The past week was by all accounts a momentous one, as no less a person than former Pakistani President and former Chief of the Army Staff, Gen (Ret'd) Pervez Musharraf, assertively disclosed what has been a 'no-go' area for India's mainstream media and the otherwise hyper-ventilating broadcast media thus far: that India's Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has, since 2002, waged a highly successful covert war against Pakistan by actively rendering all kinds of financial assistance to Balochistan-based separatists. But mind you, such covert warfare has not been waged by the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), but by the tri-services DIA and Afghanistan's Riyast-i-Amniyat-i-Milli, and in addition to his routine assignment as India's Defence Adviser at the Embassy in Kabul, Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta was officially dolling out huge financial assistance as ordered by the DIA to the Baloch separatists as and when required. For the past one year such activities being undertaken by the DIA were, in fact, openly discussed by both serving and retired senior military officials at both the Armed Forces Gymkhana and the United Services Institution within the National Capital Region. It, therefore, did not come as a great surprise to South Block when Brig Mehta was specifically targeted for assassination by the Pakistan Army's Peshawar-based 324 Military Intelligence Battalion . This in many ways is reminiscent of the era ranging from the mid-1980s and early 1990s during which RAW had succeeded in gaining the trust of what would later morph into the Northern Alliance.
In fact, by 1986, despite India's official recognition of the then Soviet-backed Afghan regime led by Dr Najibullah, India had begun extending medical assistance to the guerrilla forces led by the legendary leader Ahmad Shah Massoud and as a consequence of this, one wing of the All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) was completely cordoned off by South Block and it was there that all those Mujahideen wounded in battle while fighting the Soviets under Massoud's leadership received the urgent medical attention that they deserved. So impressed was the Northern Alliance by India's humanitarian assistance that this relationship, at first opportunity, got elevated to a higher level when, in the early 1990s after the breakup of the USSR, the Northern Alliance succeeded in securing Tajikistan's approval for an Indian Army-run field hospital to be established at Farkhor.
1 comment:
Dear Air Marshall,
Please accept my apologies for posting some rather scathing remarks on one of your articles (which you have not allowed). Actually I am sorry that I did'nt know you were a retired Air Marshal. I thought you were an Arm Chair IAS chap sitting in MoD passing judgement on the fauj and IAF. Didn't like it.
I however still stand by my comments mainly :-
(a) The Army deserves its own chopper fleet. Just because MoD plays off one against the other (Army Vs Air Force) doesn't mean that the Army should not have its own fleet.
(b) "One size fits all" vs "All eggs in one Basket" does not work always (or even most of the times). Take the ALH. If the Army, Air Force and Navy are operating ALH (which isn't fit for any of them) and HAL decides that the fleet is grounded (because of yet another Gear Box failure), we will all be in the same boat-grounded and far from home (talk about jointmanship in a sentence).
(c) As of today we have completed the Annual Air Maint task. Army's demand was cut down by 30% last year. Just because we haven't got our act together with respect to our heptr fleet serviceability does not mean that Army should suffer.
(d) The IAF is run by fighter pilots who cannot see beyond their own kin (just like the IAS). Guys who have slaved in the heptr fleet (HCLs, AEB, DASI, COs and the works) have not got their ranks whereas jokers in the fighter stream have been made Gp Capts. It is a inequality which will have repercussions later. That is one of the reasons I said that the Army should have its own heptr fleet. The IAF has lost its ability and moral right to manage its heptr fleet.
(d) Army should have its own Medium Lift heptrs. For how many years can you make a chap fly a Cheetah, 5 Yrs- 10 yrs??. Stagnation and ennui ensues pretty quickly.
The Article bout Kargil (PAF view) was great. I had read a hard copy without knowing you had circulated it. Thanks.
Obviously, these comments are not for publishing. I just didn't have you E-Mail ID.
With Regards,
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