Kargil War from the Donkeys mouth

KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE

Pakistani writings on Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is PAF airman's perspective, focusing on the IAF's air operations and the PAF's position.

Operational Planning in the PAF

Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF's appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF's hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.

The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF's 'corporate' decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.

The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF's operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.

In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot's career after repatriation and rose to command PAF's premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.

The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders' School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF's Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.

The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.

The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.

There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF's hierarchy was highly qualified and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.

First Rumblings

As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army's Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army's interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.

After hearing Gp Capt Tariq's report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army's ongoing 'review of contingency plans' required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the 'Kashmir Contingency'.


Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the 'latest situation in Kashmir' at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a 'protective manoeuvre', he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. "Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold," he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of 'providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir' was never mentioned.)

When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. "I have Stingers on every peak," he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud's reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link's vulnerability to our offensive elements.


It seemed from the Corps Commander's smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners' minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander's elucidation.

Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, "After this operation, it's going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!" as we walked out of the briefing room.

Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army's planning, though we were given to believe that it was a 'limited tactical action' in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.

IAF – By Fits & Starts

The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as 'Operation Safedsagar', commenced on 15 May with the bulk of operational assets positioned by 18 May. 150 combat aircraft were deployed as follows:

Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)

Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)

Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)

Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)

Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)

One-third of the aircraft were modern, 'high-threat' fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.

Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC. The salient feature of this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders' positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting 'interrogation' session.)

The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud's rant about a 'Stinger on every peak' seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis' glee.

The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded precision. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led it to be even more cautious.

By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 'technical violations' (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.

The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable for Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.

The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.

While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.

PAF in a Bind

From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF's intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.

Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najib Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najib had an excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy's Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with the help of some courageous flying by Army Aviation pilots. With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.

To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.

While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF's minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.

F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be 'rationalised', a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staff's minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.

Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAF's lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.

It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.

In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to 'equal the match'. Might it strike to some that PAF's restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?


Aftermath

It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the Chief of Army Staff (COAS): General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA): Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio's self-serving presentation.

In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly 'capture' territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman's attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.

In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their 'star-spangled' universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the '65 and '71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters ('devil's advocates', if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.

Tailpiece

Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff in 2001, President Musharraf struck at PAF's top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the appointment of service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi's rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior General Musharraf particularly during Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could order around like one of his Corps Commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus'haf was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF's interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that PAF's precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.

India - Union, Federation or Commonwealth

Human beings by their nature are divisive people, they are greedy and if left to them, they would like to blow up the whole world and have all its riches for themselves. Strength of nations is their ability to work together as one. Why India is a success is not because we are able to help each individual in his or her hour of crisis but the belief of people to keep their past behind and move ahead to create a bright and positive future for this great land. The greatness of Sardar Patel is magnified million fold as he was able to tell different Indian ethnic groups that their destiny laid in a common and strong India. He greatness was that he was able to tell people to keep their belief in this gods own country called India. He was able to tell a Dogra that what they historically did to say a Punjabi or what the rajputs did to maratha’s was irrelevant in this new India. The idea of India is to keep people together and not further divide them. Just read some constituent assembly debates on allowing secession and the reasons given against them. Hardly a few would know that the constituent debated on the definition of India and whether to keep India a federation or a commonwealth or a union and finally settled for a Union. One of the most liberal constitutions was framed so that people do not feel the need to secede and find their voices heard with the frame work of the Union of India. The problem is that the system has failed and not the constitution.

The constitution allows a great deal freedom and if any section of the society feels that the executive or even the legislature is not up to the mark, the judiciary can be called upon to act like an alibi. In how many countries and that too developing can an ex P.M be taken to a small district court and made to stand in the convict’s box. The liberalism of this nation even after enduring subjugation in form of a foreign rule for nearly 800 years and even after seeing 30% of your territory taken away by creating an experimental country called Pakistan is something that enhances my respect to our nation’s constitutional forefathers. How many nations which have gone through all that we underwent prepare something as liberal as our constitution? Even issues like declaring this nation a Hindu Rashtra or banning conversions was debated in the constituent assembly and finally decision was taken not to go in that direction. Look at our neighbourhood and one realises what was the calibre our leaders who allowed such a thing. Pakistan – Muslim nation, Nepal – Hindu, China – Communist (Han), Sri Lanka – Sinhala, Burma – Buddhist, Maldives – Muslim, Afghanistan – Muslim and later Bangladesh – Muslim and INDIA - SECULAR. Look today where most of these other nations are; top in the list of failed states and ask a reason why – the answer is not difficult, religion cannot be a basis of nationhood, secularism will be. Mr. Jinnah’s experiment called Pakistan has failed and faster the Paki’s accept that the better it is. Nations like Saudi Arabia or Bahrain or Qatar survive as they hold a tight lid over their people and incentives like free cash doles and loan waivers are granted to keep the population from revolting. Time is a great leveller, it shows your propaganda might be the best (Pakistan’s) but it is the ethos that run a nation. Paki’s might fill venom in their text books against India and call Indian by their casteist names but “SATYAMEV JAYTE” – another great motto by our nation’s founders has come true. The millions of baby snakes made to order for India are now biting their own people in Pakistan. Hate only breeds hate; travel on a Paki passport and you see your condition at the immigration desk of any country. Over the years an Indian passport has earned for itself a great degree of respect and thanks to our software professionals and people like the Tata’s and the Mittal’s and many more like them.

Most of our countries problems are human created and that too mostly by the great politicians. You need not go further than see the state our parliament is in today. 90% of the members do not even come prepared for important discussions on subjects like 123 Nuclear Deal, Defence Budget, etc. The parliament has been reduced to a verbal and sometimes physical duel between members on issues which a national parliament should not even discuss. Our parliament discusses issues like village roads, rural health, poverty alleviation, etc leaving no time for issues concerning our strategic depth, energy security, reform of services like immigration, armed forces, Para military, police, etc. Why should centre even have a ministry like rural health or tribal welfare when the same issues are state subjects? Why should centre even spend money directly on issues like rural roads, health, etc? All these issues should be given to the states to handle and centre should move out of the same ASAP. This was the biggest crime that congress did to this country; it never allowed institutions to be formed autonomously. They subverted the entire democratic process of this country just because Justice Sinha of Allahabad high court declared Indira Gandhi’s election for the Rae Bareilly lok sabha seat null and void. Centre and its institution should now focus themselves on issues like defence, finance and security – energy, internal, etc.

My idea is to make states an equal partner in the development of this nation and not to overlap schemes which only result in increased bureaucracy and lesser delivery on the ground. Some ideas can be like the Airports in metro’s have been privatised, make assets like Non metro airports a JV between centre and state governments and run by professional bodies. All local city and within state trains should be run by a JV company similar to the lines of NJ transit in America and all interstate trains to be run as they are (under Indian Railways). In U.S, such ports and trains are operated by local municipal authorities like Ports Authority of NY and NJ handles most of the airports in the NY/NJ area and also run the NJ transit system. I can also say the in case of currency notes; we can issues them bearing great freedom fighters of each states. I saw a very similar system done by U.K for their regions of Northern Ireland and Scotland. Both regions have something called a Scottish or Northern Irish Pound which is always pegged to the U.K pound. Such measures will not make states secede from India but will allow them room to manoeuvre on issues like finances, social harmony, etc. This will allow a more serious leadership to come up in states as they will have no longer an option to blame centre for all their ills. The centre should act as a friend and a guide to states and not a big daddy as it does today.

To end this essay on India all I can say is that apart from SATYAMEV JAYTE, the very idea of India is derived from 2 mottos; E Pluribus Unum (U.S.A) meaning FROM MANY, ONE and Dieu et mon droit (England) meaning GOD AND MY RIGHT. The American motto is something that we truly are – one in a million and to further enhance our prestige we need to constantly introspect. For surviving and thriving in this modern uni-polar world; my logic would be to have an eagle sharp mind like America and a compassionate soul like Europe.

p.s - Next in the series, I would write this in context of Kashmir

Neighbour's Envy, India's Pride - How everything has been proved wrong to what Paki's said - 1999

Calling the Indian Army Chief's Bluff

Columnist Lt Gen (Retd) JAVED NASIR, former DG ISI exhorts our leaders to ensure that India recognizes ground realities

The Indian Chief of Army Staff made a statement on 11 February 1999 that 'If militancy in Kashmir grows too big, India would be tempted to enlarge the conventional weapons' implying thereby the level of conventional conflict. That this statement was datelined from New Delhi, simultaneously with the announcement made by the Indian Prime Minister that he was undertaking the historical inaugural Bus ride to Pakistan and most important of all that he would be talking even on the most contentious issue of Kashmir. This could not be coincidental, certainly not in India where an Army Chief has to wait for days even for an official appointment with the Defence Minister. How dare he make a statement which contrasted so much with his Prime Minister declaration. I think there is no doubt that it was a ploy of either the Indian Foreign Ministry or RAW- both unfortunately have a very rigid stance totally divorced from reality and devoid of any flexibility.

Is the Indian threat perception realistic and justified? Is the Indian Army in a position to enlarge the conflict should the militancy grow bigger than the present level? This article will take these two questions in details.

Let us first take the justification of the monstrous white elephant in the shape of the defence forces that India is maintaining. The military system and the quantum of ready military strength are a direct reflection of the response to the threat perceived by a country. This threat can neither be imaginary nor whimsical. It has to be real. Having crystallized the threat it has to be seen whether it can actuate. India has to the rest of world since 1962 played the bogey of Chinese threat. It was a self-inflicted wound, a military blunder as one of its actors Brig Dalvi so aptly brought out in his book 'The Himalayan Blunder'. In order to wash off the absolute humiliation to which Indian Army was subjected, it has since that day been exaggerating the Chinese threat beyond all limits of probability. Even if the Sino Indian border was denuded of the last Indian soldier, the Chinese would not be able to come beyond the point they reached in 1962. The terrain does not place the capability beyond a limited tactical offensive. India had only the border security forces and no regular troops on its frontiers with China. For the immediate response to the Chinese infiltration, the first troops India inducted were from plains of Punjab who did not have even winter uniforms. From cantonments where temperatures were still on the plus side of 100o-F, they were airlifted to NEFA at altitudes in excess of 12000 FASL and day time temperature below 40o-F. India has since 1962 been playing on western minds the phobia of China. Indian ground and air infrastructure and its military system are organised for an offensive against Pakistan only. Its mechanised forces of which India is so boastful cannot even reach within 100 Kms of the Indian side of the Sino Indian border. Indian air force's most modern state of the art, MiGs-25, SU-27s, MiG-29s, SU-30s and Mirage 2000 would not be able to reach even tactical targets in China. As regards the naval threat, China does not have the capability to pose even a wildly distant threat. With 19 Ocean going (mostly Kilo class) submarines to which a nuclear one is being added shortly, the aircraft carrier Vikarant, (negotiations to buy another one from Russia with SU 27s with short take off capability are going on) with over 150 combat aircrafts and armed helicopters of the naval aviation, none of which can reach the Chinese waters but these can very effectively choke Pakistan's sea lanes of communication through a sea blockade. Therefore, when India talks of the Chinese threat, it is a fantasy. It is an imaginary whimsical threat which cannot actuate and the response that India has cannot even reach the Sino Indian border.

India's declared (12.5 Bil $) and hidden (3.5 Bil $) defence budget is five times Pakistan's defence budget (3.2 Bil $). In fact it is almost twice of Pakistan's national budget - after the nuclearisation of both India and Pakistan - there is no justification to have the monster of defence forces being maintained by India at present levels. These need to be cut drastically which is possible only if the military planners on both sides from amongst the retired officers sit together and work out genuine and realistic force goals. Pakistan is maintaining the minimal defensive response - a unilateral force reduction by Pakistan will totally compromise Pakistan conventional response. It will, however reciprocate any force reduction that India may affect, while maintaining the delicate minimal defensive balance.

In Kashmir freedom fighters have a genuine cause, full support of the people and a contiguous border with a sympathetic country and finally the freedom fighters are willing to make the sacrifices and can sustain the casualties. The counter insurgency operations are a bottomless bucket, a super sucker of more and more troops. This is what has happened to the Indian army whose induction in Kashmir has already exceeded the staggering figure of 600,000 a number which far exceeds even the total strength of Pakistan Army. Apart from second line forces and logistic units, regular infantry troops number is approximately 400,000. This is the infantry strength of nearly 45 Infantry Divisions - a number that far exceeds the total infantry strength of the 4 RAPID(s), 18 Infantry, 9 Mountain Divisions and about 15 Independent Brigades that India actually has. From where did the rest of infantry come? The Indian desperation is manifested from the fact that having milked all infantry units from the field formations - they have cocooned the tanks and taken away the manpower from the tank regiments and grounded even their air defence units as well, which make up for the additional infantry. Grounding specialist units and using them as infantry in counter insurgency operations is last straw and the most demoralizing stage. The freedom struggle has entered the 11th year. Some five years back every Indian infantry soldier was getting a tenure every 5 years. The way Indian inductions in Kashmir have escalated, this dreaded tenure has been reduced to just one year. Every Indian soldier and officer has to return to Kashmir after one year of completion of one year tenure. This is actually the crux of the matter - counter insurgency operations are the most difficult. These operations sap energies and resources with such rapidity that even the strongest economies and the best of soldiers start wilting under it very quickly. The insurgents do not have any fixed time for attack. They can strike anywhere any time. Those fighting insurgencies remain under tension for 24 hours of the day and 365 days of the year. This in itself injects short temperedness, frustration and sense of guilt. There has been a constant and major decline in the discipline standards. Frequency of incidents reflecting total breakdown of discipline are also on the increase. The large scale desertions and absent without leave cases, homicides, Jawans killing their own officers reflect the degeneration that has set in the Indian Army. The frequency of cases of insubordinations is reaching alarming figures - same is the case with homosexuals. Officers no longer say 'Do as I Do' but want to remain in the safety of the unit lines and say 'Do as I Say' to men designated to look for the insurgents. There are false reports and imaginary encounters which are narrated or transmitted to higher headquarters with fabricated details. Brigade Commanders transmit totally fabricated encounters to Div Commanders and they do likewise to the Corps Commanders, when on ground not a single casualty takes place. They wipe out mujahideen in hundreds. The overwhelming tendency is to avoid an encounter and return to the safety of unit camps. If the casualty figures reported in the situation reports transmitted by all the units and those appearing in the Press are added up, the whole of Kashmir population would have been killed three times over, in the last 11 years. Like Leukaemia counter insurgency operations need fresh blood which India no longer has in reserves. To maintain and support these operations logistically the bill gets multiplying.

Bulk of the India defence budget has been going to Kashmir. So when Gen V.P. Malik threatens that 'should militancy grow too much - India would be tempted to enlarge the conflict'. Who is he trying to bluff? The military planners in India cannot be so naive as not to know that the Indian army is deeply plunged and suffering from the worst imbalance of its history. They innocently think that the bluff of their Chief will work. By such large scale milking of infantry from Indian formations a very major strategic imbalance has been injected in the Indian Army's holding and strike formations. I say with all the authority and professionalism that 'THE INDIAN ARMY IS INCAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING ANY CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AT PRESENT WHAT TO TALK OF ENLARGING CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT'

This most vulnerable and critical imbalance has occurred in the Indian army because in India, ridiculing and disparaging even the best professional viewpoints of the soldiers in an ignominious manner has become a routine. The summarily sacking of the Indian Naval Chief last month is a point in reference.

Even super powers or regional powers economies, could not withstand the fallout of prolonged counter insurgency operations. France had become the sick nation of Europe while fighting insurgency in Algeria. It was De Gualle who saved France by pulling it out of Algeria. US economy was about to collapse because of the counter insurgency operations it was fighting in Vietnam. It was Richard Nixon who saved the US by pulling it out. Gorbachev was two years too late to pull USSR out of Afghanistan. India has 3,500 tanks and approximately 700 state of the art modern aircraft, of which India is so boastful. India like Pakistan is still a babe in the nuclear field. Erstwhile USSR with its 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads, over 25,000 tanks and 5,000 aircraft could not escape the fallout of a counter insurgency operation and is continuing to disintegrate. India with relatively much weaker national cohesion; what with the south, the Sikhs, the Mizos and the Nagas and the Kashmiris is much more vulnerable to break up from within. Struggle in Kashmir is wholly indigenous. The Kashmiris waited for 50 years hoping from the successive Indian Governments that they will honour the commitments of plebiscite in conformity with the UN Resolutions to which their founding fathers were signatories along with Pakistan. Having failed to convince India through peaceful means they finally took the lead from Afghanistan where they received the battle inoccultation fighting the Russians alongside the Afghan Mujahideen. The Kashmiris have a genuine cause. They are prepared to make sacrifices. They have a difficult terrain which provides lot of sanctuaries and is ideal for insurgency operations; a fully supporting population, a large contiguous border of a friendly country which having become a nuclear weapon state has acquired the badly needed nuclear deterrence. India could enlarge the operations prior to May 28, it dare not do so now, not even the hot pursuits. India's greed for grabbing land is manifested from its history of military occupations of Hyderabad, Junagarh, Kashmir and finally the totally inhabited barren wasteland of Siachen - all these it will have to vacate one day. 90% of the over 5,000 casualties that India has suffered in Siachen, have been due to weather extremities. Indian soldiers are sitting on permanent snow covered peaks, altitudes of which in most cases are in excess of 20,000 feet AMSL. The Indians are staging supplies upto Leh by AN-12s and from there by road to the base camp at Zingrulama from where MI-26s carry these to Siala. the MI-26s can lift nearly 15-20 tons but its engines need replacement after every 50 hour at a staggering cost of Rs. 8 crores/engine. From Siala it is mostly lifted by the Cheetak high attitude helicopters which carry to the forward posts. Transportation of a shell weighing 25 pounds costs well over Rs. 15,000.00 by helicopter. Supplies by helicopter costs on the average Rs. 800-1000.00 per KG. The Indian soldiers are ill-equipped, ill-fed - they do not have the luxury of the heating arrangements like their Pakistani counterparts. On the contrary Pakistan constructed all weather roads right upto the battalion HQs and in some cases even at Company HQs wherever Pakistan had troops. The credit for this goes to Gen Aslam Beg and Lt Gen Imran who both agreed to my proposal to let FWO, of which I was the DG in 1989, construct all weather roads to all the forward posts. I knew the Hindu mentality that he will stick on to Siachen. I had a hunch that these roads one day will turn Siachen into Waterloo for the Indians. These roads were completed in 1990 and gave Pakistan Army a tremendous psychological ascendancy. The transportation cost was brought down from an average of Rs. 200.00 per KG beyond Goma/Dansom to less than Rs. 100.00/ KG. This enabled Pakistan Army High Command to provide the best high altitude sleeping bags, boots and jackets, Vitamin heavy diet, fibre glass igloos with heating arrangements and hot water plastic thermoses.

The present Indian military high command has been a dismal failure in not standing upto its professional assessment and advice and plunging India in such hopeless military situation. Under such circumstances if civil supremacy was to be upheld, the Indian Army Chief should have resigned rather than compromising on sound military judgement and dictates. India is so hopelessly imbalanced and has made it so tempting for Pakistan that should it decide to exploit - India within a few days would be brought to the brink of a virtual defeat to avert which the Indian leadership may be left with no option but to go for the nuclear option which obviously will spell doom for both countries. Though Kashmir would be wrested and so would be Khalistan and the Tamil Land and in the south - but all these and many more geographical zones and Pakistan would take decades to reach even the present levels of developments.

Vajpayee's visit therefore be seen as a landmark in the relations between India and Pakistan. He has shown the statesmanship and the political maturity by acknowledging the reality of Kashmir and has thus broken the ice. We should not be worried too much by his post-visit statements. We must not forget that unlike Nawaz Sharif he heads a coalition government and that his coalition partners can bring him down any time. As such he has to make certain statement, for domestic consumption. Mian Sahib has one, he has many Qazis, Mian Sahib should consider seriously only what he conveyed in his one to one talk. Following the traditions of the Prophet (PBUH) agreement of Hudebia, the victorious entry into Makkah -he must give peace talks a chance. If the Indians take the sensible course and resolve Kashmir through plebiscite - it will open floodgates of prosperity and opportunities for the people of India and Pakistan in the form of:-

• No War pact.
• No First use of nuclear weapons.
• Mutual inspection of nuclear installations.
• Mutual ban on development of more nuclear weapons/delivery systems.
• Drastic force reductions.
• Abolition of Visas.
• No terrorist activities.
• Open trade.
• Competitions in all fields of sports.
• However should India play for diplomatic victories, the games foreign offices are best at, Mujahideen should not let the freedom struggle by them fall below the present levels. India will not be able to endure it beyond a maximum of three years - the worst will start with the next millennium when the Indian army will face the crunch of rotations in Kashmir where 100% will become due for 4th and 5th tenures. This will be the beginning of the end. India will start disintegrating from within as it happened to the erstwhile USSR.

Neighbour's Envy, India's Pride - How everything has been proved wrong to what this Paki has said - This is an 1999 articlet written by one of Pakistan's strategic thinkers and guess what, he was proved wrong? Sorry but sadly all that he has said is coming true for Pakistan - his beloved country.

President Eisenhower's Farewell Speech to the American People - 1961

Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961.

My fellow Americans:

Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation.

My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

II

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

III

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology-global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle-with liberty at stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small,there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research-these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs-balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage-balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between action of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

IV

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peace time, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even spiritual-is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been over shadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system-ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

V

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we-you and I, and our government-must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

VI

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose difference, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war-as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years-I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

VII

So-in this my last good night to you as your President-I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find something's worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I-my fellow citizens-need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.

Strategic Depth - 2 : IRAN

Patriotism is to support your country all the times and your government only when it deserves.

A catch 22 situation for us. There is strong need to keep the Iranian people on our side. Historically Iran has been a long time partner of India and we need to redevelop and strengthen our relationship. Never had we felt a need of a friend in that area than during the Khandhar hijacking fiasco. We had not even one friend to back our claims, support any action that we had contemplated nor suggested any remedies. That incident shook the top thinkers of our foreign policy and forced them to adopt a completely new approach towards Iran. We are now stuck with a position that Iran has or will shortly secure few nuclear weapons making it another atomic power in our neighbourhood. It is again a challenge that we need to make sure that even in the worst case scenario we do not close all channels of communications with the Shiite country. I also envisage that Iran would have far greater role to play in countries like Iraq, Lebanon and other countries having large Muslim Shia populations. For realising what Iran’s full role would be in such countries, we need to have a working knowledge of the Shia history and culture. Shia’s as a community have been persecuted since time immemorial and they see Iran as their natural holy land. It is akin to what Jews think about Israel. This is a major reason due to which Iran has remarkable inroads in Shia dominated areas of different countries including Indian cities like Lucknow, Delhi, etc.

In India Shia’s have been historically been better placed then the Sunni Muslims. They have had far less communal riots, discrimination and perceived lack of opportunities towards their community.

Shia’s world over have been in the forefront of education, knowledge, research and other progressive activities. Even within the different Muslim sects they are known to be the most advanced as far as women rights, family planning, general awareness, etc is concerned. In India they have had good representations in civil services, Army, police and other government organisations. In most such organisations, they have excelled and even retired at ranks like secretaries, DGPs, Lt. Generals which is very heart warming. This reflects the progressive nature of the community at large. They have however the sacrifice of Prophet Ibrahim engrained in them which they revisit every moharrum. This provides them the will and the strength to fight injustice, perceived and as well as real. For Iran as a country, it also serves as a deterrent as far as attacks on them by any other country are concerned. Most Shia’s realise that the Iranian revolution has not been a 100% success but with a dearth of alternates, this seems to be the best available choice. The fact that the world treats them as Arabs is most hurting for the Iranian people. Such a poor knowledge in the west of difference between Persian society and Arab society shocks the Iranian people. They are still amused that the Iranian president has been made most infamous by the west when in reality he does not yield any power in the real terms. He at the most is only the global face of the mullahs who run the Iranian power machine.

The poorly planned, even more poorly executed Operation Iraqi freedom and the resultant civil war has made most Iranian vary of contemplating a change in their government. The mullahs who were seen to be losing their grip on power in Iran have been bought back to the centre stage by President Bush’s Iraq policies. America will realise the complete implications of the fumbled Gulf War II in years to come. It should also be known that US and Iran has started some track II dialogues when Taliban has started ruling Afghanistan. This however proved short lived as the Gulf war II reversed all what had taken so many years to build. It should also be known that Iran has been one of the strongest barriers to the entry of narcotics to the western world from Afghanistan. The Iran border guards have one of the highest death rates while trying to fight Afghan Drug runners and smugglers. This should be viewed in the context of the fact that the best Narcotics come from the southern regions of Afghanistan which also borders Iran. It also is the most lawless of all the areas in Afghanistan and the only place where western powers can stop the activities of drug and gun smugglers is in Iranian territory and not in Afghanistan.

Look at the American track record with Iran. It says a lot to the shocking state in which U.S has been treating Iran and its people. They feel that the American far right then and the neo cons of the current regime in Washington have no other agenda except ruling their land through the creation of a puppet regime in Tehran. The activities of the CIA in league with the G-2 Desk at the pentagon has right from the over throw of the legally elected government of Premier Mossadeq in August of 1953 (Code named Op TPAJAX) to the accession of the Shah of Iran after Mossadeq’s overthrow to supporting the Iraqi dictator during the Iran Iraq war (even when he was using chemical and biological weapons against Iran), led Iranian people to accept the words of the Mullahs that Americans have no other agenda other than to make Iran a U.S backed banana republic. The facts on how the Americans had trained anti Mossadeq forces at Fort Leavenworth in the U.S and coordinated the entire exercise from SIS base in Cyprus has only added to lowering the credibility of any promises that the Americans might given to the Iranian people on the reasons for the impending conflict. The recent revelation that since the last 2 years, CIA assisted by the secret division of the Army’s green berets (who operate on U.S presidential orders within a country “perceived” enemy of the US even when they are not at war) have been scouting the Iranian country side try to finalise the locations of different American tactical bases to be used in the event of an Iran US war. This is in addition to the previous incursions that the Americans did in Iran for installing different equipments to measure the size, weight and even checking if any gasses are leaking from trucks which carry such nuclear materials on all roads which lead to a known nuclear site. These measuring equipment which is camouflaged as stones/rocks, in road signage’s poles and in ditches/culverts have been installed after India was successful in fooling the u.s spy satellites during the 1998 nuclear tests. These are to compliment the spy satellites that failed so miserably during the Indian tests. It is another story that none have detected any nuclear preparedness by the Iranian regime in the last 2 years. Iranians have always followed the IAEA except only once when lied about their links with the Pride of Jhootistan oops Pakistan Mr. A.Q Khan (Mr. Burglar). They have been supplied with some designs of the centrifuge by Mr. Khan and his “handsome young” male Sri Lankan companion in Dubai but that was the first and the last time the Iranian took AQ’s help.

Let us hope that the American people are able to oppose any violent intervention that these neo cons have in their plan for Iran. As for India, we will be faced with one more unstable “neighbour” and one less Muslim regime opposed or cold to Pakistan. In the future, our interests in Afghanistan have been designed to operate mainly through Iran. Iran has even at the best of times been neutral to Pakistan so it is Pakistan who would gain in case U.S backed regime is propped up in Iran.

In spite of all these facts the common Iranian does not have any bitterness towards America. They are more amazed than bitter seeing the way Americans are behaving towards their country. Iranians are not fools that they would not have made preparations to thwart the impending American attack. They in simple terms have been weaving carpets for more than 2000 years. They understand the intricacies of complex issues much more than the neo con crooks like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard pearl, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld or even their founders Irving Kristol or Norman Podhoretz or Leo Strauss did or do now. They have their own ways and means of equating their war with the Vietnam War of the 60s& 70s.

Strategic Depth - 1 : Wakhan

History is written by winners – Napoleon

What is meaning of the strategic depth that we say we lack? What has been our policy towards achieving it? I will illustrate just one example and try and tell how we are still stuck in the one track mindset that has plagued India since its re-independence from the British in 1947.

Our military policy towards Pakistan has been plagued by the thought that if we achieve military success in west Punjab/Sindh, what is it that we are supposed to do after we have achieved that? My answer is simple take your eyes off the easiest solution. Work out the most radical solution as that might be initially the most difficult but it could offer us the most stable solution. Let us think like the brilliant General K.S. Thimmaiah did 60 years ago and carried tanks into Ladakh. What he did was radical and that too 60 years ago, when we neither had the machinery nor the infrastructure to do the same. Lets us take a look at what Pervez mushraf did during Kargil. He started a war against India not from Kashmir or Jammu (where we had expected and had done some sort of preparation) but he started it from Kargil/Dras areas facing Skardu – Gilgit / Baltistan (all Shia dominated places). The Shia’s in Kargil/Dras have traditionally not supported Pakistan and the Shia’s in Gilgit have traditionally hated Pakistan and so that was a place where our policy makers just thought that pakistani's would never attack. They left those icy heights for gods to secure for us. The reality proved to be totally different; the general started a localised war and that too from these minority dominated areas. For Pakistan, the option is very simple – make Indian bleed with a 1000 cuts. They know that they would be defeated in all forms of warfare but they know that their limited success lies in adopting the most unconventional form of war doctrine. Their policy is to make the initial 2 weeks of blitzkrieg (like shock and awe) as their domain and by the time the Indian’s gather their forces, they would go pleading to their friends in China and the U.S state department to stop the war otherwise they always threaten that they would go nuclear.

What can our response be for such an enemy? Well first and foremost, change the complete focus of our attack policy on the western front. We know the fact that we can dominate the conventional war in Rural Sindh all the way up to balochistan, crossing through the Indus and its vast canals system. The problem is that the entire world knows the same and it is very easy for your opponent to devise a plan (nuclear or conventional) against that. It would also not serve any purpose if we divide Pakistan into different countries. So the realty is that we cannot leave it in a mess as we retreat, we cannot hold on to the land (as it belongs to a sovereign nation and we would be termed as aggressors), we cannot appoint a puppet regime and take out all gas from sui fields for our use and pay for the war. The longer we stay, more the chances that we would loose all goodwill that we have in rural Sindh and balochistan. It really seems like a catch 22 for our nation. But there is a solution, slightly difficult but there is a solution.

Let me first give the objective for the new policy - In any future conflict, reach the Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan from Kargil/Dras area. Take back the Gilgit/Baltistan Area from Pakistani control and re merge it into the Jammu and Kashmir state (just for the people who do not know, J&K assembly leaves vacant seats for the Pakistan occupied areas of the state).

What is so important about the Wakhan Corridor that I am asking my country to devise a policy that helps us reach the corridor at any cost?

First let me briefly inform about the history and geography of the Wakhan corridor and its adjoining area.

If any region of the country stands apart, it's the remote, sparsely populated Wakhan Corridor. Carved by the Wakhan and Panj rivers, the 200-mile-long valley, much of it above 10,000 feet, separates the Pamir Mountains to the north from the Hindu Kush (seat of the Hindus) to the south. For centuries it has been a natural conduit between Central Asia and China, and one of the most forbidding sections of the Silk Road, the 4,000-mile trade route linking Europe to the Far East. It also has the distinction of being the place where the sharpest change of clock takes place from Afghanistan’s +4.30 GMT to China’s +8GMT.

The borders of the Wakhan were set in an 1895 treaty between Russia and Britain, which had been wrestling over the control of Central Asia for nearly a century. In what was dubbed the "Great Game" both countries had sent intrepid expeditions into the region. Eventually Britain and Russia agreed to use the entire country (Afghanistan) as a buffer zone, with the Wakhan extension ensuring that the borders of the Russian empire would never touch the borders of the British Raj.

The Persians ruled the region in the sixth century B.C., and then came Alexander the Great 200 years later. The White Huns ruled it in the 4^th century A.D, Islamic armies in the 7^th Century, Genghis Khan and the Mongols in the 13^th Century. It wasn't until the 18^th century that a united Afghan empire emerged and after that came the British, in 1979, the Russians and now the Americans and their allies.

Only a handful of Westerners are known to have travelled through the Wakhan Corridor since Marco Polo did it, in 1271. There had been sporadic European expeditions throughout the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. In 1949, when Mao Zedong completed the Communist takeover of China, the borders were permanently closed, sealing off the 2,000-year-old caravan route and turning the corridor into a cul-de-sac. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, they occupied the Wakhan and started construction of a tank track halfway into the corridor. Today, the Wakhan has reverted to what it's been for much of its history; a primitive pastoral hinterland, home to about 7,000 Wakhi and Kirghiz people, scattered throughout some 40 small villages and camps. The only commerce is by Opium smugglers who sometimes use the Wakhan, traveling at night for their own objectives. Some of the areas are so poor and malnourished that something as small as iodine deficiency has contributed to multiple villages being full of people having mental deficiencies.

The Wakhi’s are a wiry tribe who have ancient persian roots and have lived in the Wakhan for at least a thousand years. They speak Wakhi, an old Persian dialect, and adhere to the Ismaeli sect of Islam. Their current borders are shared by Tajikistan, China and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

So what is there for India?

• We take back the Gilgit/Baltistan region which is rightfully ours.
• We would offer hope to the extremely poor and deprived people of Gilgit/Baltistan region. They have after 60 years of Pakistani occupation; fraud Judiciary, fraud infrastructure, a fraud council, etc (they could not expect much out a country which their founder Jinnah had termed as an experiment).
• We cut off the only land link between Pakistan and China.
• We have direct access to Afghanistan and also Central Asia which would help serve our strategic interests.
• It aids our strategic policy of encirclement of Pakistan that has been re enforced by the setting up of Ayni base in Tajikistan.
• It would help reverse the current policy of encirclement of India by Pakistan and China.
• We can strengthen our energy security by creating a pipeline which would carry the central Asian oil and gas thru Tajikistan-Wakhan-Gilgit/Baltistan (North Kashmir)-Kargil/Dras/Ladakh-Jammu-Rest of India.
• We block China's ambitious plan to construct a Beijing-Kabul rail link.
  

If and when we are in a war, start a front in Kargil – Dras – Ladakh region and that too not from a defensive corps/division but a strike corps formation. This strike corps should be well formed and even better equipped with at its fountain head being the special forces/Scouts/strike corps engineers, they being followed by mechanised divisions of regular infantry (High Altitude/Mountain) Troops and then these should be followed by regular forces and regular engineers. As this terrain is harsh and unforgiving, new and unconventional methods of forging ahead need to adopted. These methods maybe creating a supply chain through the frozen rivers in the area (as there are very few roads and this area is a watershed for many glaciers), maybe blocking or even diverting a river to create a dry river bed for our troops to move ahead on it, effective use of force multipliers like UAV, High Altitude-Long Range Guns, Mountain observation posts. The more radical one thinks, the faster our movements would be in such a terrain.

As the places from where the attack can be initiated are limited, we would need to start with the “Fountain head” approach – start from a narrow corridor and then move far and wide by occupying the heights. This way we can effectively control a large area from the mountain tops and block off any future attacks from the Pakistan’s (I hope the nation remembers the strategy adopted by Pakistan in Kargil).

The strength and effectiveness of the campaign will lie in the swiftness of our attack and our ability to reach our objective. This would virtually mean a dash for the Special Forces (path finders) units with a swift follow up by the regular forces. The entire operation has to be operated through the integrated defence headquarters (IDH) and not the DGMO. This is because we would need a completely integrated use of all your strategic assets at the time of his operation. The effective use of our Air Force would be the biggest strength this operation could gain by making the IDH rather than the DGMO handle the entire operation. The faster the path finder forces reach the wakhan, the faster the back up forces and the engineers would need to strengthen the Karakoram highway between shazin to bara khun. They would need to start a branch road to Wakhan from points like Sost or Passu on the Karakoram highway.

The civil departments would also need to be involved by starting immediately hospitals, post offices, Courts, telephones, paying government salaries, adding more jobs; in short getting the life back to normal. Employ as many people as we can (educated or uneducated), have no criteria for selection; just pay each and everyone a small monthly amount. It is always cheaper to have civilians control the area rather than the security forces. The faster normalcy comes on the ground the better our chances would be to have a stable and secure Gilgit/Baltistan under our belt.

History is written by winners – Napoleon