made himself Governor-General; he was retaining the presidency of the Muslim League -- now Pakistan's only political party; and he was president of the country's lawmaking body, the Constituent Assembly.

"We never expected to get it so soon," Miss Fatima said when I called. "We never expected to get it in our lifetimes."

If Fatima's reaction was a glow of family pride, her brother's was a fever of ecstasy. Jinnah's deep-sunk eyes were pinpoints of excitement. His whole manner indicated that an almost overwhelming exaltation was racing through his veins. I had murmured some words of congratulation on his achievement in creating the world's largest Islamic nation.

"Oh, it's not just the largest Islamic nation. Pakistan is the fifth-largest nation in the world!"

The note of personal triumph was so unmistakable that I wondered how much thought he gave to the human cost: more Muslim lives had been sacrificed to create the new Muslim homeland than America, for example, had lost during the entire Second World War I hoped he had a constructive plan for the seventy million citizens of Pakistan. What kind of constitution did he intend to draw up?

"Of course it will be a democratic constitution; Islam is a democratic religion."

I ventured to suggest that the term "democracy" was often loosely used these days. Could he define what he had in mind?

"Democracy is not just a new thing we are learning," said Jinnah. "It is in our blood. We have always had our system of zakat -- our obligation to the poor."

This confusion of democracy with charity troubled me. I begged him to be more specific.

"Our Islamic ideas have been based on democracy and social justice since the thirteenth century."

This mention of the thirteenth century troubled me still more. Pakistan has other relics of the Middle Ages besides "social justice" -- the remnants of a feudal land system, for one. What would the new constitution do about that? "The land belongs to the God," says the Koran. This would need clarification in the constitution. Presumably Jinnah, the lawyer, would be just the person to correlate the "true Islamic principles" one heard so much about in Pakistan with the new nation's laws. But all he would tell me was that the constitution would be democratic because "the soil is perfectly fertile for democracy."

What plans did he have for the industrial development of the country? Did he hope to enlist technical or financial assistance from America?

"America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America," was Jinnah's reply. "Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed" -- he revolved his long forefinger in bony circles -- "the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves." He leaned toward me, dropping his voice to a confidential note. "Russia," confided Mr. Jinnah, "is not so very far away."

This had a familiar ring. In Jinnah's mind this brave new nation had no other claim on American friendship than this - that across a wild tumble of roadless mountain ranges lay the land of the Bolsheviks. I wondered whether the Quaid-i-Azam considered his new state only as an armoured buffer between opposing major powers. He was stressing America's military interest in other parts of the world. "America is now awakened," he said with a satisfied smile. Since the United States was now bolstering up Greece and Turkey, she should be much more interested in pouring money and arms into Pakistan. "If Russia walks in here," he concluded, "the whole world is menaced."

In the weeks to come I was to hear the Quaid-i-Azam's thesis echoed by government officials throughout Pakistan. "Surely America will build up our army," they would say to me. "Surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in." But when I asked whether there were any signs of Russian infiltration, they would reply almost sadly, as though sorry not to be able to make more of the argument. "No, Russia has shown no signs of being interested in Pakistan."

This hope of tapping the U. S. Treasury was voiced so persistently that one wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against Bolshevism or to bolster Pakistan's own uncertain position as a new political entity. Actually, I think, it was more nearly related to the even more significant bankruptcy of ideas in the new Muslim state -- a nation drawing its spurious warmth from the embers of an antique religious fanaticism, fanned into a new blaze.

Jinnah's most frequently used technique in the struggle for his new nation had been the playing of opponent against opponent. Evidently this technique was now to be extended into foreign policy. ....

No one would have been more astonished than Jinnah if he could have foreseen thirty or forty years earlier that anyone would ever speak of him as a "saviour of Islam." In those days any talk of religion brought a cynical smile. He condemned those who talked in terms of religious rivalries, and in the stirring period when the crusade for freedom began sweeping the country he was hailed as "the embodied symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity." The gifted Congresswoman, Mrs. Naidu, one of Jinnah's closest friends, wrote poems extolling his role as the great unifier in the fight for independence. "Perchance it is written in the book of the future," ran one of her tributes, "that he, in some terrible crisis of our national struggle, will pass into immortality" as the hero of "the Indian liberation."

In the "terrible crisis," Mahomed Ali Jinnah was to pass into immortality, not as the ambassador of unity, but as the deliberate apostle of discord. What caused this spectacular renunciation of the concept of a united India, to which he had dedicated the greater part of his life? No one knows exactly. The immediate occasion for the break, in the mid-thirties, was his opposition to Gandhi's civil disobedience program. Nehru says that Jinnah "disliked the crowds of ill-dressed people who filled the Congress" and was not at home with the new spirit rising among the common people under Gandhi's magnetic leadership. Others say it was against his legal conscience to accept Gandhi's program. One thing is certain: the break with Gandhi, Nehru, and the other Congress leaders was not caused by any Hindu-Muslim issue.

In any case, Jinnah revived the moribund Muslim League in 1936 after it had dragged through an anaemic thirty years' existence, and took to the religious soapbox. He began dinning into the ears of millions of Muslims the claim that they were downtrodden solely because of Hindu domination. During the years directly preceding this move on his part, an unprecedented degree of unity had developed between Muslims and Hindus in their struggle for independence from the British Raj. The British feared this unity, and used their divide-and-rule tactics to disrupt it. Certain highly placed Indians also feared unity, dreading a popular movement which would threaten their special position. Then another decisive factor arose. Although Hindus had always been ahead of Muslims in the industrial sphere, the great Muslim feudal landlords now had aspirations toward industry. From these wealthy Muslims, who resented the well-established Hindu competition, Jinnah drew his powerful supporters. One wonders whether Jinnah was fighting to free downtrodden Muslims from domination or merely to gain an earmarked area, free from competition, for this small and wealthy clan.

The trend of events in Pakistan would support the theory that Jinnah carried the banner of the Muslim landed aristocracy, rather than that of the Muslim masses he claimed to champion. There was no hint of personal material gain in this. Jinnah was known to be personally incorruptible, a virtue which gave him a great strength with both poor and rich. The drive for personal wealth played no part in his politics. It was a drive for power. ......

Less than three months after Pakistan became a nation, Jinnah's Olympian assurance had strangely withered. His altered condition was not made public. "The Quaid-i-Azam has a bad cold" was the answer given to inquiries.

Only those closest to him knew that the "cold" was accompanied by paralyzing inability to make even the smallest decisions, by sullen silences striped with outbursts of irritation, by a spiritual numbness concealing something close to panic underneath. I knew it only because I spent most of this trying period at Government House, attempting to take a new portrait of Jinnah for a Life cover.

The Quaid-i-Azam was still revered as a messiah and deliverer by most of his people. But the "Great Leader" himself could not fail to know that all was not well in his new creation, the nation; the nation that his critics referred to as the "House that Jinnah built." The separation from the main body of India had been in many ways an unrealistic one. Pakistan raised 75 per cent of the world's jute supply; the processing mills were all in India. Pakistan raised one third of the cotton of India, but it had only one thirtieth of the cotton mills. Although it produced the bulk of Indian skins and hides, all the leather tanneries were in South India. The new state had no paper mills, few iron foundries. Rail and road facilities, insufficient at best, were still choked with refugees. Pakistan has a superbly fertile soil, and its outstanding advantage is self-sufficiency in food, but this was threatened by the never-ending flood of refugees who continued pouring in long after the peak of the religious wars had passed.

With his burning devotion to his separate Islamic nation, Jinnah had taken all these formidable obstacles in his stride. But the blow that finally broke his spirit struck at the very name of Pakistan. While the literal meaning of the name is "Land of the Pure," the word is a compound of initial letters of the Muslim majority provinces which Jinnah had expected to incorporate: P for the Punjab, A for the Afghans' area on the Northwest Frontier, S for Sind, -tan for Baluchistan. But the K was missing.

Kashmir, India's largest princely state, despite its 77 per cent Muslim population, had not fallen into the arms of Pakistan by the sheer weight of religious majority. Kashmir had acceded to India, and although it was now the scene of an undeclared war between the two nations, the fitting of the K into Pakistan was left in doubt. With the beginning of this torturing anxiety over Kashmir, the Quaid-i-Azam's siege of bad colds began, and then his dismaying withdrawal into himself. ....

Later, reflecting on what I had seen, I decided that this desperation was due to causes far deeper than anxiety over Pakistan's territorial and economic difficulties. I think that the tortured appearance of Mr. Jinnah was an indication that, in these final months of his life, he was adding up his own balance sheet. Analytical, brilliant, and no bigot, he knew what he had done. Like Doctor Faustus, he had made a bargain from which he could never be free. During the heat of the struggle he had been willing to call on all the devilish forces of superstition, and now that his new nation had been achieved the bigots were in the position of authority. The leaders of orthodoxy and a few "old families" had the final word and, to perpetuate their power, were seeing to it that the people were held in the deadening grip of religious superstition.

credit: Margaret Bourke-White & her book Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949

Afghanistan from a General's Eye

Gen. McChrystal's Speech on Afghanistan

International Institute for Strategic Studies
London, United Kingdom

I. Preamble

It is an honour for me to be here and I would like to thank you for giving me the time. I would also like to thank not only my hosts but also all of you who took time to be here today. This is an extraordinarily important subject: we have young people – not only from the coalition but also young Afghans – in the field today, who depend on the decisions we make and the analysis we do. Taking the time to talk and think about it is always time well-spent, so I thank you for that.
I am privileged to speak here today as the Commander of NATO’s ISAF forces, representing people from 42 troop-contributing nations. I represent them today and I hope to do that well. As you know, I have a British deputy, Lieutenant General Jim Dutton, who is coming to the end of his term and will soon be replaced by another great British officer, Lieutenant General Nick Parker.
Before I continue, I would like to recognise the enormous sacrifice that families here in the UK have made. As you know, the losses that we have suffered are significant in terms of those who have fallen, suffered life-changing injuries, or given up parts of their life just by being away from family. I am in awe of the performance of the British brothers whom I have been honoured to work with for a number of years now.

I am humbled to be here because I do not claim to be in the same category as people who have been talking here, such as Prime Minister Brown and President Zardari, who expressed their views on this complex subject. I do, however, believe that I can offer some perspectives and will try to do that today. I will start by posing seven questions before attempting to answer them. If this works according to my plan, it will totally exhaust your appetite for this issue and I will leave the room to wild cheers and lucrative job offers. If my plan fails, as most of mine do, I will be happy to field any questions that we have time for.

II. What is the Right Approach to Use in Afghanistan?

1. People’s Own Suggestions

People ask me this question all the time; many people offer their own suggestions. There is a multitude of approaches to what to do. Some people say that we should focus primarily on development; others say that we should conduct a counterterrorist-focused battle, given that this really started after 9/11 and Al-Qaeda’s strikes. Other people say that we should conduct counterinsurgency (COIN). A paper has been written that recommends that we use a plan called ‘Chaosistan’, and that we let Afghanistan become a Somalia-like haven of chaos that we simply manage from outside.

2. The Complexities of Afghanistan

a. The delicate balance of power

I arrived in Afghanistan in May 2002 and I have spent a part of every year since then involved in the effort. I have learned a tremendous amount about it and, every day, I realise how little about Afghanistan I actually understand. I discount immediately anyone who simplifies the problem or offers a solution, because they have absolutely no idea of the complexity of what we are dealing with.
In Afghanistan, things are rarely as they seem, and the outcomes of actions we take, however well intended, are often different from what we expect. If you pull the lever, the outcome is not what you have been programmed to think. For example, digging a well sounds quite simple. How could you do anything wrong by digging a well to give people clean water? Where you build that well, who controls that water, and what water it taps into all have tremendous implications and create great passion.
If you build a well in the wrong place in a village, you may have shifted the basis of power in that village. If you tap into underground water, you give power to the owner of that well that they did not have before, because the traditional irrigation system was community-owned. If you dig a well and contract it to one person or group over another, you make a decision that, perhaps in your ignorance, tips the balance of power, or perception thereof, in that village.
Therefore, with a completely altruistic aim of building a well, you can create divisiveness or give the impression that you, from the outside, do not understand what is going on or that you have sided with one element or another, yet all you tried to do is provide water.

b. COIN mathematics

There is another complexity that people do not understand and which the military have to learn: I call it ‘COIN mathematics’. Intelligence will normally tell us how many insurgents are operating in an area. Let us say that there are 10 in a certain area. Following a military operation, two are killed. How many insurgents are left? Traditional mathematics would say that eight would be left, but there may only be two, because six of the living eight may have said, ‘This business of insurgency is becoming dangerous so I am going to do something else.’
There are more likely to be as many as 20, because each one you killed has a brother, father, son and friends, who do not necessarily think that they were killed because they were doing something wrong. It does not matter – you killed them. Suddenly, then, there may be 20, making the calculus of military operations very different. Yet we are asking young corporals, sergeants and lieutenants to make those kinds of calculations and requiring them to understand the situation. They have to – there is no simple workaround.
It is that complex: where you build the well, what military operations to run, who you talk to. Everything that you do is part of a complex system with expected and unexpected, desired and undesired outcomes, and outcomes that you never find out about. In my experience, I have found that the best answers and approaches may be counterintuitive; i.e. the opposite of what it seems like you ought to do is what ought to be done. When I am asked what approach we should take in Afghanistan, I say ‘humility’.

III. What Environment Are We Operating In?

1. Generally Accepted Truths

The answer to this question starts with some generally accepted truths about Afghanistan, which we all know to be true:

• It is a graveyard of empires.
• Afghanistan has never been ruled by a strong central government.
• Afghans do not consider themselves Afghans.

All three are untrue. If you ask an Afghan what he is, he will say, ‘I am an Afghan’. There have been strong central governments, although different from what you think of as central government. In the sense of governance, there have been periods when Afghanistan absolutely had a central government. Therefore, we have to start by not accepting any of the generally accepted ‘bumper sticker’ truths.

2. Real Truths

a. Complex, difficult geography and demography

In terms of real truths, it is complex, difficult terrain, both in terms of land and people. It is also a tribal society with a culture that is vastly different from what most of us are familiar with. There are variations around the country; you cannot assume that what is true in one province is true in another. That goes for ethnic, geographic and economic issues. You cannot even assume that what is true in one valley is true in the next any more than you can assume that one neighbourhood in London is exactly the same as another. We would not generalise here, yet sometimes, as outsiders, we want to do that.

b. A long period of conflict

I would also remind people that we have been waging a war for eight years, yet the Afghans have been at it for 30. Life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44 years, so not many people remember pre conflict life in Afghanistan. Of those 30 years, about 10 were spent fighting the Soviets, followed by six years of ‘war lordism’ and a further six years of Taliban rule and civil rule, and the last eight years have been eight more years of fighting.
One elder said something that really struck me one night as we were talking: ‘What you see in Afghanistan now is a reflection of pieces of each of those eras’. It is now a mosaic of the experiences of all those eras. If you think about the impact of 30 years on people and on a society, calculations change. The certainty that you have when you walk through your neighbourhood in London is not the certainty that they have. The expectation of the future is not the expectation that they may have. The opportunities to be educated and to associate with different ethnic groups, which have become more of a challenge in recent years, are very different.

c. A damaged society

The society is what I would call ‘damaged’. Individuals may not be damaged, but the society is not as it was. It is not so uniformly; nor can you say ‘it is all different here’. Tribal structures, relationships and expectations are uncertain now. When you go into a village in a Pashtun area, traditionally you could have predicted what the role and interrelationships of the mullah or the elders would be. That is no longer true. It varies based upon the experience of that area. In some areas, some have disproportionate influence and others have none. Some have been killed. In other cases, elements like the Taliban have come in and completely turned upside down the traditional structures. You can also not assume that traditional structures have disappeared, so you have to go in and learn what the structure is and how people deal with it.

3. A Uniquely Complex Environment

What we face, then, is a uniquely complex environment, where there are at least three regional and resilient insurgencies, with further sub-insurgencies. They have intersected on top of a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of war. You then run into someone who raises their finger and says ‘here is the solution’ – they can have my job.

4. A Crisis of Confidence

We also face a crisis of confidence. Afghans are frustrated after the most recent eight years of war, because in 2001 their expectations skyrocketed. Along with the arrival of coalition forces, they expected a positive change. They saw that initially and then waited for other changes – economic development and improvements in governance – that, in many cases, may have been unrealistic but, in many cases, were unmet. Therefore, there was a mismatch between what they had hoped for and what they have experienced. Again, as we learn in all societies, expectations and perceptions often matter as much as the reality.

IV. What Is the Situation Now?

1. Serious and Deteriorating

The situation is serious, and I choose that word very carefully. I would add that neither success nor failure for our endeavour in support of the Afghan people and government can be taken for granted. My assessment and my best military judgment is that the situation is, in some ways, deteriorating, but not in all ways.

2. Tremendous Progress

I can also point out areas in which tremendous progress is evident: the construction of roads, provision of clean water, access to healthcare, the presence of children in school, and access to education for females. All of these are up dramatically and hugely positive, and portend well for the future.

3. A Need to Reverse Current Trends

However, a tremendous number of villagers live in fear, and there are officials who either cannot or do not serve their people effectively. Violence is on the increase, not only because there are more coalition forces, but also because the insurgency has grown. We need to reverse the current trends, and time does matter. Waiting does not prolong a favourable outcome. This effort will not remain winnable indefinitely, and nor will public support. However, the cruel irony is that, in order to succeed, we need patience, discipline, resolve and time.

V. Who is Winning?

1. A Battle of Minds and Perceptions

a. Not a game with points on a scoreboard

The answer to this question depends on who you ask. This is not like a football game with points on a scoreboard; it is more like a political debate, after which both sides announce that they won. That matters because we are not the scorekeepers: not NATO ISAF, not our governments, and not even our press. The perception of all of these entities will matter and they will affect the situation, but ultimately this is going to be decided in the minds and perceptions of the Afghan people of the Afghan government and of the insurgents, whether they can win or are winning, and, most importantly, the perception of the villager who casts his lot with the winner.

b. Villagers make rational and practical decisions

Villagers are supremely rational and practical people: they make the decision on who they will support, based upon who can protect them and provide for them what they need. If a villager lives in a remote area where the government or security forces cannot protect them from coercion or harm from insurgents, he will not support the government – it would be illogical. Similarly, if the government cannot provide him with rule of law, the basic ability to adjudicate requirements legally, or just enough services to allow him to pursue a likelihood, it is difficult for him to make a rational decision to support the government. The Taliban is not popular. It does not have a compelling context. What it has is proximity to the people and the ability to provide coercion and, in some cases, things like basic rule of law, based upon the fact that they are there and can put themselves in that position. The perception of the villager matters in terms of which side he should support, so winning the battle of perception is key.

c. Allowing the facts to speak for themselves

I also think that winning the battle of perception, as it applies everywhere but particularly to us, is about credibility. As I told you, the situation is absolutely not deteriorating by every indicator, but I will not stand up and say that we are winning until I am told by indicators that we are winning. For me to stand up and claim good things that are not supported by data in order to motivate us and make us feel good very rapidly undermines our credibility. Our own forces are smart enough to do that, so I intend to tell people the best assessment that we can, as accurately as possible, and allow the facts to speak for themselves.

VI. It Has Been Eight Years – Why Is It Not Better?

This is a fair question for the Afghan people and for societies that have supported this effort. It is true that, after eight years of tremendous effort and expenditure and the loss of good people, many things are worse. Why have eight years of effort not made things better? There are a number of complex reasons:

• The insurgency grew.
• Expectations – both expected and unexpected – were not met, which has
created frustration.
• It took us longer than I wish it had to recognise this as a serious
insurgency. As the Taliban started to regain its effectiveness, we lagged
in terms of accepting that as a clear reality.

Through our actions, we – i.e. the coalition and its Afghan partners – sometimes exacerbate the problems.

• We have under-resourced our operations.
• In some areas, we have underperformed; in others, we have under-coordinated.
• We have struggled with unity of effort, national agreements and chains of
command that are complex to say the least.
• In some ways, we have not overcome some of our intrinsic disadvantages. We
are operating in a very different culture, with language differences,
relationships that do not exist and a complex situation that takes time to
understand, yet we have not effectively developed enough expertise,
continuity of people or sufficient numbers of language-trained people to
deal with the situation as effectively as we could have.
• Most importantly, our own operational culture – and by ‘our’ I mean
coalition forces – and manner of operating distances us physically and
psychologically from the people who we seek to protect. We need to connect
with people, yet physical or linguistic barriers make it increasingly
difficult. Ultimately, our security comes from the people. We cannot build
enough walls to protect ourselves if the people do not.

We must, then, operate and think in a fundamentally new way.

VII. Can We Succeed?

1. Protecting the Afghan People from the Enemy

We can succeed. We must redefine the fight. The objective is the will of the Afghan people. We must protect the Afghan people from all threats: from the enemy and from our own actions. Let me describe it: a few days ago, just before we left to travel here, a bus south of Kandahar struck an improvised explosive device (IED) killing 30 Afghan civilians. That is tragic.
On the one hand, you might say that the Afghan people would recoil against the Taliban who left that IED. To a degree, they do, but we must also understand that they recoil against us because they might think that, if we were not there, neither would be the IED. Therefore, we indirectly caused the IED to be there. Second, we said that we would protect them, but we did not. Sometimes, then, the most horrific events caused by the insurgents continue to reinforce in the minds of the Afghan people a mindset that coalition forces are either ineffective, or at least that their presence in Afghanistan is not in their interest. That does not happen all of the time. There are times when they feel differently, but you have to put things in that context to understand what we must do.

2. Protection from Our Own Actions

a. Respecting the people

We also need to protect them from our own actions. When we fight, if we become focused on destroying the enemy but end up killing Afghan civilians, destroying Afghan property or acting in a way that is perceived as arrogant, we convince the Afghan people that we do not care about them. If we say, ‘We are here for you – we respect and want to protect you’, while destroying their home, killing their relatives or destroying their crops, it is difficult for them to connect those two concepts. It would be difficult for us to do the same. The understanding, then, must be that we respect the people.

b. Changing our mindset

We must assign responsibility because, ultimately, the Afghans must defeat the insurgency. As a force, however, we must change our mindset. Whether or not we like it, we have a conventional warfare culture – not just our militaries but our societies. Our societies want to see lines on a map moving forward towards objectives, but you will not see that in a counterinsurgency because you do not see as clearly what is happening in people’s minds. We will have to do things dramatically and even uncomfortably differently in order to change how we think and operate.
In short, we cannot succeed by simply trying harder. We cannot drop three more bombs and have a greater effect; it is much more subtle than that.

3. Crucial Next Steps

In my mind, therefore, what we must do over the next period of time is:
• Gain the initiative by reversing the perceived momentum possessed by the
insurgents.
• Seek rapid growth of Afghan national security forces – the army and the
police.
• Improve their effectiveness and ours through closer partnering, which
involves planning, living and operating together and taking advantage of
each other’s strengths as we go forward. Within ISAF, we will put more
emphasis on every part of that, by integrating our headquarters, physically
co-locating our units, and sharing ownership of the problem.
• Address shortfalls in the capacity of governance and the ability of the
Afghan government to provide rule of law.
• Tackle the issue of predatory corruption by some officials or by warlords
who are not in an official position but who seem to have the ability,
sometimes sanctioned by existing conditions, to do that.
• Focus our resources and prioritise in those areas where the population is
most threatened. We do not have enough forces to do everything everywhere
at once, so this has to be prioritised and phased over time.

4. A Need for Resolve

As you know, the concepts that I have outlined here are not new, but if we implement them aggressively and effectively, we can create a revolution in terms of our effectiveness. We must show resolve. Uncertainty disheartens our allies, emboldens our foe. A villager recently asked me whether we intended to remain in his village and provide security, to which I confidently promised him that, of course, we would. He looked at me and said, ‘Okay, but you did not stay last time.’

VIII. Why Bother?

1. The Risk Posed by Al-Qaeda

Afghanistan is difficult, so why bother? It is a long way away. It is not our business. As we know, however, 9/11 brought us here to the latest interaction, and Trans national terrorist threats absolutely remain. I believe that the loss of stability in Afghanistan brings a huge risk that Trans national terrorists such as Al-Qaeda will operate from within Afghanistan again.

2. High Stakes for Afghanistan and the Region

I also believe that the stakes are high for Afghanistan and for the region. An unstable Afghanistan not only negatively affects what happens within its borders but also affects its neighbours. Afghanistan is, in many ways, one of the keys to stability in south Asia. A state that can provide its own security is important to all international security, and certainly to that of the UK, the US and our international partnership. The Afghan people are worth bothering about and they deserve that.

IX. Conclusion

In conclusion, I am exceptionally proud to serve at ISAF. Within my office, I have a picture of a British battle group, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gus Fair, with whom I worked for a long time in Iraq. He is with his soldiers, who I had the opportunity to speak with when I visited them during operations in Spin Majid this summer in the Helmand River valley. I keep that picture because, when I looked into their eyes, which were bloodshot with fatigue, I remember the extraordinary professionalism, competence and sheer courage of those young men. Whenever I come to London, I like to run through the city, and I particularly like the statues that you have erected to heroes. I hope that you erect one to that generation – they have earned it.

Thank you.

Lest We Forget - Nagarwala Mystery 1971

Capt Nagarwala, a close confidant of Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, withdrew lakhs of rupees from the secret chests of State Bank of India Parliament Street New Delhi, the account being numberless. Chief Cashier of the branch Mr. Malhotra readily gave the cash to Nagarwala allegedly on instructions of Indira Ji. The story thus goes that he imitated the voice of PM to tell Malhotra to pay Nagarwala Rs. 9 lakhs. Soon there was hot chase and Nagarwala was nabbed, cash recovered and ‘restored’ to the rightful owner. In the process Malhotra was fired from Bank service for gross violation of ‘rules’.

But then it is possible that two and two make five. Soon Malhotra became the Chief Security Officer of the Maruti Udyog Ltd then owned by Sanjay Gandhi! He also found himself rewarded with many licenses for plying buses and matadors on Delhi roads for owning everything but the money. See the linkage of the heritage?

Incidentally, CBI Deputy Director Madhvan who had almost reached the end-users was fired half way through the enquiry even as Nagarwala was sent to mental ward in GB Pant Hospital and of course ‘died’. The police party led by an SP who enquired into the Nagarwala case was shown having perished in accident with truck!


Jai Ho!!!!!!! Congress Party

credit:Daily Excelsior

Kargil War from the Donkeys mouth

KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE

Pakistani writings on Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is PAF airman's perspective, focusing on the IAF's air operations and the PAF's position.

Operational Planning in the PAF

Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF's appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF's hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.

The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF's 'corporate' decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.

The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF's operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.

In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot's career after repatriation and rose to command PAF's premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.

The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders' School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF's Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.

The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.

The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.

There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF's hierarchy was highly qualified and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.

First Rumblings

As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army's Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army's interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.

After hearing Gp Capt Tariq's report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army's ongoing 'review of contingency plans' required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the 'Kashmir Contingency'.


Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the 'latest situation in Kashmir' at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a 'protective manoeuvre', he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. "Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold," he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of 'providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir' was never mentioned.)

When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. "I have Stingers on every peak," he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud's reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link's vulnerability to our offensive elements.


It seemed from the Corps Commander's smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners' minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander's elucidation.

Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, "After this operation, it's going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!" as we walked out of the briefing room.

Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army's planning, though we were given to believe that it was a 'limited tactical action' in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.

IAF – By Fits & Starts

The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as 'Operation Safedsagar', commenced on 15 May with the bulk of operational assets positioned by 18 May. 150 combat aircraft were deployed as follows:

Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)

Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)

Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)

Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)

Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)

One-third of the aircraft were modern, 'high-threat' fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.

Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC. The salient feature of this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders' positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting 'interrogation' session.)

The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud's rant about a 'Stinger on every peak' seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis' glee.

The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded precision. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led it to be even more cautious.

By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 'technical violations' (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.

The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable for Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.

The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.

While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.

PAF in a Bind

From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF's intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.

Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najib Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najib had an excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy's Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with the help of some courageous flying by Army Aviation pilots. With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.

To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.

While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF's minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.

F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be 'rationalised', a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staff's minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.

Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAF's lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.

It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.

In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to 'equal the match'. Might it strike to some that PAF's restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?


Aftermath

It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the Chief of Army Staff (COAS): General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA): Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio's self-serving presentation.

In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly 'capture' territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman's attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.

In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their 'star-spangled' universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the '65 and '71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters ('devil's advocates', if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.

Tailpiece

Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff in 2001, President Musharraf struck at PAF's top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the appointment of service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi's rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior General Musharraf particularly during Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could order around like one of his Corps Commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus'haf was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF's interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that PAF's precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.

INDIA - AFGHANISTAN: War and Friendship

The past week was by all accounts a momentous one, as no less a person than former Pakistani President and former Chief of the Army Staff, Gen (Ret'd) Pervez Musharraf, assertively disclosed what has been a 'no-go' area for India's mainstream media and the otherwise hyper-ventilating broadcast media thus far: that India's Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has, since 2002, waged a highly successful covert war against Pakistan by actively rendering all kinds of financial assistance to Balochistan-based separatists. But mind you, such covert warfare has not been waged by the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), but by the tri-services DIA and Afghanistan's Riyast-i-Amniyat-i-Milli, and in addition to his routine assignment as India's Defence Adviser at the Embassy in Kabul, Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta was officially dolling out huge financial assistance as ordered by the DIA to the Baloch separatists as and when required. For the past one year such activities being undertaken by the DIA were, in fact, openly discussed by both serving and retired senior military officials at both the Armed Forces Gymkhana and the United Services Institution within the National Capital Region. It, therefore, did not come as a great surprise to South Block when Brig Mehta was specifically targeted for assassination by the Pakistan Army's Peshawar-based 324 Military Intelligence Battalion . This in many ways is reminiscent of the era ranging from the mid-1980s and early 1990s during which RAW had succeeded in gaining the trust of what would later morph into the Northern Alliance.

In fact, by 1986, despite India's official recognition of the then Soviet-backed Afghan regime led by Dr Najibullah, India had begun extending medical assistance to the guerrilla forces led by the legendary leader Ahmad Shah Massoud and as a consequence of this, one wing of the All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) was completely cordoned off by South Block and it was there that all those Mujahideen wounded in battle while fighting the Soviets under Massoud's leadership received the urgent medical attention that they deserved. So impressed was the Northern Alliance by India's humanitarian assistance that this relationship, at first opportunity, got elevated to a higher level when, in the early 1990s after the breakup of the USSR, the Northern Alliance succeeded in securing Tajikistan's approval for an Indian Army-run field hospital to be established at Farkhor.

Bomb Blasts: Indians - Half truths, Full lies and lots of rumours

The last few days have been very crucial for the investigators of the pan India bomb blasts. They seem to have found some leads after the humiliating 4 years where they were running around in circles (like a dog trying to jab its tail). As usual the police and the public gave different version of things which most of the media was quick to show as “Breaking News”. The media content swung like a pendulum moving from India’s Osama Tauqeer to Azamgarh being India’s Waziristan. One channel showed Tauqeer and others with devils ears and tongue. Please for god sake “SHUT UP”. If this is the level of media coverage then I and other sane people will support going back to the days of “Dukhdarshan” (Doordarshan).
As being slightly more “knowledgeable” and “Level minded” (pun intended) than our electronic media journalists, there are a couple of points that I wish to communicate out on these bomb blasts, their investigation and also take the liberty of commenting on some allied issues.

The Delhi – Batla House Encounter

Please for god’s sake, this was not a fake encounter. Fake encounters are not done in broad day light in the middle of a colony, nor does the mission leader tell his family that he is going to be back in a couple of hours leaving behind his critically ill son. Please accept the encounter story of the Delhi police as they are saying the truth (at least this time). Any sceptic can watch a very balanced coverage on headlines today news channel which was able to procure the actual encounter footage shot either with a mobile phone camera or a normal camera with low quality digital zoom. It clearly showed a below par police action where casualty was nearly 100% sure. As has been reported in some creditable media that the cops were of the opinion that this would be a “QUICK ARREST” operation and before other people realise it, they would be back at their Lodhi Road office. Some Police officers want to join such raids for the lure of medals; some for promotions but some do have genuine team spirit and all these scenarios’ can lead to mistakes and lots of them were committed on that fateful day. As for the shots having hit Inspector Sharma from the back, the headlines today clip clearly shows the volley of fire coming from the house and the ill equipped and ill prepared raiding party rushing downstairs to escape that gun fire. As for the escape of the terrorist, well if such was the planning of the arrest, then escapee of 2 -3 or all the terrorists is no big deal. Having myself seen visuals and also read about the manual of procedures employed by a raiding party in U.K, I can tell that this was a shoddy work by the special cell. The blame if any goes to the concepts in training for such operations that Indian police employ in which a false sense of bravado and complete sense of recklessness gets groomed into them. In this age of the internet and you tube, just look into clips of such raids by U.K and U.S police and one can appreciate my view on this. I do not doubt the bravery or the team spirit of these policemen but just sacrificing one’s life leads to nothing. What if the court tomorrow says that no the encounter was not perfect or the captured people are not terrorists? These scenarios can happen and the only reason is that our police hardly go with an effort to create a case against the accused. The entire exercise is to capture an accused and then “Break” him down to reveal everything. This does sensationalise the news of that day but when the story goes to the inner pages of the newspapers, the terrorists go scot free. This is totally opposite to the procedure employed by the U.K police who operate in a scenario where the suspects are trailed for months and only when enough legally admissible evidence is accumulated, the cell is busted. This is the biggest reason that police in such countries enjoy far higher credibility than our police do. Such credibility not only leads to better moles in the terrorist cells but also in improved convictions.

Month of Ramdan – There were murmurs at the Batla house area that a Muslim could not do something so un-Islamic during the holy month of Ramdan. The terrorist have no knowledge of Islam or love for it. They only know the language of hate and nothing else. This was reaffirmed as within a couple of days the terrorist and that too the wahibi’s (purist) nearly blew up the Marriott in Islamabad and that also when an iftar dinner was being organised. This is their level of knowledge of Islam and their thoughts for a Muslim Ummah or an Islamic Caliphate.

What can be done to assure the sceptical people of India that such encounters are genuine?

1. Give raiding party helmet cams (U.K police has started using them). This if needed can show if the raiding party was following the set procedures or not. Army has been doing this for a long time and it is time that the police forces start the same also.
2. All deaths natural and unnatural needs be verified by a system called Coroner’s Inquest. This simple process goes a long way in clearing the air about encounters. The system is presently working in the U.K and has been able to produce wonderful results. The Coroner is somewhat like a constitutional figure and he/she goes beyond the role of a post mortem expert. He/She also enquires about the conditions leading to the death and also what could and should be done to prevent such a loss of life. Lots of changes have been bought into the emergency management system in the U.K by such inquests.
In the U.K even the Armed Forces are under the preview of the Coroner’s Inquest which might not be possible so we could have a separate Coroner for Armed forces directly reporting to the Defence Minister. We need this openness not only for keeping the Armed Forces record clean but also to make sure that generals who are responsible for the life of the front line jawans and officers give them the best quality tools to achieve their missions. Right now jawans and officers who lay down their lives for this nation are quickly termed Saheed and no institutional effort is made to address the root causes of their deaths. Lots of deaths in Indian Armed forces are attributed to malfunctioning of ammunition or poor quality of communication equipment or weapons or body armour and nothing is done quickly enough to correct these issues.
3. Please allow press briefings to be done by professionals and not regular policemen and women. Train your P.R cops in what P.R means. For someone who has wielded lathi all his life, words would not be the easiest things which would flow from his/her mouth.
4. Rumour mills work over time at such places especially where the majority of the people are either illiterate or semi educated or like most Indian’s - Born sceptics. What the police and their P.R fellows need to do is to make sure that their voice is heard. Tools that You Tube, Orkut, Face book and Internet chat rooms offer a quick and easy way to disseminate your point of view. These days even royal family of U.K, U.N, etc have their own video channels on the You Tube.
5. Order a Coroner’s Inquest and publish its finding or even updates on the internet.
6. Train and prepare your men and women on such missions well enough. Equip them well and show your evidence gathered to a magistrate before a raid is started (Italy does that – A Magistrate leads the police campaigns against mafia’s, terrorist or other shady characters). This will allow the encounter specialists to access if the evidence gathered is good enough or more needs to be done under the existing laws to nail the terrorist in a court of law.
7. Pick up more people from smaller communities into the force especially Delhi Police in the lower rung. There are hundreds of young retired ex Army men and women including Muslims who could be immediately absorbed into the force. This will allow some credibility and increase professionalism into the police forces.

As I have reported in my earlier blogs that intelligence agencies and police forces are busy doing “bandobast” for their “bade sahibs” and their free loader relatives rather than trailing the terrorists. A quick reading of Maj. Gen V.K Singh’s book on R&AW reveals the same, 90% of all information in R&AW is purely technical and that is shocking. Human assets remain and will remain your best bet in thwarting any sinister plans of the terrorists.

Religion from a modern perspective is the right to practise your rituals and beliefs without any fear until and unless they impede on the other person’s right of existence. If you look at these terrorists this is not what they want, they are hell bent on forcing their beliefs on people lesser capable of defending themselves which include groups like women, economically downtrodden, etc. Forcing religious beliefs leads to different problems and that is pretty well seen in Muslim countries. If you starting discriminating than people have a habit to take such acts to levels beyond the comprehension of sane people. Glaring examples are Muslims in Iraq; first the division was between Iran and Iran, then it was divided between Iraqis and Kurds and the Iraqis subdivided themselves between Iraqis and marsh Arabs; then Iraqis got divided into Shia’s and Sunni’s and then Shia and Sunni’s got divided into different factions and then these factions would finally get divided into different factions as per each household. Gen. Petreus of the U.S ARMY did nothing extraordinary but just divided people as per their wishes and some kind of peace was restored in Iraq.

A proof of forcing people to follow a certain philosophy is that a few days back I read an interesting fact about Pakistan. Lots of Sunni Muslims write their faith as Shia Muslims to escape the compulsory Zakat during the months of Ramdan that Gen. Zia had introduced in that country. This Zakat amount is compulsorily deducted from the salaries for all Sunni Muslims and exempted for Shias and other Minority groups. Also anybody flying into Bangkok can find Saudi jets with their billionaire owners are parked in Bangkok and other places of pleasure for days at end – Do not think for prayers (As far as I know Bangkok is NOT famous for that).

Trust me if Hindu’s think that their saviour in the current times is Dr. Praveen Togadia or Raj Thackeray and Muslims think that their saviour is Osama or some Paki funded politician or “Amar Chitra Katha of Dalal Salam fame and his Netaji or the very “Punny” Chara Eater – Laloo, Aloo, Balu and his family including his railway platform changing brother in Laws” then all the best to those who believe in this. I would to stick myself to reading books and writing by blog.

Live together we have to, so better it is that we start quickly.

p.s – Ignorance breeds even more ignorance: I asked a friend of mine if he knew who was ABU FAZL. The answer even before I could end the question was TERRORIST (As all terrorists change their names to Abu something). All I can say is the fact is that Abu Fazl was one of the most learned scholars that Akbar had in his court. Abu Fazl wrote Akbarnama, translated Bible into Persian and also was instrumental in changing Akbar’s temperament to a modern outlook.
Now there are two ways of looking at this answer, one all is lost and now Muslims are doomed. The other way is that such things need to be highlighted. Firstly accept that there is a problem and this cycle of violence that can be stopped if and only if people from within the Muslim community wake up and tell not only other Indians but also young boys and girls of their community that their ideals need to be Abu Fazl or Dara Shikoh and not osama’s of this world.

Please also read: Muslim Freedom Fighters of India/edited by S. Ganjoo. ISBN 81-261-1281-6

India - Union, Federation or Commonwealth

Human beings by their nature are divisive people, they are greedy and if left to them, they would like to blow up the whole world and have all its riches for themselves. Strength of nations is their ability to work together as one. Why India is a success is not because we are able to help each individual in his or her hour of crisis but the belief of people to keep their past behind and move ahead to create a bright and positive future for this great land. The greatness of Sardar Patel is magnified million fold as he was able to tell different Indian ethnic groups that their destiny laid in a common and strong India. He greatness was that he was able to tell people to keep their belief in this gods own country called India. He was able to tell a Dogra that what they historically did to say a Punjabi or what the rajputs did to maratha’s was irrelevant in this new India. The idea of India is to keep people together and not further divide them. Just read some constituent assembly debates on allowing secession and the reasons given against them. Hardly a few would know that the constituent debated on the definition of India and whether to keep India a federation or a commonwealth or a union and finally settled for a Union. One of the most liberal constitutions was framed so that people do not feel the need to secede and find their voices heard with the frame work of the Union of India. The problem is that the system has failed and not the constitution.

The constitution allows a great deal freedom and if any section of the society feels that the executive or even the legislature is not up to the mark, the judiciary can be called upon to act like an alibi. In how many countries and that too developing can an ex P.M be taken to a small district court and made to stand in the convict’s box. The liberalism of this nation even after enduring subjugation in form of a foreign rule for nearly 800 years and even after seeing 30% of your territory taken away by creating an experimental country called Pakistan is something that enhances my respect to our nation’s constitutional forefathers. How many nations which have gone through all that we underwent prepare something as liberal as our constitution? Even issues like declaring this nation a Hindu Rashtra or banning conversions was debated in the constituent assembly and finally decision was taken not to go in that direction. Look at our neighbourhood and one realises what was the calibre our leaders who allowed such a thing. Pakistan – Muslim nation, Nepal – Hindu, China – Communist (Han), Sri Lanka – Sinhala, Burma – Buddhist, Maldives – Muslim, Afghanistan – Muslim and later Bangladesh – Muslim and INDIA - SECULAR. Look today where most of these other nations are; top in the list of failed states and ask a reason why – the answer is not difficult, religion cannot be a basis of nationhood, secularism will be. Mr. Jinnah’s experiment called Pakistan has failed and faster the Paki’s accept that the better it is. Nations like Saudi Arabia or Bahrain or Qatar survive as they hold a tight lid over their people and incentives like free cash doles and loan waivers are granted to keep the population from revolting. Time is a great leveller, it shows your propaganda might be the best (Pakistan’s) but it is the ethos that run a nation. Paki’s might fill venom in their text books against India and call Indian by their casteist names but “SATYAMEV JAYTE” – another great motto by our nation’s founders has come true. The millions of baby snakes made to order for India are now biting their own people in Pakistan. Hate only breeds hate; travel on a Paki passport and you see your condition at the immigration desk of any country. Over the years an Indian passport has earned for itself a great degree of respect and thanks to our software professionals and people like the Tata’s and the Mittal’s and many more like them.

Most of our countries problems are human created and that too mostly by the great politicians. You need not go further than see the state our parliament is in today. 90% of the members do not even come prepared for important discussions on subjects like 123 Nuclear Deal, Defence Budget, etc. The parliament has been reduced to a verbal and sometimes physical duel between members on issues which a national parliament should not even discuss. Our parliament discusses issues like village roads, rural health, poverty alleviation, etc leaving no time for issues concerning our strategic depth, energy security, reform of services like immigration, armed forces, Para military, police, etc. Why should centre even have a ministry like rural health or tribal welfare when the same issues are state subjects? Why should centre even spend money directly on issues like rural roads, health, etc? All these issues should be given to the states to handle and centre should move out of the same ASAP. This was the biggest crime that congress did to this country; it never allowed institutions to be formed autonomously. They subverted the entire democratic process of this country just because Justice Sinha of Allahabad high court declared Indira Gandhi’s election for the Rae Bareilly lok sabha seat null and void. Centre and its institution should now focus themselves on issues like defence, finance and security – energy, internal, etc.

My idea is to make states an equal partner in the development of this nation and not to overlap schemes which only result in increased bureaucracy and lesser delivery on the ground. Some ideas can be like the Airports in metro’s have been privatised, make assets like Non metro airports a JV between centre and state governments and run by professional bodies. All local city and within state trains should be run by a JV company similar to the lines of NJ transit in America and all interstate trains to be run as they are (under Indian Railways). In U.S, such ports and trains are operated by local municipal authorities like Ports Authority of NY and NJ handles most of the airports in the NY/NJ area and also run the NJ transit system. I can also say the in case of currency notes; we can issues them bearing great freedom fighters of each states. I saw a very similar system done by U.K for their regions of Northern Ireland and Scotland. Both regions have something called a Scottish or Northern Irish Pound which is always pegged to the U.K pound. Such measures will not make states secede from India but will allow them room to manoeuvre on issues like finances, social harmony, etc. This will allow a more serious leadership to come up in states as they will have no longer an option to blame centre for all their ills. The centre should act as a friend and a guide to states and not a big daddy as it does today.

To end this essay on India all I can say is that apart from SATYAMEV JAYTE, the very idea of India is derived from 2 mottos; E Pluribus Unum (U.S.A) meaning FROM MANY, ONE and Dieu et mon droit (England) meaning GOD AND MY RIGHT. The American motto is something that we truly are – one in a million and to further enhance our prestige we need to constantly introspect. For surviving and thriving in this modern uni-polar world; my logic would be to have an eagle sharp mind like America and a compassionate soul like Europe.

p.s - Next in the series, I would write this in context of Kashmir

DELHI BOMB BLAST - 13 SEPTEMBER 2008 – COMMENT REPLY

Thanks to my learned friend who has put his comments on my blog about the Delhi Blasts. Let me clarify some things on what I wrote, firstly none of the people whom I criticised is a constitutional authority. P.C Halder and Home Minster form the bureaucracy/executive. Only people in the position like the President of India or the Governor of a State or the Election Commissioner or the Judges of Supreme Courts are constitutional authorities. Even if they were constitutional authorities, why should we not be able to criticise their conduct. Look at what the courts have said about the family of the President, there are cases of first degree murder on the immediate family members of the president and we should allow such people to hide behind the cloak of not criticising any constitutional authority. Look at the cases of the judges of the Ghaziabad courts defrauding the lowest rung employees of their life’s saving (P.F Scam). Our motto should be the one that I have taken from an American Security Organisation - IN GOD WE TRUST, ALL OTHERS WE INTERCEPT. No one is above the law and that too when people’s lives are involved.
Secondly, again I was tagged along with a few million eunuchs who ran away, from where I do not know but if this blog commentator person is referring about the Kashmiri Migrants, well at least I and my community are clearly on one side and not like other Kashmiri’s who are still in the valley and chant Pro India slogans when they come begging for their monthly cash dole and anti India slogans when they reach back in the valley. My close family, friends as also the wider community to which I belong have been working in the government and security forces trying to fight terror not only in the Valley but in other parts of India (and around the world too). Lots of our community boys have laid down their lives fighting terrorist in the valley and more so like I have said before, our community does not need any certificate from anyone for our patriotic feelings; it is the others who need to show where they belong too; India or Jhootistan. Where ever our community has gone it has always raised the bar as far education and other activities is concerned. Look at the valley, even today thousands of kashmiri muslims send their kids outside of the valley so that they get some good education. This was not an inborn phenomenon as the Kashmiri muslims were deprived from good education before the Indian independence. Whatever mass Kashmiri education came in the valley was only after Bakshi’s saw that the biggest reason that the pundits did well for themselves was their strong emphasis on education. Look at the scenario today, the same things the pundits have done to the Jammu region as well. There is a mass education movement on and what is different from the previous times is that the dogra boys and girls are pushing for higher studies and not stopping at graduation. Jammu has witnesses an exceptional boom in their economy after the migration 1989-90 and lots can be attributed to the Pandits. As a community we have always pushing more on education and less on guns. Imagine the situation in valley now and see where Jammu is today, Valleys loss is Jammu’s gain. Pandits are not pickpockets or rapist but educationist and they have shown that in Jammu. I again say look at the valley and look at Jammu.
Thirdly as far as our identity is concerned, well it will be preserved come what may. That is protection that any Indian will get in our country, unfortunately people who have been fed on Jhootistan propaganda know very little of this. I really hope that the government of India freely opens up the muzzafarabad route for both trade and people to people contact so that people on the Valley realise that there the original state subjects of P.O.K have been put in a minority in their own state by the Punjabi’s through the Pakistani army’s ex servicemen rehab scheme. Better still has been done in Northern Areas – Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Shia’s after their rebellion during Zia’s tenure were brutally hacked and driven out of their land. The shia’s have been revolting frequently against this inhuman treatment in more than one way, Zia’s death is also blamed on a Shia airmen who came from the northern areas. In contrast if there is some semblance in P.O.K area (due to its propaganda nature), the northern areas are a black hole. There is no government and the only authority that people know is the Army and the I.S.I. Look in one of my previous blogs and you would see what Baloch’s say about Pakistan and how their leaders are treated by the Pak army and the ISI and we on the other hand pay for the medical treatment of Kashmiri separatist leaders. Helping some in need is the Indian ethos but let it not be known that Kashmiri’s are thankless people. Indian ethos stems from the old proverb that a fruit bearing tree is always bent downwards, so we need to be humble for all the acts that we do but the other side should not see that as our weakness.
Kashmiri people in the valley should see this and realise that what their ancestors did during the 1948 Pakistani - Kabaili raid was because they saw through the designs of Jhootistan. Today 99% of the valley folk would not know that today’s Lal chowk in Srinagar infamous for grenade attacks was actually the place where Pakistani - Kabaili’s who were caught by the JK Militia were publically executed in that square. As I have said before that an entire generation has grown up in the valley without any knowledge of their history and only knowing the Nizam e Mustafa that has been enforced privately since 1989.
p.s – Just got a post asking if I am in the army, Please NO. That was a typo error which I realised after I published it. I am a common Indian citizen who is in a private organisation and that is the reason that I do not write under my name. As for hunting down is concerned, well house to house search is common in all law and order manuals all around the world. In the recent muslim youth riots within Denmark, the police used the same techniques to quell the riots. The 2006 Paris immigrant riots were quelled by the French police only after a house to house raid at the Picasso estate area of Paris. In the 2000 BNP-South Asian riots, the Leeds, Leicester, bradford and other police forces in the U.K used house to house searches and identity parades to fight this menace. What we need to remember that community needs to be involved in such mass exercises and educated on the need for the same.
Also please do not publish hearsay stories about the truckers and this donation. Please all of it is based on hearsay - Half truths and full lies and lots of rumours. Lots of people have called saying that on the 6th October, Geelani is going to declare Independence after the Id namaz and Pakistan, Bangladesh and some other Muslim nations will recognise it. All this has stemmed from just one statement of Zardari at his swearing in press conference that something is going to be done within a month. Lots of our friends who are honest, secular Kashmiri’s (including Minority shia’s) have called our relatives to enquire if such reports were true. Ha Ha Ha.
Please we cannot be bogged down by half truths and full lies and lots of rumours. Please there is so much to do, there are so many people suffering and if we the lucky few who are blessed with good education and support waste our time on 400 acres of Land then there is nothing sadder to say. The faster that issue is over the better it is, we have family ties with so many kashmiri muslims that it is amazing that we have allowed the situation to reach such a turn. The main culprits are the leaders of the valley and then Jammu. Now if there are any bad feelings talk it across and clear it up. We would meet each other again and then as a saying goes – Hate a person but not so much that next time you meet, you would have to lower your eyes in shame.
My strength and that of this nation comes from our democracy. My personal motto IN GOD WE TRUST, ALL OTHERS WE INTERCEPT gives me the freedom to criticise our own bad politicians, our own gods, our holy books which have some negative references and it is because of this freedom I still say that GOD BLESS INDIA. This great country of 5000 years, of a book of knowledge of Rig Veda and it has managed to retain its roots. It is amazing and nothing else. The more I have read about the ethos that defined this nation even in 1947, the more I respect it. The debates in the constituents assembly before the constitution was passed are iconic and should be read by one and all as to why we call this nation as great and why I will stand by each and every letter of the same.
More later.

DELHI BOMB BLAST - 13 SEPTEMBER 2008

So the eunuchs have stuck in Delhi and killed innocent people and as usual our leaders are even bigger eunuchs. They have lost all moral decency and are clinging on. The leader of the pack is Shivraj Patil - the Marathi manoos of Raj Thackery, followed by P.C Halder and tons of other like laloo, Aloo and Balu. I get shocked when i think that this is the same seat on which my ideal and idol Sardar Patel used to sit. This is the same marathi manoos that Raj Thackery wants to defend. This is my problem with such issues, you are deviating from the core issues. Our nation is under threat and we need to to fight it together. Mr Patil, get out of the ministry and get lost to Italy and enjoy the favours of the pope. Your heart cried when kadamal burnt and you have no tears when Indian's were killed in Delhi. People who were killed were Indian and not Hindus, Muslim's, etc. For the sake of India, get out of the ministry and the bureau and allow new people to run them. Open up the intelligence services to common men and women of India, throw IPS officers out of the IB and recruit ordinary citizen who have a caliber to understand the terrorists. Recruit people from all sections of the society where the criteria is their caliber and not the person being a marathi manoos or kashmiri manoos or kerala manoos.

Also simultaneously hunt down the laloos and aloos who visit the Abu Bashir's of India and stop police from doing their duty. Hunt down the Raj Thackery, Abu Azmi and the Raza Murad's of this world who want to destroy India and its ethos, who think that they can cook their political roti's over the lives of people killed. Hunt down the people who take as little as Rs 700/- and provide bangladeshi's the false identity papers when they land up in India. Hunt down the Mohammad Azam Khan's and Mohd. Shabuddin's who are the listed I.S.I agents in the books of Intelligence agencies. Hunt down each and everyone, even if one has to do house to house search or crack down that we ask our security forces to do in the Kashmir valley.

Remember that we are the third biggest sufferer of terror attacks after Iraq and Afghanistan. Time now is to hunt down one and all who do such killings.

p.s - I have seen some new comments that someone calling himself/herself as anonymous. A lot of garbage has been written in the same and I will soon respond to that person. Again like previous times and true to a Kashmiri's mindset, a lot of rumours have been used to create this response. Half truths and full lies are being used to write responses to this and other blogs and newspaper article. I will respond point to point but right now just too troubled with the blasts.

KASHMIR - JK POLICE and CRPF - FOLLOW UP NEWS STORY

Well sometimes when you write your blog there is a strange feeling that what you write may come true and that is what happened with the last story. Within 2 days of writing this blog i read a news column that the central government has announced additional IPS positions for Para Military Organisations. I guess one must remember who is at the helm of affairs in the Home Ministry in New Delhi.

Govt nod for 48 new posts for IPS men in paramilitary forces

New Delhi: The government on Thursday cleared a proposal for creation of 48 new posts in various central police organizations to accommodate IPS officers — a move which has been strongly resented by cadre officers of the paramilitary forces who term it an attempt to provide a ‘parking lot’ for those senior cops who do not want to return to their parent states.
The decision — taken by the Union Cabinet — will create new posts of special directors-general of police (SDGPs) and extra posts of additional DGs and inspector-generals of police (IGPs) in paramilitary forces like CRPF, BSF, CISF and ITBP besides central police organizations (CPOs), including CBI.
Though the government called the decision a “functional necessity”, the cadre officers in the paramilitary forces said that “the move was not only demoralizing for them but also added fuel to the fire” at a time when the Centre has even denied them the recommendation of the 6th Pay Commission over the issue of giving more senior-level posts to officers from within the cadre.
The government, however, has a different take on it. Referring to the Cabinet decision, a senior home ministry officer said: “It will strengthen the supervisory structure of the CPOs for better command and control and for effective implementation and monitoring of projects and activities in the specified organizations.”
A number of middle-level cadre officers of CRPF and BSF, however, questioned the Cabinet decision while talking to TOI, asking whether the cadre officers who fought Naxals and terrorists and thereby gained actual experience of the ground situation were not qualified enough for the job. The decision will help the country’s largest paramilitary force, CRPF, in getting three new SDGPs. They will be posted in Jammu and Kashmir (militancy), Bihar (Left-wing extremism) and Assam (insurgency).
Other organisations like BSF would get two new SDGPs who will be posted in Chandigarh (western front) and Kolkata (eastern front). ITBP and CISF will also get one SDGP each while the premier investigating agency, the CBI, has been sanctioned an additional Special Director’s post raising the number to two.
The Special DGs will have the rank of Director-General but a slightly lower pay scale.
In yet another decision, the Cabinet approved a Rs 500-crore special scheme to create police infrastructure in the Naxal affected states during the 11th Plan period.

CREDIT: TIMES NEWS NETWORK